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and graduation rates of bachelor’s degree-seeking students. I use administrative
data from the State of Maryland to study the state’s largest need-based grant aid
program using a regression discontinuity design. I find positive effects of grant
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In the second chapter, I study State Loan Repayment Programs which pay
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health care provider shortage area. I gather data from individual states on the
amounts that their programs offer over time and use changes in designations of health
care provider shortage areas to implement a generalized differences-in-differences
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early career earnings.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In this dissertation, I examine the effect of three education policies that affect
student decision-making processes at different points during the academic career.
I examine how grant aid affects persistence and attainment of bachelors’ degree-
seeking students, how loan repayment programs can cause recent medical school
graduates to locate in provider shortage areas, and how career and technical training
in high school affects enrollment, degree receipt, and early career earnings among
Maryland students.
In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of receiving a $3,000 grant, renewable annu-
ally, on the persistence and likelihood of graduating among bachelor’s degree-seeking
students attending public institutions in Maryland. I use a regression discontinuity
strategy that exploits a cutoff in eligibility for the grant based on a threshold level of
financial need that a student must demonstrate. Using student-level, administrative
data from the Maryland Longitudinal Data System, I find that the receipt of this
grant, beginning in a student’s first year causes, a 8% increase in persistence to the
second year and this persistence effect extends to a 10% effect on persistence to the
fourth year. I find similar-sized effects on degree receipt within 5 years, though the
effects are not statistically significant due to imprecision caused by limits on the
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number of available student cohorts in the data.
In Chapter 3, I focus on State Loan Repayment Programs (SLRPs) which
provide payments towards reducing the debt of recent medical school graduates in
exchange for a contract in which a physician commits to practicing in a healthcare
provider shortage area. I use the Area Health Resource Files, which tracks the
number of physicians by county, and information collected from individual states on
the generosity and length of their SLRP programs. I use a generalized difference-in-
differences approach that utilizes changes in whether or not a county is eligible for the
SLRP benefits as well as changes in state program generosity over time to estimate
the effects of SLRPs on the physician-to-population ratio of a county. In general
I find no effect of the SLRP program on the overall physician-to-population ratio.
However, when I limit to the ages of physicians likely to have recently graduated
from medical school, I find suggestive evidence that the average SLRP increases the
physician-to-population ratio of a county, by an amount that is equivalent to 10% of
the difference between the urban-rural difference in physician-to-population ratio.
In Chapter 4, I examine the effect of completing a Career and Technical Educa-
tion (CTE) program in high school on postsecondary enrollment, degree completion,
and early career earnings. I utilize two complementary strategies to examine the
effects of CTE programs. First, using demographic, high school standardized test
scores, and school-level data for students, I use a propensity score matching (PSM)
approach to match CTE program completers with students who do not complete
CTE programs based on these observable characteristics. Using this method, I find
that CTE completion appears to be associated with a substitution away from four-
2
year college enrollment towards enrollment in two-year college, and positive effects
on early career earnings, on average. I examine the effects separately by broad fields
of study of the CTE program completed to look at program heterogeneity. I then
complement this strategy with an instrumental variables strategy using the distance
between a student’s high school and the nearest CTE Center, which provides many
CTE classes for the school district. I find that students closer to a CTE Center
are significantly more likely to complete a CTE program. Using this IV method, I
find that students induced to complete a CTE program because of how close their
high school is to a CTE Center are more likely to enroll in two-year colleges and
less likely to enroll in four-year programs, results that are consistent with the PSM
strategy.
3
Chapter 2: The Effect of Need-based Grants on Postsecondary Stu-
dent Attainment
2.1 Introduction
In the United States, federal and state governments provide nearly $50 bil-
lion worth of grant aid to undergraduate students annually [College Board, 2017].
By lowering the net price of college attendance, grant programs aim to increase
the number of students graduating from college. Only around 55% of bachelor’s
degree-seeking students complete their degree within five years [National Center of
Education Statistics, 2017]. Existing research documents substantial labor market
returns and other social benefits to college completion [Oreopoulos and Petronijevic,
2013] and negative consequences associated with leaving college without a degree,
such as a higher likelihood of defaulting on student loans [National Center of Educa-
tion Statistics, 2017]. Given the significant public investment in grant aid programs
and the known benefits of completing a degree, knowing when grant aid programs
affect attainment is of policy interest. Estimated effects of grant aid on attainment,
vary widely, suggesting that not all programs are equally effective, and that partic-
ular features of grant aid programs may enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of grant
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aid.
I estimate the causal effect of Maryland’s largest need-based grant aid program
on persistence and degree-receipt within five years for students at public, four-year
institutions. Using a discrete cut-off in eligibility based on financial need and a
regression discontinuity strategy, I find that first-year students who receive a renew-
able award of approximately $3,000 per year are less likely to drop out. Specifically,
recipients are 8%, 14%, and 10% more likely to reach the second, third, and fourth
years, respectively, than non-recipients, and I also provide suggestive evidence that
recipients are more likely to graduate within five years.
Besides the dollar amount provided to students, there are many other aspects
of grant aid programs that could influence their effectiveness in increasing attain-
ment. I exploit other features of the EA Program’s design to understand the effects
of a grant program’s structure. First, I use the fact that the EA Grant eligibility
thresholds vary over time to test whether the EA Grant has larger effects on lower-
income students. I find suggestive evidence that lower-income students experience
the largest persistence gains when receiving a grant. Second, I examine the fact
that the EA Grant is renewable, meaning that eligible students are automatically
eligible in subsequent years if they still have any unmet financial need. Specifically,
I compare the effects of EA Grant eligibility versus eligibility for the Pell Grant,
which does not have this renewable feature, and, among the same cohorts of en-
tering college students, provide suggestive evidence that the EA Grant has larger
effects on persistence. Finally, I use the eligibility thresholds a student would face
in their second year to test the effect of becoming eligible to receive the EA Grant
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in the second year versus the effect of becoming eligible in a student’s first year on
persistence to year three. I provide suggestive evidence that beginning to receive the
grant in the second year has little effect on persisting to the third year, in contrast
to the positive effect of becoming eligible in year one.
Eligibility for Maryland’s Educational Assistance (EA) Grant is determined
by a student’s Expected Family Contribution (EFC), a value calculated from the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) that indicates a student’s level of
need. The EFC is used as the basis for eligibility for many need-based grants, most
notably the federal Pell Grant. Each year the State of Maryland sets a threshold
level of EFC below which students are eligible for the EA Grant and above which
they are ineligible. I use the eligibility criterion for the EA Grant as the basis
for a regression-discontinuity design to estimate the effect of receiving a renewable
grant in a student’s first year on persistence, graduation, and early career earnings
using data on students at Maryland public, four-year institutions from the Maryland
Longitudinal Data System.
Students can become eligible for the EA Grant at any point during their
academic career if their financial need becomes large enough for them to qualify.
As a consequence, some students who are ineligible for the EA Grant in their first
year may receive the grant later in their academic careers, potentially leading to an
underestimate of the effect of grant aid using the standard regression-discontinuity
design. Grant programs can be structured in a variety of way, but one of the most
common is to provide a student support over four years of undergraduate study
as long as they remain at an eligible level of income. To compare eligible first-
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year students against an appropriate, policy-relevant counterfactual student who is
never eligible for any grant aid, I adapt a “dynamic” regression discontinuity model
of Cellini et al. [2010] and use the eligibility threshold in a student’s first year to
estimate the probability of becoming eligible for the EA Grant in later years. Using
the dynamic model, I can estimate the effects of first-year EA Grant eligibility net
of any effects for initially-ineligible students by using a recursive estimation process.
My findings contribute to a growing literature on the effects of grant aid on
college students’ persistence, graduation, and post-college outcomes. Literature
on the effects of grant aid on educational outcomes initially focused primarily on
whether grants induced college attendance among students who would otherwise not
have matriculated. In a survey of the existing literature Deming and Dynarski [2009]
find that $1,000 of grant aid generally increases enrollment by 4 percentage points
(p.p). However, enrollment effects depend on the type of program examined. The
Pell Grant generally has been found to have no effect on enrollment for traditional-
aged students [Hansen, 1983, Kane, 1995, Seftor and Turner, 2002, Denning et al.,
forthcoming], while other federal and state programs have shown positive effects
on enrollment [Kane, 2003, Dynarski, 2003b, Cornwell et al., 2006, Abraham and
Clark, 2006, Goodman, 2008, Dynarski, 2008]. Deming and Dynarski [2009] argue
that grant programs with simple to understand eligibility criteria are most effective.
Increasing college enrollment does not necessarily lead to increasing college
completion, and the returns to college completion substantially exceed the returns
received by college drop-outs. Bound et al. [2010] analyzed different high school
classes in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and the National Ed-
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ucation Longitudinal Study of 1988, and found that the 1992 graduating cohort
had higher rates of enrollment in postsecondary education than the 1972 class, but
worse graduation rates. In more recent cohorts, the rate of graduation has remained
largely stagnant in the four-year sector over the last 10 years [College Board, 2017].
Stagnant graduation rates are concerning, given that the net cost of college has
increased by 22% in the last 10 years. Student who enroll in college, but do not
finish are also particularly likely to default on their student loans [National Center
of Education Statistics, 2017].
Recent research on grant aid programs have examined outcomes beyond en-
rollment, including persistence, degree completion, and post-college earnings and
have generally found positive effects. Several studies have used regression disconti-
nuity strategies to examine state and federal grant programs. Castleman and Long
[2016] found that students who received $1,300 from Florida’s Student Access Grant
increased the rate of degree completion within six years by 22%. Bettinger [2015]
examined a change in Ohio’s need-based grant aid, which increased aid for some
students while decreasing aid for others, and finds that drop-out rates fell by 2% in
response to $800 additional in grant aid. Bettinger et al. [2019] study California’s
Cal Grant, which has both an income threshold and a high school GPA threshold for
eligibility, and find that Cal Grant receipt has no effect at the income threshold, but
at the GPA threshold receipt increases bachelor’s degree completion by 10%. Look-
ing at even longer run outcomes, they find a positive 3% effect effect on earnings
after graduation for students at the GPA threshold. Denning et al. [forthcoming] ex-
amine students who are more likely to qualify for the maximum Pell grant by virtue
8
of an “automatic-zero” EFC and find a 10% effect on bachelor’s degree receipt from
$700 additional grant aid at entry. In addition to the quasi-experimental evidence,
randomized experiments, such as that of Goldrick-Rab et al. [2016] and Angrist
et al. [2014] have also found positive persistence and completion effects of randomly
assigned grant aid to low-income students. Goldrick-Rab et al. [2016] found that a
$3,500 annual award increased degree receipt by 21% and Angrist et al. [2014] found
that a nearly $7,000 award and increased enrollment four years later at four-year
institutions by nearly 19%.
I add to this growing literature by estimating the effect of a large need-based
grant aid program. The positive effects on persistence that I estimate fit within
the wide range of estimated effects found by prior studies. My finding that grant
aid receipt appears to have larger effects for lower income students, contributes
to the few existing studies that have examined heterogeneous effects by income
of grant aid [Alon, 2011, Williams, 2018, Denning, 2018]. I also provide evidence
that aid received earlier during a student’s academic career has a larger effect on
longer-run outcomes. While other studies have not examined this effect for grant
aid, Conger and Turner [2017] find that college students’ degree receipt is more
responsive to tuition changes that occur earlier in their academic career. Lastly, I
provide suggestive evidence that the guarantee of receipt in future years for students
who receive an EA Grant aid may play a role in its positive effect using a comparison
to the effects of the Pell Grant. The study of the guaranteed nature of the need-
based grant is, to my knowledge, new to the literature on grant aid.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide
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a conceptual model that illustrates how changes in net tuition may affect a student’s
persistence, and how this effect differs when students are credit constrained. In
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I discuss the details of the EA Grant program and the MLDS.
Section 2.5 describes the empirical strategy that I use, while Section 2.6 produces
the results of the estimation. In Section 2.7, I provide evidence regarding the design
of grant aid programs. In Section 2.8, I conclude.
2.2 Conceptual Model of Persistence
Grant aid may affect persistence through several mechanisms, one of which
may be by relaxing credit constraints. Increased grant aid reduces how much stu-
dents pay towards tuition, which might allow some students to continue who would
otherwise be unable to borrow enough to continue their studies. The existing lit-
erature provides mixed evidence on the existence of credit constraints in higher
education [Dynarski, 2003a, Cameron and Taber, 2004, Lovenheim, 2011, Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo, 2011, Brown et al., 2011]. Related to a student’s level of credit
constraint, grant aid may also reduce a student’s need to work while enrolled. Stu-
dents who have exhausted their available credit or who face prohibitively expensive
credit might require income from wages in order to finance their education. Broton
et al. [2016] and Carruthers and Özek [2016] examine at the effect of grant aid on a
student’s propensity to work outside the classroom and found significant decreases
in the probability of working or earnings received during the school year.
To illustrate how changes in net price could affect both a students’ enrollment
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and persistence, I present a simple two-period model of student behavior adapted
from Altonji [1993], modified to allow an explicit cost to education that must be
paid every period (e.g. tuition and fees). At the end of high school, students have
imperfect information about their ability to finish college (and thus earn a higher
“graduate wage”), and must base their initial college enrollment decision on a noisy
expectation of their likelihood of college completion. Once enrolled in college, stu-
dents recieve updates to their information about their probability of graduation and
make a decision about whether to continue or drop out. Students enter each school
year comparing the expected net benefits of continued enrollment with the alter-
native of not enrolling and make a series of enrollment decisions. The idea that
students have incomplete information about their ability before attending postsec-
ondary education and subsequently learn about their own ability after enrollment
forms the basis of similar models, such as Arcidiacono et al. [2016], and has been
demonstrated to have an empirical basis by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [2014].
In period 0, representing the time in late high school and immediately after
high school graduation, students observe a measure of their own ability, A, which
could represent a score on a standardized test, such as the SAT or ACT. Standard-
ized tests provide some information about a student’s likelihood of graduation, but
other idiosyncratic factors, such as work ethic, health factors, etc., may also con-
tribute to a student’s probability of success. In period 0, the student must make a
decision about whether to enroll in college, or to begin working and receive the “high
school wage”. In period 1, students learn their probability of graduating college in
period 2, which is a draw from a distribution that is a function of A. Once students
11
observe this probability, they again make a decision to continue or to leave school
and earn the wage for having completed “some college”. In period 2, all uncertainty
is revealed, and remaining students either graduate and earn the graduate wage, or
fail to graduate and earn the some college wage. I assume that the student does
not know their draw of the probability of graduation at period 0, but does know the
wages corresponding with each level of education.
This timing can be illustrated in the following timeline:
0 1 2
Observe ability and make
decision to enroll or work
and receive high school
wage
If enrolled, receive draw
of probability of graduat-
ing in period 2. Decide to
enroll in period 2 or drop
out and recieve “some col-
lege” wage
All uncertainty is re-
solved. Enrolled students
either graduate and re-
ceive graduate wages or
drop out and receive the
“some college” wage
The probability of graduation, Pr(grad) = p, depends on ability such that
p ∼ F (p|A), where F (p|A) is the CDF of p. In period zero, a student observes A
and knows the conditional probability F (p|A), but does not receive a draw of the
probability of graduation until after enrolling in college. Once enrolled, a student
observes their draw of p.
A student’s earnings are expressed in present value and depend on the amount
of schooling received. Y0 is the earnings of a high school graduate. The earnings for




rates the return to the one year of education (r1), and is discounted to the present by
the interest rate, R. A student who enrolls in period 2, but fails to graduate earns
Y1
1+R
, while a successful graduate earns Y2 =
Y0(1+r2)
(1+R)2
, which incorporates the return
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to graduation (r2). I assume that all wages (Y0, Y1, and Y2) are known and certain
prior to the initial enrollment decision and do not vary with A or other characteris-
tics. The net price of education, T , must be paid each decision-making period. This
is the net cost of attending college, which is equal to the sticker price (or list price)
of tuition and fees minus any grant aid received, T = list price−grant aid. For the
sake of simplicity in the mode, I assume that T does not change between periods.
In each decision making period, students receive an endowment, representing,
for example, a transfer from a parent. The endowments in period 0 and 1 are ω0 and
ω1, respectively, and are draws from distributions, ω0 ∼ Ω0(ω0), and ω1 ∼ Ω1(ω1),
representing uncertainty over the income available to a student while enrolled in
college. For convenience, I assume that the two distributions are independent, but
the conclusions of the model would still hold if the two distributions were correlated.
The two endowments are revealed before each decision period (i.e. ω0 is known when
making the initial enrollment decision and ω1 is known prior to the re-enrollment
decision).
In each period, students are able to borrow and save. In period 0, if a student
decides to attend college in period 1, the amount of saving s0 = ω0 − T . Likewise,
the amount of saving to attend college in period 2 is s2 = (1 +R)s0 +ω1− T . I will
first present the model without any borrowing constraints on the student, and then
show the results with borrowing constraints (i.e., a lower bound on s0 and s1.
I work backwards from the student’s decision in period 1 about whether to
continue their education or leave school. I assume that students are risk neutral
to simplify the calculations, but this does not fundamentally affect the model’s
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implications. In period 1, p has been revealed, and the value function, or the
student’s expected value of each choice given the previous choices of savings and
enrollment, of period 2 is:
V (g2, s0) = max{pY2 +
(1− p)Y1
(1 +R)
+ (1 +R)s0 +ω1− T, Y1 + (1 +R)s0 +ω1} (2.1)
In words, a student making the decision to enroll in period 2 compares the
expected net value of enrolling in period 2, versus the net value of leaving school
and receiving the “some college” wage.
In period 0, the value of enrolling in period 1 is:
V1(A, T ) = E[V2(g2, s0)|A, T, ω0] (2.2)
Which is the expected value of V2 with respect to the distribution of the probability
of graduation and the distribution of the future endowment, conditional on ability,
tuition and the initial endowment.
A student decides to initially enroll if her expected value of enrolling is greater
than the high school wage, Y0. A student, therefore, makes the decision to enroll if:
V1(A, T ) > Y0 + ω0 (2.3)
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2.2.1 Effect of a Price Reduction Without Borrowing Constraints
Using this simple model, I now show how changes in college price could affect
persistence. Increases in grant aid affect the net price of tuition, so demonstrating
the implications of price reductions will be equivalent to the impact of increased
grant aid.
To make the model more applicable to my setting, I focus on the decisions
of students for whom Equation 2.3 holds (i.e., those who remain in college) and
analyze the effect of price reductions on the probability of persistence to period 2.
This effectively shuts down the effect of price reductions on initial enrollment. In
Section 2.1, I discussed how some programs, like the Pell Grant, have been found to
have no effect on initial enrollment, and in Section 2.6.2, I provide evidence that the
EA Grant has no effect on initial enrollment. Therefore, I treat tuition reductions
as if they occur after a student has already made their decision to initially enroll in
college. If the model were to allow initial enrollment effects, the effects on persistence
would affect initial enrollment through a student’s expectations in period 0.




− T > Y1 (2.4)
p >
Y1(1− 11+R) + T
Y2 − Y11+R
(2.5)
That is, if the expected net present value of enrolling in period 2 is greater than the
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net present value of leaving school. The proportion of students who decide to enroll
in an additional year of school is:
1− F (Φ(T )|A) (2.6)
Where F (.) is the CDF of the distribution of the probability of graduation, p,
and Φ(T ) is the expression in the right hand side of 2.5, which expresses the ratio
of the gains to leaving school after one year to the returns from a successful second
year. If there is a tuition reduction, T ′ < T , then Φ(T ′) < Φ(T ). Therefore:
1− F (Φ(T )|A) < 1− F (Φ(T ′)|A) (2.7)
Which means that more students will enroll in a second year when the price is lower.
However, despite the increase in persistence, the expected graduation rate, or the
average p among students who are induced to re-enroll in the second period will
be lower than the graduation rate of students whose decisions are unaffected by
price, as Φ(T ′) > Φ(T ). Students who did not previously find the next benefit of
continuing will now choose to enroll in the second period. Also, because the policy
is causing students with lower expected returns to re-enroll, this also implies that
there will be a reduction in the overall graduation rate.
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2.2.2 A Net Tuition Reduction When Students Face Borrowing Con-
straints
The above model allowed students to borrow in order to pay the cost of ed-
ucation each period. However, if students face restrictions on borrowing, then net
tuition reductions will also affect students at the margin of the borrowing constraint.
To illustrate the case of restricted borrowing, I simply require net saving to be
higher than some arbitrary lower bound, γ1. This credit constraint reflects the fact
that there are limits on federal loan eligibility, and that private loans carry higher
interest rates [Mazzeo, 2007] and might be limited in availability to students of lower
ability [Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011].1
This results in the following condition:
(1 +R)s0 + ω1 − T ≥ γ1 (2.8)
I again focus on students who have already made the decision to enroll in period
1. As p and ω1 are independent draws, a tuition reduction of T
′ < T would affect
the students at the margin of net benefits minus net costs according to Equation
2.5.
However, students will also face the margin of the second period credit con-
straint. Students will decide to enroll in period 2 if Equation 2.5 holds and if
1Dependent first-year students can borrow a maximum of $5,500 in federal Direct loans, a
maximum of $3,500 of which can be subsidized. Undergraduate students face an aggregate loan
limit of $31,000 over the course of their undergraduate career. Independent students have higher
borrowing limits.
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Equation 2.8 also holds. A net tuition discount will reduce the number of students
who drop out after period 1 due to credit constraints. The credit constraint binds on
the portion of the population that do not meet condition 2.8. Using the distribution
of period 2 endowments, Ω1, this portion of the population would be:
Ω1((1 +R)s0 + ω1 − T ) (2.9)
Therefore, the increase in the population that is not bound by the credit
constraint under the new T ′ is:
1− Ω1((1 +R)s0 + ω1 − T ′ − γ1) > 1− Ω1((1 +R)s0 + ω1 − T − γ1) (2.10)
In this model, a tuition reduction increases both the population unbound by
any credit constraints and the population that finds it beneficial to enroll in year 2.
This leads to an unambiguous increase in the proportion of initially enrolled students
who persist to period 2. Increases in grants will also lead to an unambiguous increase
in the proportion of students who initially enroll, now through an additional credit
constraint alleviation as well as an expected net benefit decision.
With the credit constraints, the effect of grant aid on the average rate of
graduation, p is ambiguous, as it will depend on which margin is most affected by
the reduction in price. As is the case in the unconstrained model, some students
who did not previously find the expected returns to a second year of education worth
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the investment because of the low probability of graduation and receipt of a college
graduate wage will decide to enroll in period 2 as a result of the price reduction.
However, in the credit constrained model, students of particularly high p may be
unable to enroll in period 2 due to credit constraints. If the proportion of high p
students that are constrained is large, then the average p among persisting students
could actually increase. In such a situation, a net tuition increase could lead to
both an increase in persistence and an increase in the graduation rate among the
students who decide to persist to period 2.
2.3 Program Description: The Educational Assistance Grant
The Howard P. Rawlings Educational Assistance (EA) Grant is the State of
Maryland’s largest need-based grant program, providing grant aid to students in
two- and four-year degree programs at postsecondary institutions in the state. The
amount awarded to a student is based on their level of unmet financial need, with
a maximum award of $3,000, and can be renewed annually. In the state fiscal
year 2015, the program disbursed 28,525 EA Grant awards to new and continuing
students, with a total expenditure of $61.1 million.
Students must complete the Federal Application for Free Student Aid (FAFSA)
to be eligible for federal grants and loans. Completing the FAFSA automatically
places students into consideration for an EA Grant. A FAFSA application, using
a complex formula, generates an Expected Family Contribution (EFC), which indi-
cates what the family of a student could reasonably contribute toward the student’s
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cost of education. The FAFSA uses many pieces of financial information to arrive
at an EFC, but a student’s EFC is generally correlated with their and their family’s
income (unless the student files the FAFSA as an independent student) and the
number of family members at home and in college.2 EFC is also used to determine
eligibility for other programs, such as the Pell Grant, the largest federal need-based
grant program, which offers a schedule of grant aid that depends on EFC and cost of
attendance (COA). The cost of attendance is determined by the school and includes
tuition and fees, books, expected living expenses and can vary by program and living
arrangements (i.e. whether a student plans to live on campus or commute). To be
eligible for the EA Grant, students must be MD residents, attend an in-state public
university full-time, and be degree-seeking.
To award the EA Grant, the state first determines a student’s unmet need
by taking a student’s cost of attendance and subtracting the student’s EFC, the
amount of Pell Grant awarded, and certain other state scholarships, such as the
Guaranteed Access grant, a state grant provided to as small number of students,
but that provides 100% of the cost of attendance to student’s whose families fall
under 130% of the federal poverty line.3 A student’s unmet need is then their cost
of attendance, less their EFC, Pell Grants, and state scholarships received, or a
measure of the amount that students are not expected to pay by federal formula,
but is not met by other forms of grant aid.
2The definition of independent for the purposes of the FAFSA is not the same as dependent for
tax purposes. Independent status is determined if a student meets certain criteria, such as being
older than twenty-four, having a child that depends on them for more than half of their support,
or being legally emancipated, among other criteria.
3The State of Maryland also adjusts each student’s cost of attendance using a regional cost of
living adjustment.
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The State of Maryland has limited funds for the EA Grant, and cannot fill all
existing unmet need. As a result, students with unmet need are sorted in ascending
order by EFC, and the state exhausts EA Grant funding up to an EFC cutoff. Above
this cutoff, students are no longer eligible for the EA Grant. Eligible students who
attend two-year and four-year institutions can receive grants equal to 60% and 40%
of their existing unmet need, respectively, up to the $3,000 maximum award.
In practice, the state sets an initial threshold EFC eligibility threshold based
on estimates of how many students will accept (or renew previous) EA awards in an
attempt to exhaust yearly appropriations. Students below the initial EFC cutoff are
notified of their eligibility and receive the award as part of their financial aid package
from their institution. Awarded students must return signed forms indicating their
acceptance of the terms and conditions of the award, certifying their eligibility,
accepting the length and amount of the award, and acknowledging the procedure
for renewing the award in the future.4. Students above the initial EFC cutoff are
placed on a wait list for the award and are accepted off of the wait list as the state
raises the cutoff EFC to distribute additional available aid.
Students may apply to multiple institutions and Maryland first determines
eligibility by the institution with the highest cost of attendance on the student’s
FAFSA. Students who then attend lower-cost institutions become ineligible for the
aid if attending the lower-cost institution results in no unmet need. This reduction
in expenditures increases the statewide EFC cutoff further, and the state offers more
4Based on state reports, this requirement to accept the terms and conditions is nontrivial. A
significant percentage of awarded students in a year do not fill out the terms and conditions and
then become ineligible for the grant aid.
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students aid who are on the wait list. A final EFC cutoff is determined in the fall
semester once the process of determining the pool of eligible students is complete.
In recent years, the final EFC cutoff has varied substantially from year to
year. A graph of the final EFC cutoff over time can be found in Figure 2.1, where
each academic year is represented by the terminal year (for example, 2013-2014 is
represented as 2014). The final EFC cutoff was higher than $8,000 in 2009, 2010,
and 2014, while it was lower than $6,000 in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015. In 2012
and 2015, the EFC cutoff was particularly low, at $1,500 and $2,610. To put this
context, an student with $1,000 EFC has an average household income of $45,000
while a student at $10,000 EFC has an household income of $87,500. A combination
of factors has led to this variability, including the difficulty of estimating how many
students will accept the aid and attend the institution that makes them eligible.
In addition, the state had awarded less than appropriated for several years prior to
2014 and decided to use that surplus in the 2014 year. The lower EFC cutoff in the
2015 year is a direct consequence of the large increase in awards in 2014.
2.4 Data and Sample
I use data from the Maryland Longitudinal Data System (MLDS), which con-
tains linked longitudinal data from three Maryland agencies. The Maryland State
Department of Education (MSDE) provides data on public PreK-12 students and
schools. The Maryland Higher Education Commission (MHEC) provides data on
Maryland public and private college students and colleges. The Department of La-
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bor Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) provides data on Maryland employees using
data from the state’s unemployment insurance database. The earnings data ex-
clude information for federal employees, military employees, individuals who are
self-employed, private contractors.
I focus on students who entered four-year universities in Maryland between and
including the 2008-2009 (2009) and 2015-2016 (2016) academic years. I construct
postsecondary enrollment histories for all students in the sample and use financial
aid data to create histories of students’ financial aid awards for each year of postsec-
ondary enrollment, and to determine eligibility for the EA Grant program. The final
sample of students used for the analysis is created using the following criteria: (1)
The sample is limited to students who completed a FAFSA, and thus have financial
aid data available to view EFC, COA, and adjusted gross income. (2) The sample
is limited to in-state, first-time, full-time, and degree-seeking students in order to
be consistent with the eligibility requirements of the EA Grant program. (3) In this
spirit, the sample is limited to students who have positive remaining financial need.
(4) Lastly, only students with available 12th grade public school enrollment are kept
in the sample. Using these filters, the overall analytical sample has 41,976 students
(38%) out of the total 108,110 full-time, first-time, degree-seeking students in the
Maryland higher education system over this time period.
The main outcome variables include probabilities of persisting to a given year
in college, probability of graduation within 5 years, and earnings in a given academic
year after entering postsecondary education. Indicator variables were created that
equal 1 if a student is enrolled X years later at any four-year institution serve
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as measures of persistence. A similar indicator was created for graduation, which
equals to 1 if a student receives a bachelor’s degree from the same institution within
5 years of entry. The earnings data were used to create measures of earnings within
an academic year. To align with academic years, earnings years were coded such that
quarters roughly match the academic year, thus earnings in the 2013-2014 academic
year are from quarter 3, 2013 through quarter 2, 2014. Any missing quarters were
coded as zero for a student, meaning that the workforce wages measures is the sum
of all observed wages (including zeros) for the academic year approximation.
Information from the FAFSA and financial aid received were used to deter-
mine EA Grant eligibility and as outcome variables to determine how a student’s
overall financial aid changes with EA Grant receipt. Aid awards were summed by
category for the first academic year. The categories, EA Grant aid, other sources
of grant aid, and loans from all sources during the first academic year were used as
dependent variables. After the first year, a student’s receipt of financial aid will also
be determined by whether they re-enroll, which would make the examination of the
effects on other sources of aid difficult.
Other demographic, test score, and income variables were included as control
variables. I observe a student’s race, gender, and ethnicity, as well as their level
of adjusted gross income (AGI) from the FAFSA application. I also observe SAT




The parameter of interest in estimating the effect of EA Grant receipt is the
effect of becoming eligible at college entry compared to a counterfactual of a student
who is never eligible for EA Grant aid. Since the EA Grant is renewable, the effect of
being eligible in the first year includes the promise that the grant will be available in
future years, so the estimate of first year eligibility includes this guarantee of future
price reductions. This is in contrast to many other grant programs, for example,
the Pell Grant requires a student to have a sufficiently low EFC in each year, so the
estimate of the effect of Pell Grant eligibility includes only the increase in grant aid
for the particular year a student is eligible.
The EFC eligibility threshold generates a discontinuous change in grant eli-
gibility which allows for causal estimates of this parameter using a regression dis-
continuity design [Hahn et al., 2001]. Consider a hypothetical student considering
enrolling in her first year of postsecondary education. I denote a student’s normal-
ized EFC, or the distance between her EFC and the threshold EFC that determines
EA Grant eligibility, as ˜EFC, and an indicator for EA Grant eligibility, gi as equal
to 1 if ˜EFC < 0, and equal to 0 otherwise. Denoting the dependent variable -
enrollment in year 1 - as y1i, then I can estimate the following regression model:
y1i = βgi + f( ˜EFC) + εi, (2.11)
where εi is unobserved variation in the probability of enrollment with E[εi] = 0, and
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f(.) is a flexible function of the running variable. The parameter β is interpreted as
the effect of becoming eligible for the EA Grant in a student’s first year on enrollment
in the first year. There may be reasons why eligibility of receipt of grant aid, gi may
be correlated with εi. Students who are eligible for grant aid have less family income
on average, which could, for instance, affect their ability to receive outside help with
coursework. However, if the unobservable factors correlated with gi are continuous
through the eligibility threshold, then within a neighborhood of the threshold, the
effect of EA Grant eligibility, β is identified by the discrete change in eligiblity at
˜EFC = 0 [Hahn et al., 2001]. Using notation, if the identifying assumption holds,
that, conditional on ˜EFCi, the unobservable component is continuous:
lim
υ→0
E[εi| ˜EFCi = υ] = lim
υ→0
E[εi| ˜EFCi = −υ] (2.12)
Then β is identified by:
lim
υ→0
E[yi| ˜EFCi = υ]− lim
υ→0
E[yi| ˜EFCi = −υ] = β (2.13)
Eligibility for the EA Grant, which renewable in every year that a student
remains enrolled, decreases expected net tuition for every subsequent year of enroll-
ment. If eligibility for the EA Grant was only extended to first year students, a
similar regression to Equation 2.11 could be used to estimate the effect of the EA
Grant on subsequent years of enrollment. These regressions would simply replace y1i
with y2i, y3i, y4i, or an indicator for graduation. Each regression would identify the
effect of EA Grant eligibility on persistence to a given year or graduation versus a
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counterfactual in which a student was never eligible for additional grant aid through
the EA Grant program.
2.5.1 Dynamic Regression Discontinuity
One aspect of the design of the EA Grant program that affects the interpreta-
tion of the estimated parameter is that students who are ineligible for an EA Grant
may subsequently become eligible for EA Grants in later years. An example of this
would be a student who is just ineligible for the EA Grant in their first year, given
their EFC. In their second year, the EA Grant threshold is more lenient (higher)
than in their first year, and their EFC now qualifies for an EA Grant. Once a
student becomes eligible, they may renew the EA Grant in any subsequent years
they are enrolled regardless of EFC, as long as they have unmet need. Subsequent
eligibility for students who were ineligible in their first year may be gained by a
change in family circumstances or by the threshold rising in a subsequent year (e.g.,
Figure 2.1). Students who enter in 2013 and are just ineligible by EFC are likely to
be eligible in their next year (2014) for a renewable EA Grant.
A consequence of a policy where ineligible students can subsequently become
eligible is that it changes the interpretation of the “control” group (those just ineli-
gible in their first year) compared to the treatment group. Some ineligible students
can receive treatment in their later years. For the sake of notation, I will consider
year 0 to be a student’s first year, and year 1 the second year, etc. If I want to
consider the effect of EA Grant eligibility in the first year on enrollment in year 1,
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then an RD estimation of:
y1i = β1g0i + f( ˜EFC0i) + εi (2.14)
identifies the effect β1, the effect one year after the beginning of the grant’s receipt.














It is possible to see how it is the effect of becoming eligible in the first year plus
a treatment effect for those in the control group that become eligible in the second
year multiplied by the probability that a student in the control group received
treatment. The quantity dgi,1
dgi,0
will always be negative in this context because a
student who begins to receive the EA Grant in year 0 will be less likely to begin
receiving the grant in year 1 (as they have already become eligible). Thus the effect
is smaller than the effect of becoming eligible for the EA Grant in the first year
versus a counterfactual in which the student never receives a decrease in price due
to the EA Grant due to the addition of this negative quantity.
To estimate a policy-relevant treatment effect - the effect of becoming eligible
for the EA Grant in a student’s first year - I adapt the “dynamic” RDD model of
Cellini et al. [2010]. In this model, eligibility for an increase in grant aid in the
year of entry can affect the probability of grant aid increases in the future years. I
consider a treatment indicator gi,t that is equal to 1 if a student i is permanently
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eligible for an extra amount of grant aid up to $3,000 in year t and zero otherwise.
To represent the renewable nature of the EA Grant, gi,t is an indicator for receiving
an increase in grant aid in year t that decreases tuition in each subsequent year after
t. As an outcome variable, I consider yit as an indicator for whether a student is
enrolled in year t. If the direct effect of receiving an increase in grant aid in year t−τ
on enrollment in year yit depends on only the number of years since the increase in







τ + εit (2.16)
or as the sum of the partial effects of the complete history of increases in grant aid.
The coefficient βDτ is the direct (D) effect of a increase τ years prior to t on yit,
holding constant any other increases in grant aid.
The direct effects are policy relevant. For example, a policymaker might want
to know what is the effect of providing a student an extra $3,000 in grant aid,
beginning in year 1, where the aid is renewable and the student knows that it is
guaranteed in all years, on the probability of enrolling in year 3. In a model using
yi3 as the dependent variable, this would be the effect β
D
3 .
An RD regression like that of Equation 2.11 could be performed on an indicator
for receiving a grant increase τ years earlier. Such a regression would take the form:
yit = gi,t−τβ
T
τ + f( ˜EFC) + eit (2.17)
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However, as explained above, the identified effect includes the direct effect of
a grant increase plus the effects on the probability of future grant aid receipt. This
regression identifies an “total” (T) effect, which includes the effect on future grant
aid increases.5 The total effect then is a combination of the direct effect of receiving
an increase in a given year and the probability that subsequent treatments will be
received. If receiving an increase in grant aid changes the probability of receiving
a permanent increase in grant aid in the future, βT1 will not equal β
D
1 . Equation
2.18, shows how, if the probability of receiving a permanent increase in the future




















where πh equals the change in probability of a grant increase in period t− τ +h due
to receiving a grant increase in t− τ + h.
As a concrete example, the effect in Equation 2.15 of receipt in a student’s






5In Cellini et al. [2010], the direct effects are called “treatment on the treated” and total effects
are called “intent to treat” effects, mirroring the language used in an instrumental variables setting.
Here I use “direct” and “total” to prevent confusion, because I will estimate the RD using a “fuzzy”
design.
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or the effect of receiving the grant in the first year on enrollment in the second year
plus the effect of receiving the grant in the second year on enrollment in the second
year multiplied by the change in the probability of receiving the grant in the second
year after receiving the grant in the first year.
In the case of the EA Grant program, students who are ineligible in year one
may receive the EA Grant if they qualify in a later year. This means that πh < 0,
and assuming that the direct effects are positive, then the βDτ > β
T
τ . Another way to
think about this is to consider the treatment and control group when the treatment
is receiving an EA Grant in the first year. If the probability of receiving an increase
in year 2 is affected, then the total effect incorporates the fact that some of the
initially eligible students received treatment.
2.5.2 DRDD Implementation
Following the method of Cellini et al. [2010], I implement a recursive estimator
which estimates the direct effects of receiving increases in grant aid by incorporating



























To estimate βT0 , I use an RDD regression of enrollment in year 1 on EA Grant
eligibility in year 1. For βT1 , I use an RDD regression of enrollment in year 2 on
EA Grant eligibility in year 1, and so on. The π effects are similarly intent to treat
effects, or the overall effect of receiving a permanent increase in aid in a given year
due to a change in receiving grant aid in the first year. For example π1 can be
identified by a regression of the indicator for receiving a grant aid increase on EA
Grant eligibility in year 1, and all other πs estimated in a similar manner. Once
the total effects and πs are estimated, then the estimates of the direct effects can
be derived, and standard errors for the D estimates can be obtained by the Delta
Method.
To implement the dynamic RD estimation, I first pool data from all of the
2009-2016 cohorts. I estimate the total effects via equation 2.25:
yit = β
T
t 1{ ˜EFCi < 0}+ ψ( ˜EFCi) + εit (2.25)
I choose a subset of observations within a bandwidth around the EFC thresh-
old. I use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2011] (hereafter IK) bandwidth selection
procedure to obtain a bandwidth of $3,500 EFC, but show the results are robust
to a variety of bandwidths. I use the second year enrollment as the outcome for
the procedure to obtain the $3,500 figure and apply this same bandwidth to each
outcome. The indicator function 1{ ˜EFCit < 0} is equal to 1 if the EFC is below the
threshold and equal to 0 if the EFC is above the threshold. The function ψ( ˜EFCit)
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is a flexible function of ˜EFCit. In my preferred specification, this is a linear term
in ˜EFCit, which is allowed to change in slope at the cutoff.
6 I also interact the
EFC functions with the cohort entry year allowing the slopes to differ by cohort
year. In each estimation equation, I also include fixed effects for the institution and
entry cohort, as well as several control variables, including race, gender, ethnicity,
and SAT math scores. Within the optimally selected bandwidths, I estimate the
coefficients using local linear regressions with a rectangular kernel.
I similarly estimate the change in the probability of beginning to receive the
EA Grant in a later year, corresponding to the πs of the dynamic model, using the
same procedure and bandwidth. I estimate:
git = πt1{ ˜EFCi < 0}+ φ(EFCi) + υit (2.26)
where git is an indicator for beginning to receive the EA Grant t years after en-
try. The coefficient πt is interpreted as the effect of becoming eligible in year 1 on
beginning to receive the EA Grant in year t.
I estimate the RD regressions 2.25 and 2.26 simultaneously using a seemingly-
unrelated regression (SUR) procedure where the two outcome variables are stacked.
This procedure obtains the βTt and πt coefficients and a covariance matrix of the
estimated coefficients. I solve the recursive model described in Section 2.5.1 for the
direct effects, βDt , and use the Delta Method to obtain the standard errors.
Until this point, I have assumed a “sharp” RD, or that eligibility in a student’s
6A first-order polynomial minimizes the AIC.
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first year perfectly determines EA Grant receipt. In reality, some eligible students
do not receive the EA Grant while a very small percentage of ineligible students
appear to receive an EA Grant beginning in their first year. The requirement to
complete paperwork to receive the EA Grant, as well as the late notice to students
from the wait list, is likely responsible for some of the non-receipt among eligible
students, while the data also may contain measurement error since student’s FAFSA
information is collected and provided as a snapshot in time, and can change due to
verification, professional judgment, and other subsequent changes.7 In the case of
a fuzzy RD, an indicator for eligibility in the first year would serve as an excluded
instrument for receipt in the first year.
In the fuzzy RD Equation 2.25, for βT to represent a causal effect, the re-
lationship between unobserved variables correlated with both Yit and git should be
continuous through the cutoff. A family’s ability to hire a tutor, for example, is likely
related to both the student’s grant eligibility and probability of graduation. For the
required assumption to hold, this relationship must not change discontinuously at
the eligibility threshold. If the effect of grant aid on outcomes is heterogeneous,
then, under an additional monotonicity assumption, the estimated effect is a local
average treatment effect (LATE), producing an estimated effect for the average type
of student induced to receive treatment by becoming eligible for the grant aid.8
7Since 2012, colleges have been required to verify at least 30% of their student’s FAFSAs, where
they choose several items from the FAFSA for which the student must provide the documentation
used to complete the application (such as income tax returns or W-2s) to the school. This can
result in a change of a student’s EFC. Professional judgment is a limited authority for a college to
change inputs to the EFC determination in special circumstances with appropriate documentation
8This assumption takes on additional significance in the case of pooling students who face
different eligibility thresholds. Cattaneo et al. [2016] show that the identified effect when pooling
across thresholds is a weighted average of the LATEs for each threshold, weighted by the probability
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I incorporate the “fuzzy” RD into the dynamic model with a first stage equa-
tion in which an indicator for receipt in the first year, gi0, is regressed on an indicator
for eligibility in year 1:
gi0 = δ1{ ˜EFCi < 0}+ ξ(EFCi) + κi0 (2.27)
I include this first stage by stacking Equation 2.27 in the SUR regression,
and using δ, or the effect of eligibility in year 1 on receipt in year 1 to scale the
direct effects. To illustrate, I compute the effect of becoming eligible in year 1 on





In Section 2.6, I provide estimates from both the static and dynamic models.
In a sense, the two models provide bounds for the true direct effect on persistence.
If students who become eligible for the EA Grant after the first year experience no
increase in persistence due to the EA Grant, then the estimated total effect from the
static will equal the direct effects. The dynamic model, on the other hand, makes
the assumption that the effect of becoming eligible for the EA Grant only depends
on the length of time since the start of eligibility, not the year in which the eligibility
begins. This means, for instance, that the model assumes the effect on persistence
to year 3 for someone beginning to receive the EA Grant in year 2 is the same as
a student faces a particular threshold and is a complier at the given threshold. Despite the local
nature of the pooled effect, I continue with the estimation procedure, noting the interpretation of
the effects.
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the effect of persistence to year 2 for someone beginning to receive the grant in year
1. In reality, the fact that beginning to receive the EA Grant in a later year means
fewer years of expected receipt would make it reasonable to assume that the direct
effects could actually decrease in later years. Under this assumption, the dynamic
model is providing an upper bound, in a sense, by projecting the same size effect
into later years (i.e., assuming the control group students who later become eligible
experience the same size persistence effects as those who begin receiving the grant
in the year of entry).
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows financial and demographic characteristics of the sample of
students who were potentially eligible for the EA Grant. Columns 1 and 2 show the
characteristics of all eligible students and those with EFCs that placed them in the
estimation sample, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 illustrate the differences between
EA Grant recipients and non-recipients in the overall sample of students.
The average student in the overall sample had an AGI of nearly $77,000 and
a cost of attendance of nearly $22,000. 36% of students received Pell grants and
nearly 40% received institutional grant aid. Three-quarters of students had a Direct
Loan, while 20% received funds from a Parent PLUS loans. Around 30% of the
total sample received EA Grant awards, and 61% had positive earnings during their
first academic year. The sample is 45% White, 6% Hispanic, 44% male, and had an
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average math SAT score of 541.
Restricting to students within the bandwidth eliminates high AGI students.
Within the $3,500 bandwidth, the average AGI was around $60,000. These stu-
dents were more likely to receive Pell Grants and institutional grants. While the
percentages of students with Direct and Parent PLUS loans were similar, the aver-
age amount of PLUS loan was smaller for the estimating sample. Students in the
estimation sample were less likely to be white and had lower math SAT scores.
Comparing EA Grant recipients versus non-recipients illustrates the necessity
for utilizing a quasi-experimental design to identify the causal effects. EA Grant
recipients have much lower AGIs ($50,194) than non-recipients ($87,752). They
were more likely to receive other types of grant aid and were much less likely to take
out Parent PLUS loans. EA Grant recipients were less likely to be white and male,
and had lower SAT scores than non-recipients.
2.6.2 Examining the RDD Identifying Assumptions
I examine the validity of the regression-discontinuity assumptions in two ways.
I first perform a McCrary [2008] density test to detect whether there are significant
differences in the number of students on either side of the eligibility threshold. I then
test whether there are significant differences in observable characteristics of students
on either side of the threshold. Significant differences in observable characteristics at
the threshold would be an indicator that correlated unobservables might also differ
for eligible and ineligible students.
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Looking for changes in the density of observations near the threshold is a
common RD diagnostic to check for evidence of sorting behavior that could bias
the estimates [McCrary, 2008]. In this particular setting, a McCrary density test
takes on additional meaning, as I only observe the EFC of students who enroll in
university and complete a FAFSA. If the EA Grant has an initial enrollment effect,
then the estimate of EA Grant receipt could be biased by selection into enrollment
in a public, 4-year colleges in Maryland.
Figure 2.2 shows a scatterplot depicting the number of students within $50
EFC bins by distance to the EA Grant eligibility threshold. The figure provides
no visual evidence of a change in the density at the threshold. Implementing the
McCrary test, I find a log difference in the density on each side is -0.003 with a
standard error of 0.06 indicating no change in the density at the threshold.
As an additional test I examine changes in predetermined demographic vari-
ables through the threshold. To create a demographic index, I regress a model of
persistence to the third year on race, ethnicity, gender, adjusted gross income, de-
pendency status, math SAT, cohort, and institution, and use this to predict the
probability of persistence to the third year for each observation. This provides a
single test of demographic similarity and avoids false positive problems created by
multiple hypothesis testing. I then regress the predicted dependent variable on
an indicator for eligibility and the linear function of EFC. Results of this test are
contained in the first column of Table 2.2. Tests for individual demographic charac-
teristics are presented in the remaining columns. Graphical depictions with binned
averages can be found in Figure 2.3.
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The estimated difference in the predicted probability of persisting to the third
year based on predicted observable characteristics is 0.004, and precisely estimated,
with a standard error of 0.005. Eligible students who are barely eligible for the
EA Grant appear to be similar to students who are barely ineligible in terms of
demographics that are predictive of academic success. Columns (2)-(6) of Table 2.3
show no significant differences in individual demographic characteristics.
One potential reason why the EA Grant might not affect initial enrollment
effects is due the final threshold being determined after students were admitted
off of the wait list. Recipients on the wait list often learn of their eligibility after
the start of the fall semester, limiting their ability to select into their first year of
university based on grant eligibility. Based on this evidence, I assume that the effect
of receiving EA Grant on the propensity to enroll in the first year is zero. This zero
estimate is then used in the DRDD estimation of the persistence and graduation
effects. To do so, I set the direct effect of EA Grant receipt in the first year on first
year enrollment equal to zero.
2.6.3 First Stage Effects on Financial Aid
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4, I show how EA Grant eligibility affects a student’s
financial aid in the first year of eligibility. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 graphically show
the average of the financial aid variables within $500 EFC bins by distance to the
eligibility threshold. When students receive state grant aid, other changes in their
financial aid can occur. Institutions offer institutional grant aid, and previous studies
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have found that institutions reduce their own grant aid in response to grant aid from
federal, state, or private sources [Turner, 2014, Angrist et al., 2014, Bettinger, 2015].
Students also can reduce the amount borrowed through federal loan programs in
response to grant aid. Understanding how a student’s financial aid package changes
helps understand the full impact of grant eligibility and provides a clear picture of
what the actual treatment is.
The first column of Table 2.3 and subfigure (a) of Figure 2.4 show that eligible
students received $1,621 more in EA Grants relative to ineligible students in their
first year. The second column of Table 2.3 and and subfigure (b) of Figure 2.4 shows
that EA Grant eligibility causes a 56.6 p.p. increase in the probability of EA Grant
receipt.
Eligible students receive significantly less institutional grant aid ($253), which
suggests that institutions react to additional grant aid from other sources by reduc-
ing the amount of aid that they provide, or “capturing” around 15% of a student’s
EA Grant in the form of higher prices. The 15% rate of capture is similar to the
estimate found by Turner [2014]. I find a statistically significant, albeit small in
magnitude, increase in Pell Grant aid for eligible students. Higher Pell Grant re-
ceipt would cause concern that eligible students are different from ineligible students
in an unobservable way that is correlated with Pell Grant receipt, but in Table 2.12,
I show that this difference in Pell Grant aid is due to two cohorts who faced EA
Grant thresholds which were near the Pell threshold, and when I remove these co-
horts the difference in Pell is no longer significant, while significant effects on other
outcomes remain, including the effects on other types of financial aid, persistence,
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graduation, and earnings. Column (7) of Table 2.5 shows no significant difference
in private scholarships received by EA Grant eligibility.
Combining the EA Grant receipt with the institutional decrease, there is a
reduction of -$184 in non-EA Grant aid among EA Grant recipients, and a $1,437
increase in total grant aid received due to eligibility (Column (6)). Subfigure (c) in
Figure 2.5 shows that EA Grant eligibility serves to increase the grant aid received
by students above the nearly $4,000 in grant aid just-ineligible students receive.
Therefore, an appropriate interpretation of EA Grant receipt is an exogenous in-
crease in grant aid among students who already receive considerable amounts in
grants.
Table 2.4 shows estimated effects of EA Grant (in $1,000) on student loan bor-
rowing. These estimates are obtained by using eligibility by EFC as an instrument
for the amount of EA Grant received (in $1,000). I find that $1,000 of EA Grant
significantly reduces a students total amount of loans received by $347. When I
disaggregate the outcome by type of loan, I find that this effect is largely driven by
a decrease in the Parent PLUS loans, with a significant decrease of $232 per $1,000
of EA Grant. The effect on Direct and private loans are also negative but small and
statistically insignificant.
These results indicate that first year EA Grant eligibility leads to an overall
increase in the amount of grant aid received. However, understanding how a stu-
dent’s financial aid changes in response helps understand the overall treatment and
potential mechanisms. The grant aid response indicates a substantial decrease in
institutional grant aid, and thus the effect of EA Grant receipt on academic out-
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comes includes the fact that as student’s total grant aid increase is smaller than
the increase in EA Grant aid. The reduction in Parent PLUS loans may indicate a
mechanism by which students’ families react to additional grant aid. Parent PLUS
loans are carry higher interest rates and can only be received by a dependent stu-
dent’s parents. This may indicate that when students receive additional grant aid,
there is a shift of some of the grant aid as a transfer to the the student’s parents.
2.6.4 Effects on Persistence and Graduation
Figure 2.6 shows graphs of the average rates of persistence to the second,
third, and fourth years, as well as graduation within five years by distance to the
EA Grant eligibility threshold of a student in their first year. Each of the graphs
show a jump in the average probability of persisting to a given year and graduating
within 5 years at the eligibility threshold.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the effects from my main specifications on
academic persistence and the probability of graduating within five years of entering
college. It is organized into two panels. Panel A provides the static RD estimates,
and thus represents an estimate in which some of the “control” group may eventually
receive the EA Grant. Panel B incorporates the dynamic model to account for
control group contamination. Each panel presents the first stage estimate of the
effect of eligibility on the probability of receiving an EA Grant in student’s first
year, a reduced form estimate of the outcome variable on EA Grant eligibility, and
a Wald estimate to estimate the effect of first year EA Grant receipt on the outcome.
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The dynamic estimation affects the reduced form, and as a result, the Wald estimate
if there are students who receive EA Grant beginning in later years. Standard errors
are provided in parentheses and a 95% confidence interval is presented for the Wald
estimates in each panel. Each dependent variable is an indicator for enrollment
at the same institution or graduation from a four year institution within 5 years.
Persistence to the fourth year only uses data from the 2009-2015 entering cohorts,
and graduation within 5 years only uses data from the 2009-2013 entering cohorts.
First year EA Grant receipt has statistically significant effects on persistence
to a student’s second and third years (p < 0.05) and the fourth year (p < 0.10) of
6.5 p.p, 9.1 p.p., and 5.9 p.p., respectively. EA Grant receipt leads to an increase in
5-year bachelor’s degree receipt, of 4.3 p.p., but this effect is less precisely estimated
and is statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p = 0.10). In Panel B, which
reports the estimates with the dynamic estimation, the effects on persistence to the
3rd and 4th years are larger (10.2 p.p. and 7.6 p.p, respectively). The estimate for
graduation within 5 years increases to 6.5 p.p., but remains statistically insignificant.
These estimates are sizable in percentage gains relative to barely ineligible
students. Using the preferred dynamic estimates, the effects of receiving the EA
Grant at college entry, are 7.7%, 13.6%, and 10% increases in the probabilities of
persisting to the second, third, and fourth years, respectively. These results are
comparable to estimated effects of need-based grants in other settings. Goldrick-
Rab et al. [2016] found that an annual award of $3,500 increased graduation within
four years by 4.7 p.p. (21%). Castleman and Long [2016] found that an additional
$1,300 award that was rarely received past the first year led to an increase of 4.6
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p.p. (22%) in bachelor’s degree receipt within six years. Denning et al. [forthcoming]
found that an $750 increase in first year grant aid, and a $1,012 increase in grant
aid over a students academic career lead to a 3.3 p.p. (11%) increase in earning a
bachelor’s degree.
The EA Grant offers a max of $3,000 per year and on average spends $5,793
on each first year recipient over their entire enrollment in college.9. The percentage
point effect of the EA Grant is comparable to the estimates of these other studies,
but is smaller in percentage terms, especially when compared to the dollars spent.
This may be due to, in part, the slightly higher baseline rates of persistence and
graduation in my sample: 71% and 62% of my sample persist to the fourth year
and graduate within five years, respectively. As described above, 55% of four-year
students graduate within 5 years, and in the sample of some of the above studies,
that percentage is lower.10
2.6.5 Earnings
In Table 2.6, I examine the effects of EA Grant receipt on early career earnings.
Improvements in persistence and graduation are of interest to economists because
of documented returns to completing a degree [Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013].
Examining early career earnings allows me to test whether the increase in persistence
translates into greater earnings, which, in turn, can provide insight into the type
of marginal student that is being induced to continue in their education due to the
9To obtain this estimate, I perform the same dynamic estimation procedure as Table 2.5, but
instead use the amount of EA Grant in each year as the dependent variable
10Castleman and Long [2016] have an average graduation rate from a four-year institution of
16% in their sample of all Florida high school graduates.
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additional grant aid (e.g., like the students induced to continue education in Section
2.2).
Table 2.6 presents the results using earnings during the academic year as out-
come variables.11 These regressions implement the IV estimator without using dy-
namics, as in Panel A of Table 2.5, since the dynamic model cannot be applied to
earnings in the same way as probabilities of persistence. Therefore these estimates
are underestimates in the case of any control group students experiencing a posi-
tive effect on later earnings from EA Grant eligibility in years after the first year.
Earnings in the 5th, 6th, and 7th years after entry use 2012, 2011, and 2010 as the
final cohorts of the sample, respectively. This can be seen in the declining number
of observations in each column. All dependent variables are inclusive of zeroes, or
students who do not have any positive earnings in Maryland UI covered sectors.
Examining the first column, I first test whether EA Grant recipients have
differential earnings in the first year that they receive the EA Grant. This is a test
of whether EA Grant receipt changes the extent to which students work outside of
school. If find a small and statistically insignificant difference of -$170, indicating
that the EA Grant receipt does not appear to significantly affect how much students
work during school. However, the size of the estimate and its standard error, $238,
does not rule out the types of significant effects found in other studies, such as
Broton et al. [2016].
Due to the decreasing sample size, the standard errors on the outcomes in
11Earnings are only available for students who work in the private-sector in the state of Maryland.
If grant aid causes students to be more likely to remain in MD, this could have an upward bias on
the earnings estimates.
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columns (2)-(4) become fairly large. In column (2), the estimate on annual earnings
during the 5th year is fairly small, at $526, however, columns (3) and (4) find large
effects on annual earnings during the 6th and 7th years of $5,662 and $10,174, re-
spectively. These estimates are significant at the 90% and 95% respectively. These
estimates represent a 26% and 41% increases in average annual income, respectively.
These estimates are large, but are also more sensitive to changes in bandwidth se-
lection and functional form than the effects on persistence, as shown in the following
section.
2.6.6 Robustness
I show the robustness of the main results to different bandwidths and specifi-
cations in Tables 2.7 through 2.9. Each table includes the estimated first stage effect
of eligibility on receiving an EA Grant in the first year, as well as the estimated
effect of EA Grant aid receipt in the first year on institutional grant aid and loans,
persistence to a given year, and earnings. To keep the robustness tests simple, I
examine only the effects without incorporating the dynamic framework.
In Figure 2.7, I plot the main persistence estimates by bandwidth to illustrate
how the estimates vary with bandwidth choice. The solid line is the estimated effect,
while the dotted line represents the 95% confidence interval. Estimates are slightly
larger at smaller bandwidths, particularly less than $2,000 EFC, but are also less
precise. Above a bandwidth of $2,000, the estimates are quite stable and do not
show large changes with changes in the bandwidth choice.
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Table 2.7 shows in greater detail how the estimate changes with bandwidth
in $1,000 increments, from $1,000 to $5,000. The IK bandwidth used in the main
effects estimation was $3,544. In general, it is possible to see that most estimates are
fairly robust to changes in bandwidth, and, as should be expected, standard errors
decrease with increases in the bandwidth. The first stage estimate ranges between 52
p.p. and 58 p.p. increase in the probability of receiving EA Grant in the first year.
The amount of institutional grant captured by the institution increases with the
bandwidth, from -$234 to -$512, but above $3,000 EFC find a significant decrease
in institutional grant aid. The loan effect is fairly similar across specifications as
well.
In all of the persistence specifications, the estimated effect decreases slightly
with an increased bandwidth, but in all specifications show positive effects on persis-
tence and graduation. The second and third year effects are statistically significant
at all bandwidths, while the fourth year effect is only marginally significant at band-
widths near the IK optimally chosen bandwidth. The largest differences in point
estimates due to bandwidth occur in the earnings estimates. At most bandwidths,
the first year earnings estimate is small and statistically insignificant. Earnings in
the 5th and 6th years varies with bandwidth choice, though the standard errors are
fairly large to begin with. The earnings in the 7th year estimates are more stable
across bandwidths with marginally significant effects near the IK bandwidth. From
Table 2.7, most of the main results appear to be robust to large changes in the
choice of bandwidth, with the exception of the earnings estimates, which vary more
widely.
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In Table 2.8, I show that the main effects are robust to changes in the specifi-
cation and use of controls. Column (1) shows the effects without any controls and
without interacting the linear EFC function with the cohort indicators. Column
(2) includes the cohort interaction, Column (3) adds institution fixed effects, and
Column (4) adds individual demographic, income, and test score covariates. None
of the estimates of the main effects appear particularly sensitive to these functional
forms and control inclusion options.
In Table 2.9, I show that my main estimates appear robust to the degree of
polynomial used in the EFC function. Based on minimizing the Akaike Information
Criterion, a linear function is used in the preferred specification. In Table 2.9, I
show how the main results change if a quadratic or cubic polynomial is used. The
use of higher order polynomials increases the standard error of the estimates, but
otherwise does not appear to result in large changes in the point estimates. One
exception to this generalization is the effect on institutional grant aid in the first
year. The effect on institutional grant aid is positive and significant with the use of
a linear function, but negative and insignificant with a quadratic, and positive but
insignificant with a cubic.
In Tables 2.10 and 2.11, I show how the earnings estimates differ by choice of
bandwidth and choice of polynomial. Table 2.10 shows that the effect on earnings
six year after entry, for example, ranges from $11,102 at $1,000 EFC to $1,619 at
$5,000 EFC. Earnings seven years after entry also vary greatly by bandwidth and
the estimates at $3,000 and $4,000 EFC are even much smaller than the estimate
at the $3,500 optimal bandwidth. Table 2.11 tells a similar story with the choice
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of polynomial. The large, significant effect on earnings in the seventh year after
entry decrease to a much smaller and statistically insignificant effect at second and
third order polynomials of EFC. These results suggest that the large earnings effects,
while consistent with increased persistence, should nevertheless be interpreted with
caution, given their sensitivity to specification.
I show additional robustness tests that test some data restrictions. In Table
2.12, I show that two years in which the EA Grant threshold was near the Pell
threshold is primarily responsible for the significant difference in Pell Grant aid
between EA Grant eligible and ineligible students. The main persistence results
are robust to excluding these two years. After removing these two cohorts, the
effect of receipt on Pell is effectively 0, while I find significant effects of 9 p.p., 10
p.p., and 7 p.p. on persistence to the second, third, and fourth years, respectively.
This indicates that the main results of the paper are unlikely to be driven by any
interaction with Pell Grant receipt.
Additionally, one concern with pooling all cohorts together by distance to
the threshold and choosing one bandwidth is the asymmetry in cohorts represented
below and above the threshold. In some years, the threshold was quite low, under
$2,000, so the population of students with normalized EFCs less than $1,500 is not
going to contain students from all cohorts. The same is not true above the EFC
threshold. To understand whether the estimates may be sensitive to this, I limit
the lower bandwidth to $1,500. Table 2.13 shows that even with the truncated
lower bandwidth, I still find similar significant effects on a student’s financial aid
and persistence responses. This would suggest that the mix of cohorts represented
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below the threshold do not impact the main effect estimates.
In another robustness test, I examine the changes around the “initial” thresh-
old, or the threshold that the state initially chooses before students are made eligible
from the wait list. Students from the wait list are unlikely to see initial enrollment
effects as they often do not learn about their EA Grant eligibility until the fall
semester. Students initially eligible, however, find out that they are eligible dur-
ing the normal financial aid cycle, or in April, and this could possibly affect their
enrollment decisions.
Figure 2.8 shows the density of students around the initial threshold. I do
not see visual evidence of a decrease in the density at the eligibility threshold that
would indicate an enrollment effect. A McCrary [2008] density test finds a log
difference in height of -0.033 with a standard error of 0.08, a large standard error
that makes the estimate difficult to interpret. In Table 2.14, I show the differences in
demographic characteristics of students at the initial threshold. I find no evidence of
significant differences between initally eligible and wait list eligible students. Table
2.15 shows the effects of EA Grant probability, institutional grant aid, total loans,
and probability of enrolling in year 2 using the initial threshold. I do not see a
significant difference in EA Grant receipt or institutional grant aid, but do find
a significant decrease in total loans of $867, though the effect is not statistically
distinct from the effect using the wait list threshold. Learning about an award
earlier might give students more of an opportunity to change the amount of loans
they accept, which may become more difficult once a semester begins. I find no
significant effect on persistence to the second year for learning about an award in
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April rather than the fall semester. The sum total of these estimates suggest that
learning about the EA Grant earlier does not lead to an initial enrollment effect,
but may lead students to accept loans of smaller amounts.
2.7 The Effects of Program Design
Several aspects of the EA Grant program provide an opportunity to examine
whether grant aid is more effective when: 1) targeted at relatively lower-income
students 2) guaranteed if a student re-enrolls and 3) provided earlier in a student’s
academic career.
First, the varying eligibility thresholds over the years I examine offers an op-
portunity to examine heterogeneity by student income. Students at different levels
of EFC possess different family resources, so examining differential responses for
students of different thresholds amounts to examining heterogeneous effects by fam-
ily resources. To do this, I implement the same dynamic estimation procedure as
described in the previous subsection, but interact the EA eligibility variable with
the cohort year. I use the same IK bandwidth as optimally chosen for the pooled
estimation. One consequence of this bandwidth choice is a lower degree of power
after looking separately at each threshold. I, therefore, group the cutoffs into two
groups, “low” EFC and “high” EFC, and estimate the effects for each group. This
provides an estimation of the effect of EA Grant receipt in year on persistence to a
given year for low- and high-income individuals.
I supplement this analysis with another measure of income available in the
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data. I use a student’s free-and-reduced-price meals (FARMs) status in high school
as another measure of low socio-economic status and interact EA Grant eligibility
with an indicator for students having FARMs status in their senior year of high
school.
Second, I test for whether a grant is more effective if guaranteed in future
years by comparing the effects of receipt of the EA Grant with that of receipt of the
Pell Grant. The Pell Grant is the largest, and most well-known source of federal
grant aid. Though there are several differences between the EA Grant and the Pell
Grant, one major difference is that the Pell Grant requires an eligible EFC in every
year of receipt, while the EA Grant is renewable for four subsequent years once a
student becomes eligible. This enables me to estimate the RD effect of EA Grant
aid and Pell Grant aid on the same sample and use the comparison to understand
the effect of renewability on a program’s effectiveness.
Lastly, I examine whether the EA Grant is more effective if received earlier
in a student’s academic career. I use an indicator for whether a student becomes
eligible in their second year for the EA Grant by using their second year EFC as an
instrument for beginning to receive the EA Grant in the second year and compare
this estimate with estimated effects of persistence due to eligibility beginning in the
first year.
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2.7.1 Targeting by Income
In Table 2.16, I examine the differences between the “low” and “high” thresh-
old groups as defined above to examine whether there are differential effects for
students of different levels of income. Panel A corresponds to students facing low
thresholds and Panel B corresponds to high thresholds. In each panel, the dynamic
estimation is used.
Examining the Wald estimates, students facing low thresholds experience in-
creases in persistence that are much larger than the point estimates for students
facing high thresholds. Lower-income EA Grant recipients have an effect of 9.7 p.p.,
11.3 p.p, 7 p.p, and 12.4 p.p. on persistence to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and graduation
in the 5th year, respectively. The same effects for the high thresholds are 3.1 p.p.,
4.1 p.p., 5.8 p.p., and 0.001 p.p.. The estimates for the low group are statistically
different from zero for the 2nd and 3rd year effect. Splitting the sample into two
groups increases the standard error for each group significantly. As a result, the
estimates for each group are fairly imprecise and I cannot reject the hypothesis that
students of different incomes experience equal effects of grant aid.
As a supplement to the “high” versus “low” strategy, I also report the results
of interacting EA Grant receipt with a students FARMS status, as a proxy for low
socio-economic status. Table 2.17 shows the results of this estimation, and to keep
the estimation simple, I report only the static RD results. The first row shows the
effect of receiving EA Grant in the first year on persistence to years 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, while the second row shows the additional effect from the interaction
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with receipt and FARMS status. There is a significantly larger effect for FARMS
students, 8 p.p. in persistence to years 2 and 4, with a positive but statistically
insignificant 4 p.p. estimate on the interaction for year 3. The positive estimates
for FARMS students provide additional evidence that the effect may be larger for
students of relatively lower-income backgrounds.
2.7.2 Guarantee of Future Eligibility
I next contrast the effects of EA Grant eligibility with those of the Pell Grant.
The Pell Grant is awarded to student on the basis of their cost of attendance and
EFC. As the cost of attendance is similar across students in my sample of Maryland
public four-year institutions, Pell receipt is also determined according to a student’s
EFC. The Pell grant is awarded in decreasing amounts up to a maximum EFC
threshold, but the minimum Pell award is between $500-$600, depending on the
given year, producing a discontinuity. I compare effects using both the Pell Grant
and EA Grant discontinuities in Table 2.18.
Columns (1) and (2) present the first stages for the Pell and EA Grant awards
in a student’s first year, respectively. I do so in dollar terms by regressing the average
award on an indicator for eligibility. I find that just-Pell eligible students receive
$536 in additional Pell Grant, compared to the $1,677 received on average by eligible
EA Grant students. In Columns (3) and (4), I present the IV estimates of the effect
of $1,000 of Pell or EA Grant on persistence to the second year. I find that the
EA Grant has a statistically significant (p < .05) 2 p.p. effect on persistence to the
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second year, while Pell Grant receipt has a statistically insignificant from zero -0.01
effect on persistence to the second year. A null effect on persistence for students
at the upper limit of eligibility of the Pell Grant is consistent with similar work by
Marx and Turner [2015], who estimate no persistence effects for Pell Grant recipients
at City of New York institutions. Denning et al. [forthcoming] find positive effects
of the Pell Grant recipients in Texas, but using a different margin, the “automatic
zero” EFC, which affects students of such low resources that they qualify for a zero
EFC. Therefore their complier population is not as directly comparable to that of
this paper.
I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two grants produce the same
persistence effects, due to the size of the standard errors. Nevertheless, these results
may be suggestive of a differential effect for the EA Grant versus the Pell Grant.
This difference may be due to the fact that EA Grant is guaranteed for students
into future years as long as they have remaining financial need and maintain full-
time enrollment, while Pell Grant students must meet the eligibility threshold in
any given year, making receipt of future awards less certain.
2.7.3 Receipt at Entry Versus Later Years
Aspects of the administration of the EA Grant program provide an opportunity
to examine the effects of timing of grant aid receipt. Students who are not eligible
in their first year might later become eligible if their EFC changes or the eligibility
threshold falls. In Table 2.19, I use the threshold that students face in their second
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year, which is often different from the threshold of their first year, to identify the
effects of beginning to receive the EA Grant in the second year.. In Column (1) I
estimate that students who are just-eligible by EFC in their second year are 37 p.p.
more likely to begin receiving EA Grant aid in their second year than students who
are ineligible. This effects is not 1 due to the fact that many students receive the
EA Grant in their first year, as well as for some of the other reasons of “fuzziness”
identified earlier. I then estimate the effect of beginning to receive EA Grant aid
in year 2 on persistence to the third year. The reduced form and IV estimates are
found in Columns (2) and (3).
I find no evidence of a positive effect for students who begin receiving EA Grant
aid in year 2. Beginning to receive EA Grant in the second year has a statistically
insignificant -0.01 effect on persistence to the 3rd year. Though the standard error
of this estimate is fairly large, at 0.04 p.p., the estimate is statistically distinct from
the estimate of persistence to the 3rd year in Panel B of Table 2.5, or the effect
for students who begin receiving EA Grant in the first year. This estimate would
suggest that earlier receipt of the EA Grant could have larger effects on persistence.
2.8 Conclusion
I estimate the effect of the Maryland Educational Assistance grant on academic
persistence, graduation, and early career earnings using a regression discontinuity
strategy based on the level of need that the State of Maryland sets as an eligibility
cutoff. Using this method, I find that receiving a renewable award in a students first
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year leads to a 10% increase in the probability of persisting to the fourth year, and
find an statistically insignificant, but positive effect on the probability of graduation
within 5 years.
Additionally, I investigate three other aspects of grant program design in order
and provide suggestive evidence that other parts of a grant program’s structure
might influence the magnitude of the program’s effect. First, using the fact that
eligibility thresholds varied over time, I find that the effects for relatively lower-
income students appear to be larger than those for higher-income students. Second,
I compare the renewable EA Grant program, which provides a guarantee of the
award in each year a student re-enrolls, with the Pell Grant, which does not have
this property, and provide evidence that the EA Grant has a larger effect. Finally, I
show evidence that receiving the EA Grant in a student’s first year has larger effects
on persistence to the third year than if a student began receiving aid in year two.
Though future studies would be necessary in providing stronger evidence about
these aspects of program design, these estimates have several policy implications for
the design of grant aid programs. They would suggest that a grant aid program
would be best served by: (1) targeting aid towards lower-income individuals, (2)
making awards renewable in subsequent years even if a student’s finances were to
change (and also making this salient to students when they receive the awards),
and (3) structuring aid programs so that grant aid receipt begins in the first yearn




Figure 2.1: EA Grant Threshold for Eligibility by Year
Note: Figure 2.1 shows the maximum expected family contribution (EFC) for EA Grant
eligibility by academic year. The solid line represents the ultimate thresholds used for
the main specifications in this paper. The dashed line represents the initial cutoffs at the
time that financial aid award letters are sent, and before students off of the waiting list
are provided EA Grant aid awards. EFC is measured in current dollars.
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Figure 2.2: Density of Students at the Threshold
Note: Figure 2.2 shows the number of students within $50 EFC bins on each side of the
EA Grant eligibility threshold.
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(a) Male (b) White
(c) SAT Math (d) Adjusted Gross Income
Figure 2.3: Changes in Demographic Thresholds
Note: Figure 2.3 shows the discontinuity in demographic characteristics at the eligibility
threshold. The graph pools together all years of data. Gray dots represent the average
EA Grant amount within $500 EFC bins, while the solid line represents the estimated
linear relationship estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Dollar amounts
are in 2016 U.S. dollars.
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(a) Average EA Grant
(b) Probability of an EA Grant
Figure 2.4: Change in Average EA Grant Aid and Probability of Receipt at the
Threshold
Note: Figure 2.4 shows the discontinuity in average EA Grant receipt and the
probability of receiving hte EA Grant at the eligibility threshold. The graphs pool
together all years of data. Gray dots represent the average EA Grant amount within
$500 EFC bins, while the solid line represents the estimated linear relationship estimated
separately on each side of the threshold. Dollar amounts are in 2016 U.S. dollars.
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(a) Institutional Grants (b) Pell Grants
(c) Overall Grant Aid (d) Loans
Figure 2.5: Changes in Financial Aid Variables at the Threshold
Note: Figure 2.5 shows the discontinuity in the types of financial aid at the eligibility
threshold. The graph pools together all years of data. Gray dots represent the average
EA Grant amount within $500 EFC bins, while the solid line represents the estimated
linear relationship estimated separately on each side of the threshold. Dollar amounts
are in 2016 U.S. dollars.
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(a) Persistence to the 2nd Year (b) Persistence to the 3rd Year
(c) Persistence to the 4th Year (d) Graduation in 5 Years
Figure 2.6: Changes in Persistence at the Threshold
Note: Figure 2.6 shows the discontinuity in the probability of enrollment and graduation
at the eligibility threshold. The graph pools together all years of data. Gray dots
represent the average EA Grant amount within $500 EFC bins, while the solid line
represents the estimated linear relationship estimated separately on each side of the
threshold.
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(a) 2nd Year (b) 3rd Year
(c) 4th Year (d) Graduation in 5 Years
Figure 2.7: Robustness of the Persistence Estimates to Bandwidth Choice
Note: Figure 2.7 graphs the estimated direct effect of EA Grant receipt in the first year
on each persistence outcome by choice of bandwidth. The solid line represents the
coefficient estimates, while the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals around
the estimate.
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Figure 2.8: Density Plot at the Initial EFC Threshold
Note: Figure 2.8 shows the number of students, aggregated in $50 EFC bins on each side




All IK Bandwidth EA Grant No EA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Financial Characteristics
Expected Family Contribution $8,749 5,083 3,419 10,953
Adjusted Gross Income $76,764 61,019 50,194 87,752
Cost of Attendance $21,918 21,640 21,200 22,215
Percentage with Pell Grants 36 55 72 21
Average Pell Grant $3,301 3,195 3,668 2,783
Percentage with Institutional Grants 39 52 57 32
Average Institutional Grant $3,320 3,517 3,352 3,297
Percentage with Direct Loans 75 76 72 76
Average Direct Loan $5,701 5,808 5,659 5,718
Percentage with Parent PLUS Loans 20 19 13 23
Average Parent PLUS Loan $11,439 9,651 7,610 12,352
Percentage with EA Grants 29 39 100 0
Average EA Grant $2,957 2,915 2,957 NA
Percentage with Positive Earnings 61 62 58 62
Average Earnings $3,063 3,194 3,078 3,057
B. Demographic Characteristics
Percentage White 45 39 37 49
Percentage Hispanic 6 7 7 6
Percentage Male 44 43 42 45
Average Math SAT Score 541 529 523 548
N 26,170 10,227 7,656 18,514
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics Among Potentially Eligible Students
Note: Table 2.1 shows the means of financial aid and demographic variables for students
in the MLDS data for those in the estimation sample (potentially eligible for the EA
Grant) between the 2009 and 2016 academic years. Column (2) limits to only those
within the $3,500 EFC bandwidth. Columns (3) and (4) show the difference between EA




Predicted Male White Hispanic AGI Math SAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EA Eligible 0.004 −0.01 0.002 0.004 958 8.11
(0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (723) (6.53)
Dep. mean | Inelig. 0.76 0.44 0.43 0.06 69,701 486
Observations 10,227 10,227 10,227 10,227 10,227 10,227
Table 2.2: Checking for Demographic Changes at the EA Threshold
Note: Table 2.2 displays the point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of an RD regression using demographic characteristics as
dependent variables. Each regression regresses the outcome on an indicator for having an
eligible EFC, with a flexible function of EFC as a control. Estimates are obtained by a
local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman
(2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section in the text for more



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Direct Parent PLUS Private
Loans Loans Loans Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Per $1,000 EA Grant −347∗∗ −56 −232∗∗ −37
(135) (71) (100) (50)
Dep. mean | Inelig. $7,542 $4,569 $2,314 $549
Observations 10,227 10,227 10,227 10,227
Table 2.4: Effects on loans in the first year (per $1,000 of EA Grant award)
Note: Table 2.4 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD regression using loan and work-study variables
as dependent variables. The first stage regresses the amount of EA Grant receipt on an
indicator for having an eligible EFC. The second stage regresses the dependent variable
on the estimated EA Grant aid. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression with
a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Earn-Y1 Earn-Y5 Earn-Y6 Earn-Y7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EA Grant receipt −170 526 5,662+ 10,174∗∗
(238) (2,115) (3,082) (4,442)
Dep. mean | Inelig. 1,985 18,178 21,211 24,794
Observations 10,227 4,565 3,388 1,951
Note: +p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.6: Earnings Effects of EA Grant
Note: Table 2.6 displays the point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD regression using earnings in a given number of
years after initial enrollment as dependent variables. The first stage regresses the
amount of EA Grant receipt on an indicator for having an eligible EFC. The second
stage regresses the dependent variable on an indicator for EA Grant receipt. Estimates
are obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the
Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section
in the text for more details on the estimation. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
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Bandwidth 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
EA Grant 0.52∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Institution -234.21 -234.53 -328.32∗∗ -446.71∗∗∗ -511.94∗∗∗
(284.24) (193.84) (155.17) (137.73) (123.22)
Total Loans -1,146.53 -1,199.46∗∗ -952.16∗∗ -1,046.11∗∗∗ -805.48∗∗
(754.08) (506.35) (411.41) (370.38) (336.54)
First Year Earn. -730.35 -51.80 -91.17 -167.44 -48.40
(469.49) (318.58) (254.83) (225.53) (203.87)
Pers.-2yr 0.12∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.034) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
Pers.-3yr 0.11+ 0.092∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.039) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025)
Pers.-4yr 0.071 0.059 0.062+ 0.052 0.045
(0.067) (0.045) (0.037) (0.033) (0.029)
Degree-5yrs 0.097 0.056 0.063 0.037 0.033
(0.089) (0.06) (0.048) (0.042) (0.037)
N 3,203 6,269 8,980 11,106 13,123
Table 2.7: Robustness of Main Effects to Bandwidth Choice
Note: Table 2.7 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD on each dependent variable, varied by chosen
bandwidth. The first stage regresses the and indicator of EA Grant receipt on an
indicator for having an eligible EFC. The second stage regresses the dependent variable
on the estimated EA Grant aid. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression with
a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500
EFC. Refer to the methods section in the text for more details on the estimation. Each
cell is a separate estimation, with the dependent variable as the row and the columns
representing the chosen bandwidth. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
72
EA Grant 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Institution -216.82 -378.36∗∗ -441.70∗∗∗ -448.24∗∗∗
(172.50) (177.30) (146.12) (145.81)
Total Loans -1,554.74∗∗∗ -916.94∗∗ -1,031.08∗∗∗ -996.75∗∗
(381.11) (397.30) (390.06) (387.41)
First Year Earn. -63.07 -182.83 -165.01 -169.65
(228.65) (236.84) (240.07) (238.91)
Pers.-2yr 0.054∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Pers.-3yr 0.09∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Pers.-4yr 0.064+ 0.063+ 0.057+ 0.057+
(0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Degree-5yrs 0.063 0.062 0.043 0.042
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045)
N 10,227 10,227 10,227 10,227
Year interaction? No Yes Yes Yes
Institution FE? No No Yes Yes
Demographic Vars.? No No No Yes
Table 2.8: Robustness of Main Effects to Functional Form and Controls
Note: Table 2.8 displays the point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD on each dependent variable, varied by chosen
functional form and controls. The first stage regresses the amount of EA Grant receipt
on an indicator for having an eligible EFC. The second stage regresses the dependent
variable on an indicator for EA Grant receipt. Estimates are obtained by a local linear
regression with a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011)
bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section in the text for more details on
the estimation. Each cell is a separate estimation, with the dependent variable as the




EA Grant 1,620.94∗∗∗ 1,555.77∗∗∗ 1,448.42∗∗∗
(43.00) (64.40) (85.83)
Institution -253.19∗∗∗ -12.13 -153.11
(81.16) (121.71) (162.28)
Total Loans -563.03∗∗∗ -515.37 -620.27
(218.07) (326.92) (435.91)
Pers.-2yr 0.036∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.021) (0.028)
Pers.-3yr 0.051∗∗∗ 0.045+ 0.064+
(0.017) (0.025) (0.033)
Pers.-4yr 0.032+ 0.037 0.031
(0.019) (0.029) (0.038)
Table 2.9: Robustness of Main Effects to the Degree of Polynomial
Note: Table 2.9 displays the point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of an RD on each dependent variable, varied by the order of the
polynomial of the EFC function. Each regression regresses the outcome on an indicator
for having an eligible EFC, with a flexible function of EFC as a control. Estimates are
obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the
Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section
in the text for more details on the estimation. Each cell is a separate estimation, with
the dependent variable as the row and the columns representing the chosen order of
polynomial. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
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Bandwidth 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
EA Grant 0.52∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Earn-5yrs 1,565.24 1,457.82 780.21 -516.91 -714.53
(4,189.60) (2,835.77) (2,312.53) (1,978.45) (1,735.63)
Earn-6yrs 11,102.28+ 6,327.63 5,112.52 3,817.14 1,618.69
(6,394.65) (4,306.89) (3,371.38) (2,820.89) (2,386.03)
Earn-7yrs 6,906.36 6,517.14 8,866.84+ 7,436.27+ 1,827.23
(10,008.74) (6,404.14) (4,778.99) (3,984.55) (3,420.38)
Table 2.10: Robustness of Earnings Effects to Bandwidth Choice
Note: Table 2.10 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD on each dependent variable, varied by chosen
bandwidth. The first stage regresses the and indicator of EA Grant receipt on an
indicator for having an eligible EFC. The second stage regresses the dependent variable
on the estimated EA Grant aid. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression with
a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500
EFC. Refer to the methods section in the text for more details on the estimation. Each
cell is a separate estimation, with the dependent variable as the row and the columns




Earn.-0yr -95.83 -143.20 -365.14
(129.66) (194.50) (259.30)
Earn.-5yr 269.06 1,007.18 833.97
(1,076.98) (1,602.63) (2,141.44)
Earn.-6yr 973.64 1,091.03 1,678.02
(631.05) (943.46) (1,257.17)
Earn.-7yr 5,246.07∗∗ 2,583.64 1,581.87
(2,248.96) (3,369.49) (4,483.18)
Table 2.11: Robustness of Earnings Effects to the Degree of Polynomial
Note: Table 2.11 displays the point estimates and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors (in parentheses) of an RD on each dependent variable, varied by the order of the
polynomial of the EFC function. Each regression regresses the outcome on an indicator
for having an eligible EFC, with a flexible function of EFC as a control. Estimates are
obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the
Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section
in the text for more details on the estimation. Each cell is a separate estimation, with
the dependent variable as the row and the columns representing the chosen order of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predicted Male White Hispanic AGI Math SAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EA Eligible −0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.004 480.92 7.11
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (654.17) (8.96)
Dep. mean | Inelig. 0.74 0.43 0.34 0.068 51,579.68 473.25
Observations 6,818 6,818 6,818 6,818 6,818 6,818
Table 2.14: Checking for Demographic Changes at the Original Threshold
Note: Table 2.14 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an RD regression using demographic characteristics as
dependent variables. Each regression regresses the outcome on an indicator for having an
eligible EFC according to the original threshold, with a flexible function of EFC as a
control. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel
within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the
methods section in the text for more details on the estimation. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
Dependent variable:
EA Grant Institution Total Loans Pers.-Y2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Immediately EA Eligible −0.02 34.42 −524.55∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (103.51) (227.48) (0.02)
Dep. mean | Inelig. 127.85 1,892.63 7,541.88 0.84
Observations 6,818 6,818 6,818 6,818
Table 2.15: Examining Original Cutoffs
Note: Table 2.15 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an RD regression using demographic characteristics as
dependent variables. Each regression regresses the outcome on an indicator for having an
eligible EFC according to the original threshold, with a flexible function of EFC as a
control. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel
within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EA Grant receipt 0.05∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
EA Grant receipt × FARMS 0.08∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 10,227 10,227 8,625
Table 2.17: Heterogeneous Effects by FARMS
Note: Table 2.17 displays the point estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of an
RD of the probability of being enrolled in a given year on EA Grant receipt as well as an
interaction between EA Grant receipt and whether a student had free-and-reduced-price
meals (FARMS) status in high school. An indicator for FARMS status is included in the
model but excluded from the table. Estimates are obtained by a local linear regression
with a rectangular kernel within the Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of




Pell Y1 EA Year 1 Pers-Y2





Pell Grants ($1K) −0.005
(0.03)
EA Grants ($1K) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
Dep. mean | Inelig. $3,264 $128 0.83 0.84
Observations 12,283 13,123 12,283 13,123
Table 2.18: EA Vs. Pell
Note: Table 2.19 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD regression using persistence to the second year
as a dependent variable. The first stage regresses the average amount Pell Grant or EA
Grant on an indicator for eligibility for Pell and EA Grant respectively. The second
stage regresses the dependent variable on the estimated grant aid. Estimates are
obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the
Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC for the EA Grant and $3,200
for the Pell Grant. Refer to the methods section in the text for more details on the
estimation. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
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Dependent variable:
Rec. Year 2 Pers-Y3
(1) (2) (3)
EA Eligible 0.37∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.02) (0.02)
EA Grant receipt −0.01
(0.04)
Dep. mean | Inelig. 0.24 0.82 0.82
Observations 9,363 9,363 9,363
Table 2.19: Receiving Grant Aid beginning Year 2
Note: Table 2.19 displays the point estimates (and heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors in parentheses) of an “fuzzy” RD regression using persistence to the second year
as a dependent variable. The first stage regresses the an indicator for beginning to
receive EA Grant in year 2 on an indicator for having an eligible EFC in year 2. The
second stage regresses the dependent variable on the estimated EA Grant aid. Estimates
are obtained by a local linear regression with a rectangular kernel within the
Imbens-Karyalanaraman (2011) bandwidth of $3,500 EFC. Refer to the methods section
in the text for more details on the estimation. ∗∗∗p<.01, ∗∗p<.05, +p<.1
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Chapter 3: How Effective Are Loan Repayment Programs at Draw-
ing Physicians to Underserved Areas?
3.1 Introduction
The United States faces a large problem with an unequal distribution of pri-
mary medical care across regions. Less populated, rural, and poorer areas have
difficulty attracting practicing primary care physicians, creating a large disparity
in the availability of primary care between urban and rural areas. In 2010, rural
areas averaged 6.8 primary care physicians per 10,000 residents, while urban areas
averaged 8.4 [Petterson et al., 2013]. Since previous research has shown the supply
of primary care physicians has been found to significantly increase the health of the
population [Starfield et al., 2005], this inequity in access to primary care provides a
rationale for publicly funded interventions in order to mitigate the discrepancy. In
response to the unequal primary care provider distribution, federal and state loan re-
payment programs (LRPs) have become increasingly popular policy solutions. LRPs
provide physicians with funding towards existing medical student loan debt in ex-
change for a commitment to provide primary care services in a federally-designated
primary care shortage area for a contracted number of years.
In this paper, I estimate the effectiveness of loan repayment programs by es-
timating a fixed effects regression of a county’s physician-to-population ratio on its
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eligibility for the federal loan repayment program (LRP) and on the generosity of
a state loan repayment program (SLRP) in the state where the eligible county is
located. This panel data approach is made possible by counties becoming eligible
and ineligible for the loan repayment programs and changes in SLRP generosity
over time. I estimate my model under the assumption that there are no county-level
shocks correlated with eligibility or program generosity. In my main specification,
I estimate that the federal and state programs do not have statistically significant
effects on the physician-to-population ratio. However, when I estimate the model
separately for different age ranges of physicians, I find marginally statistically signif-
icant effects of SLRPs for physicians in the “35 to 44 years-of-age” range, consistent
with the prediction that loan repayment programs will be most effective at attracting
recent medical school graduates, who are likely to have larger medical school debts.
For this age group, I find that a county becoming eligible for an SLRP of $30,000
per year (the average among state programs) has a marginally significant (at the
10% confidence level) effect of 0.165 physicians per 10,000 residents. As this is an
effect of approximately 10% of the gap between rural and urban counties, it suggests
that SLRP programs may have sizable effects on the physician-to-population ratio.
I find similar effects using the total amount of SLRP available, instead of simply the
amount per year, and the results are also consistent when I limit my sample to only
rural counties, eliminating poor urban areas that also qualify for loan repayment
programs.
These estimates contribute to a greater economics literature on individuals’
migration and location decisions, with particular relevance for how local labor mar-
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ket conditions and local government incentives enter into an agent’s location utility
maximization problem. I examine a unique type of place-based incentive, loan re-
payment, and a particular occupation, primary care physician. However, since other
professions like teaching and public service law have begun using loan repayment
programs similar to that of the physician loan repayment programs, this paper has
relevance for the effectiveness of other loan-based incentives as well. Lastly, previous
studies of physician loan repayment programs use cross-sectional surveys of partic-
ipating and non-participating physicians to assess the effectiveness of the program.
In this paper, I contribute to this existing literature because, while having their own
strong assumptions, the fixed effects estimates are less likely to be affected by issues
of selection on unobservables and omitted variables bias than the previous surveys.
I also provide an estimate of the effect per $10,000 in SLRP eligibility per year,
which is a new measure compared to the previous literature on LRPs, and one that
is useful for evaluating the benefit of the programs.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way. In section
3.2, I provide more information about how LRPs and shortage areas are defined
and structured. In section 3.3, I summarize previous economics literature that
has examined the location decision problems as well as previous studies of LRP
programs. In section 3.4, I describe a simple model of location decisions to inform
the empirical strategy. In section 3.5, I describe the model used to estimate the
effect of the federal and state programs on the physician-to-population ratio. In
section 3.6, I present the results of the regressions, and in section 3.7, I conclude.
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3.2 Loan Repayment Programs for Physicians
In 1972, the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) was created in response
to a growing shortage of primary care physicians caused by an increasing number of
graduating doctors choosing specialized fields. Initially the NHSC program consisted
of scholarships to medical schools in which students contracted with the NHSC to
provide primary care services in areas of need, earning a year of financial support
in medical school for every year of pledged service. In the late 1980s, the program
began funding loan repayment programs (LRPs) as an additional way to incentivize
primary care physicians to practice in underserved areas. This national program
offers a physician funds that can only be applied to outstanding medical education
loan balances in exchange for service. Medical school graduates are prime candidates
for these types of programs, as they accumulate a large degree of debt. In 2012,
the median education debt for medical-school graduates was $170,000 [Lorin, 2013].
In the late 1980’s, the NHSC also began to fund state loan repayment programs
(SLRPs), which were similar programs that were administered by each state’s health
agency with matching funding from the NHSC. Participation in the program was
optional for states, and was determined by the willingness of a state’s legislature
appropriate funds for the SLRP. Differences in loan repayment contracts across
states is one of the major sources of variation in loan repayment exploited for this
paper.
The NHSC has grown to support 9,600 primary care medical, dental, nursing
and behavioral and mental health practitioners through its national loan repayment
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and scholarship programs. This represents a substantial federal investment that
increased with the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Prior to the passage
of the ACA, the total NHSC budget was $124 million but afterwards was increased to
$284 million [ACA, 2013]. The NHSC funding leans heavily towards loan repayment
as its primary vehicle to address the regional disparity in primary care. In 2015,
2,934 new federal LRP awards were made, compared to just 196 scholarship awards.
SLRPs are smaller than the federal NSHC program, but still maintain a workforce
that was approximately 600 clinicians strong in 2012 [Pathman et al., 2012]. State
SLRP programs can vary in size, with some funding as few as ten physicians in a
given year, and some funding more than 100. Though all NHSC funded programs
offer funding to dentists, nurses, and mental health professionals, this paper focuses
on program availability and funding for primary care physicians.
Both the federal loan repayment program and the state repayment programs
require physicians to locate in Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs), which
are areas that are deemed to be underserved by primary care physicians. HPSAs can
range in geographic size from a collection of a few census tracts to an entire county,
and can be designated in two types: geographic- and population-based. Geographic
HPSA’s are primarily determined by a primary care physician-to-population ratio
which is lower than 1:3,500.1 In addition to the physician-to-population ratio re-
quirement, the area must also show that services in contiguous areas are sufficiently
inaccessible or distant. Population designated HPSAs are similar but instead are
1An area may also become a HPSA if it has a physician-to-population ratio of less than 1:3,000
and can demonstrate “high needs for primary care services or insufficient capacity of existing
primary care providers.” An abnormally high birth rate, infant death rate, or high degree of
poverty could meet the “high need” requirement.
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determined because a particular population group, such as a low-income population,
has insufficient access to primary care, instead of the general population.2 Popula-
tion HPSAs base their physician-to-population ratios on the number of physicians
that serve the population group to the group’s overall population. Relevant data
for the determination of a HPSA’s status is converted into a score between 1 and
25, which provides a more continuous measure of the level of need.
The process of an area becoming a HPSA can begin in two ways. The first
is through the HRSA’s yearly process, in which the agency identifies potentially
eligible HPSAs based on available physician, population, and geographic data. This
list, for each state, is then sent to the appropriate state health agency (such as a
state’s Department of Health and Human Services or Rural Health Department) or
governor, which then can approve them, at which point the regions become HPSAs.
Additionally, individuals as well as state or local agencies can request or apply for
regions to become HPSAs if they fit the necessary criteria. If the HRSA decides that
the area fits the necessary criteria, then it is recommended by the HRSA that the
region become a HPSA and the HPSA is then sent to the appropriate agencies for
approval. The HRSA also re-evaluates HPSAs every three or four years to determine
a new score and whether the HPSA should still be designated a HPSA.
In order to be eligible for the program, physicians must have already entered
into an employment contract with a practice or hospital in the area designated as a
HPSA. This is true of both the federal and state programs. Physicians can search a
2In explaining the barriers that define a population group’s insufficient access, the HRSA states
“Such barriers may be economic, linguistic, cultural, or architectural, or could involve refusal of
some providers to accept certain types of patients or to accept Medicaid reimbursement.”
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database located at the NHSC’s website, which keeps a listing of practice sites that
are in eligible HPSAs. After agreeing to a contract or having been offered a position
at an approved site, physicians can then apply to federal or state LRPs, but can
only accept a contract with one of the two. Physicians can apply to both types of
programs, but if offered a contract at both levels, they may only accept one of the
offers.
This paper estimates the effect of both the federal NHSC LRP and SLRPs.
The federal NHSC loan repayment program offers a maximum of $50,000 for a full-
time, 2-year commitment for a site in a HPSA with a score greater than or equal
to 14 or higher, and $30,000 for a score less than 14. After the initial commitment,
there is also the possibility of extending the contract on a year-by-year basis for
$35,000 a year. The program generosity has remained constant over the period of
time studied in this paper (2000-2013). The federal program is competitive in that
not all applicants are successful and an individual’s contract amount depends on
the HPSA score of the site. The acceptance rate of the federal LRP has varied
depending on the amount of funding for the program, with nearly 100% acceptance
in some years with plentiful funding and a nearly 50% acceptance rate in leaner
years [APA, 2007]. Loan repayment funds are paid via a lump sum to physicians,
who must show, via payment history reports from the loan servicer, that all funds
have been used in payment towards outstanding educational loans. Qualifying loans
include federal, state, and private loans that were used towards tuition, fees, or living
expenses during undergraduate and medical school. Participating physicians cannot
receive more loan repayment than outstanding loan amounts.
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State loan repayment programs have a similar structure to the federal program
with some major differences. States still contract with physicians to provide a loan
repayment amount for a given number of contract years, and the amount must be
applied towards outstanding loan balances, with similar proof. However, one major
difference between the SLRPs and the federal program is an increased flexibility
to set the loan repayment amount and contract years. States receive one-to-one
matching funding from the NHSC for the yearly loan repayment up through $50,000
per year in loan repayment, above which states must fund all additional yearly
amounts. In addition, states have the flexibility to require contract lengths longer
than two years. This flexibility has lead to sizable differences between state programs
in generosity, in both a total and yearly basis, which can be seen in Table 3.1.
Program terms between states and within states, over time provide one of the main
sources of variation used in this paper to estimate the causal effect of SLRP amounts
on attracting physicians. I examine the variation in more detail in Section 3.5.2.
3.3 Previous Literature on Location Decisions and LRPs
A vast amount of literature in Economics studies migration and location de-
cisions. For the sake of conciseness, I discuss only the literature with relevance to
the location decision problem of physicians, and leave more general reviews of the
economic literature on migration to Greenwood [1997] and Molloy et al. [2011].
Prior work on location decisions has found a substantial impact of wage dif-
ferentials and local labor market conditions, like unemployment and growth. Borjas
et al. [1992] shows that migration decisions depend heavily on regional differences
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in the return to skills, and that individuals locate in states that provide higher re-
turns to their level of skill. In a similar fashion, Kennan and Walker [2011] examine
sequences of location decisions, and find that interstate migration decisions depend
heavily on geographic differences in mean wages, with workers moving toward states
with higher wages, particularly if they have had an unfavorable realization of in-
come in the current period. Local labor market conditions, such as employment and
unemployment shocks, also affect migration by driving individuals out of areas with
low employment towards regions with more vacancies [Blanchard and Katz, 1992].
Since the work of Tiebout [1956] the economics literature has also acknowl-
edged the role that preferences over local public amenities, like parks, schools, and
police, play in migration. Preferences for amenities can be a significant determinant
of long-term migration [Mueser and Graves, 1995], and the contribution of amenities
to the location decision compared to local labor market conditions increases with
age [Chen and Rosenthal, 2008].
Other work has shown how particular types of migration respond to state
and local spending and incentive programs. State “millionaire” taxes, for example,
have been found to affect the migration of high-income individuals by causing them
to move from the higher tax state to lower tax states, to some degree. [Young
and Varner, 2011]. Moretti and Wilson [2013, 2015] show that state subsidies and
tax incentives for biotechnology firms are effective at drawing highly productive
scientists.
Some analysis of physician migration and location has previously been con-
ducted within the medical literature. For instance, a previous study found that
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51% of physicians practice in the same state in which they completed their gradu-
ate medical education, and those in general practice are more likely to do so than
specialists [Seifer et al., 1995]. However, there is extensive heterogeneity by state
in the percentage of physicians remaining after their education, and, interestingly,
they find a weak negative correlation in the number of physicians trained per capita
and the likelihood of retaining those physicians in a state. Seifer et. al. point to this
as evidence that increasing the number of physicians in a state cannot be achieved
as easily as by increasing the number of physicians trained at state medical schools.
Other literature has focused on what causes physicians to practice in rural
locations, areas which are more likely to be underserved. Laven and Wilkinson
[2003] and Ballance et al. [2009] review the medical literature on rural physicians
and conclude that a physician’s background and activity during medical school are
major factors in the rural or urban decision. A physician having a rural background
before entering medical school doubles the probability that they later locate in a
rural location. Experiences during medical school can also lead to an increased
likelihood of locating in a rural area, like the location of ones clerkship (learning
rotations during medical school at local hospitals) and medical residency in a rural
area.
Previous research on physician loan repayment and similar programs focuses
on surveys of participants and analyzes their personal characteristics, motivations,
and attributes of the areas in which they locate. They do this by matching loan
repayment participants with non participants (or “unobligated”) physicians by vari-
ables like specialty, race, and ethnicity, and observing differences. These studies
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provide descriptive data on they types of physicians who choose to participate in
loan repayment programs.
One important finding of this literature is that physicians who are obligated,
under an LRP, do typically serve in areas with more need than those who are
unobligated. Pathman et al. [2000] surveyed participants of scholarship and state
loan repayment programs which required service in 1999 and found that obligated
physicians were more likely to work in a rural areas and with more Medicare and
uninsured patients. In another paper, Pathman et al. [2004] had a similar finding
concerning the physician to population ratio; obligated physicians surveyed in 1996
worked in counties with 9.1 physicians per 10,000 residents, while the average for
unobligated physicians was 11.8. Jackson et al. [2003] conducted an in-depth survey
of participants in West Virginia’s scholarship and loan repayment programs, and
similarly found that obligated physicians provided care in areas with lower physician-
to-population ratios and with higher levels of uninsured patients.
These studies provided evidence that the type of physicians who participated
had different characteristics than the unobligated. Obligated physicians were more
likely to have higher levels of debt and report financial “concerns”, and the vast
majority cited the availability of the aid as a major reason for their decision to
practice in that location (Pathman et al. [2004]; Jackson et al. [2003]). Jackson et al.
[2003] also found that, among the West Virginia participants, LRP practitioners
were more likely to have graduated from a WV medical school and had previous
familiarity with their practice setting. In fact, many said that the program made it
possible to work in their preferred location, which could be interpreted as a similar
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finding to the fact that physicians with rural backgrounds prefer rural areas.
Despite previous surveys of physicians participating in LRPs, an important
question still remains with regards to the effectiveness of LRPs as a policy. To be
effective at altering migration decisions and worth the cost of the programs, LRPs
must be able to incentivize physicians to practice in underserved areas when they
otherwise would not. Concluding that LRPs are effective based on the cross-sectional
surveys above would require strong assumptions about the selection of physicians
into those programs. The literature showed strongly, for example, that physicians
who practice in rural areas are likely to have a rural background. If physicians would
have located in the rural area without the LRP, they would be likely to do so when
the LRP is in place. Then the LRP is not attracting new physicians, it is simply
compensating physicians who would have chosen a rural location regardless.
To contribute to the literature on LRPs, I estimate a generalized differences-
in-differences (DID) model using variations in available loan repayment amounts
offered over time, which contributes to the literature on LRPs in two ways. Firstly,
this model can provide an estimate of the effect on the physician-to-population ratio
of an additional $10,000 in offered loan repayment amount, something not found in
the previous literature, and which allows for easier evaluation of the effectiveness
of the programs. Secondly, using county fixed effects controls for time-invariant
aspects of counties, which, under the standard assumptions for a DID model avoids
the selection bias of simply comparing participants with non-participants. This pa-
per also contributes to the economics literature on local incentives for migration
by focusing on a previously unstudied type of local incentive, loan repayment pro-
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grams. Similar to Moretti and Wilson [2013, 2015] these programs are designed for
a particular profession, primary care physicians.
This paper also contributes to a sparse literature on the effect of loans and the
availability of loan repayment on career choice. Rothstein and Rouse [2011] study
a highly selective, private institution that replaced loan assistance with grants and
found that students were more likely to choose lower-pay “public interest” jobs, like
teaching. Federal student loan forgiveness programs for teachers are designed to en-
courage individuals to become teaching professionals at high-need schools, which is
similar to LRPs for primary care physicians. Literature on teacher loan forgiveness
is currently limited to cross-sectional surveys of teachers, but Liou and Lawrenz
[2011] find that the amount of forgiveness offered and the amount of preparation for
teaching high-needs students are important determinants of program participation.
Law schools also typically offer Loan Repayment Assistance Programs (LRAPs) in
order to encourage students to choose public interest law. Previous literature sug-
gests that these programs are limited in their effectiveness due to the fact that other
law professions are much higher paying [McGill, 2006], but Field [2009] conducts an
experiment that suggests LRAPs may be more effective if they were to be restruc-
tured as an up-front education subsidy that would have to be repaid if the student
did not enter a public interest profession.
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3.4 A Model of Physician Location Decisions and the Effect of Loan
Repayment Programs
In this section, I present a simple model of how physicians decide where to
locate and show how loan repayment programs enter into the decision problem.
The formal model provided in this section helps shape the empirical strategy used
to estimate the effect of the programs in later sections.
In each time period, physicians decide in which county to locate based on the
utility provided by living and working in that county. As a utility maximizer, the
physician locates in the county that provides the highest utility of all counties. Util-
ity can be affected by county-level attributes, such as the financial incentives offered
by the county (or employers of the county), population and treatment population
variables, amenities offered by the county, and an individual random component.
To guide the discussion, it helps to present this model formally. Using a variant
of the model of individual location decisions presented by Moretti and Wilson [2015],
the utility of physician i in county c in state s and at time t can be written:
Uisct = γ1wct + γ2 max{Fedamtt, Stateamtst}+ x′ctβ + δc + εisct. (3.1)
In Equation 3.1 the financial incentives offered by a county are composed of
the wages of the average physician in the county, wct, the available federal, Fedamtt,
and SLRP incentives, Stateamtst. The two amounts enter through a max function,
because the physician is allowed to participate in a maximum of one program. The
vector xct contains county-level variables that may vary over time that could influ-
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ence a physicians utility, which can include indicators of the economic conditions
of the county3, like unemployment and poverty rates, and variables that affect the
types patients that the physicians may treat, like the total number of births and the
number of patients on medicare. In addition to these time-varying characteristics of
the county, there are also time invariant characteristics of a county, δc, which may
impact residential decisions. This can be used to represent the value of a county’s
offered amenities, which, as an assumption, are assumed to affect all physicians’ util-
ities in the same manner, and doesn’t change over time. Lastly, there is a random,
individual component of utility, εisct, which represents a randomly drawn preference
for a particular county. Physicians then choose to locate in a county that provides
the highest level of utility, or the county where Uisct ≥ Uisc′t, where c′ represents
any other county in the U.S.
The financial incentive variables, and particularly the effects of the LRPs,
are of paramount interest to this paper, and necessitate further discussion. Wages
are clearly integral to any standard model of residential decisions, as with all other
county aspects equal, physicians are likely to prefer a location with higher pay. They
are of particular importance in studying location decisions of physicians, however,
because physicians in rural and underserved areas typically earn less than in other
areas [Weeks and Wallace, 2008], once controlling for work effort. To understand
the effect of the LRPs, it is important to control for the fact that a county which is
eligible for LRP funds is also likely to offer lower salary.
3This is particularly important for the time period studied in this paper, as it includes the
Great Recession.
99
The model of Equation 3.1 allows the magnitude of the wage and the LRP ef-
fects to differ, and thus the relative contribution to Uisct by γ1, and γ2 has interesting
implications. It is possible, for instance, for γ1 = γ2, which would mean that a dollar
of wages has the same effect as a dollar of either loan repayment incentive available.
Recall that the LRP incentive is an amount paid only towards a physician’s medical
school loans, and so this equality would imply that a physician treats a dollar of
available incentive as equivalent to a dollar of salary. In contrast, it could be the
case that γ1 > γ2, or that a physician deciding on a location could place more util-
ity weight on an additional dollar of salary compared to the offered loan repayment
amount. This could be the case, for instance, if he would heavily prefer in a given
year to spend less on paying down their debt, and more on consumption goods. The
physician would then discount their loan repayment amount available accordingly.
Discussing whether wages are preferable to physicians over loan repayment has some
parallels in the literature on in-kind benefits, where the central question is whether
a dollar value of an in-kind payment, like SNAP (commonly known as food stamps),
is preferable to a dollar of cash [Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2012].
In this model, it is also possible for a dollar of available LRP benefit to have a
utility effect larger than the effect of wages, which would be the case when γ1 < γ2.
Such an effect is less intuitive, but may exist if there are additional behavioral mecha-
nisms through which debt repayment is highly valued. As noted in the introduction,
the typical medical student graduates with a large amount of debt, combined with
their undergraduate student loans, and this large amount of debt could make loan
repayment more attractive than cash in several behavioral ways. In the student loan
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literature, there is growing evidence that students may be debt averse, or receive
an additional negative utility from carrying debt [Field, 2009, Caetano et al., 2011].
Meissner [2015] tests for the presence of debt aversion in an experimental setting,
finding that subjects are much less likely to borrow to smooth consumption than
they are to save when faced with a utility maximization problem over many periods.
LRPs may also be attractive if physicians use them as commitment devices in which
they choose the contract in order to pay down their debt more quickly than they
would have otherwise due to the temptation to spend earned income on consump-
tion. Bryan et al. [2010] provide a review of the commitment device literature, and
describe several evaluations of commitment device programs that are used to induce
individuals to save. Similar logic could extend to the SLRP as a commitment device,
which would require a participant to save, or reduce outstanding student loan debt.
The assumption of the model that physicians are choosing where to locate
in each period (which in practice will be defined as year) follows a more standard
model of location decisions based on per period random utility, but is fairly strong.
Clearly, physicians already located in one state will both be more likely to remain in
that state, and will face differential costs of migrating to different states. Loosening
the assumption of the model to capture the differential effects of an origin and
a destination location would be preferable, as the assumptions over the decision
problem are more realistic. Such a model of location decisions is used in Moretti and
Wilson [2015] to estimate the effect of taxes on location decisions of top scientists.
Unfortunately, the data on physician counts is only available at the county level, and
the econometric approach of section 3.5 will not be able to account for origin and
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destination counties, but will instead be based on county-level counts of physicians.
However, the model of Equation 3.1 is more likely to describe the problem of a
recently graduated physician, who is choosing where to locate. These types of
physicians are likely to be participants of the LRP programs, and so the assumptions
of Equation 3.1 may seem less strong in the context of recent physicians.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Using the model of the previous section as a guide for how physicians choose to
locate, I develop an empirical strategy utilizing county-level changes in the amounts
of federal and state LRP funding available to physicians over time to estimate the
effect of the programs on the county’s physician-to-population.
Before discussing the empirical model, it is necessary to briefly explain why
counties are used as the geographic unit. Though HPSAs, the geographic regions
where practicing physicians are eligible for the LRPs, are sometimes defined as
collections of census tracks, I use counties as my geographic unit of analysis for
two reasons. The first is that the best data on physician counts is only available
at the county level, rendering the use of data at the census track level impossible.
Secondly, county borders do not generally change much over time, while HPSAs
can. It is possible for some census tracts to be part of a HPSA which loses its
HPSA status, and then later become a part of another HPSA. In order to keep the
units constant and maintain balanced panel data, it is helpful to aggregate up to the
county level. To do this, I code a county as being HPSA-active if it has an active
HPSA within its borders. Many full counties are designated as HPSAs, however, a
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HPSA does not necessarily cover an entire county, and a county may contain several
HPSAs4.
3.5.1 Fixed Effects Model
The model of Equation 3.1 shows how LRPs and variables selected based on
prior research enter into the physician’s utility for each county. In the model, all
county-level variables are assumed to affect utility identically. Using county-level
data on physician counts, I estimate the following regression to determine the effects
of LRPs on the physician-to-population ratio, MDct of county c at time t:
MDct = β11{Fedct}+β2Stateamtst+β3MinY earsst+β4wagesct+X ′ctΓ+γc+αt+εct
(3.2)
Given physician-level data, the econometric implementation of the choice model
in Equation (1) would produce coefficients that represent the effect of LRPs on the
probability of choosing a county. In this model with county-level data, the coeffi-
cients have a slightly different interpretation, as each coefficient is interpreted as the
effect of that variable on the physician-to-population ratio. Though the parameters
are different, this econometric specification still estimates a measure of the effective-
ness of LRPs on drawing physicians to a county, and is able to compare the effects
of additional loan repayment dollars with that of wages.
4It is also possible for two counties to share a HPSA. This may be concerning in that the
eligibility indicator for these counties are linked, and there may be some dependence between the
counties sharing a HPSA, which may affect the outcome. When I analyze a sample that includes
only rural counties in Section 3.6.5, it naturally eliminates many of these cases, as rural counties
are much more likely to have the entire county designated as a geographic HPSA.
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The dependent variable in 3.2 is the primary care physician-to-population ra-
tio of a county, MDct, as increasing this ratio is the primary aim of these physician
recruitment incentives. Also, using the physician to population ratio aids in inter-
pretation of the coefficients, as counties have varying population sizes and looking
at the physician to population ratio provides a more comparable measure than if I
were to use the number of physicians directly. I compute the physician-to-population
ratio by dividing the total number of primary care physicians in a county by the
county’s population.
In Equation 3.2 the main independent variables of interest are the indicator for
being eligible for the federal LRP, 1{Fedct}, and the available state SLRP amount,
Stateamtct, in a given county and year. For clarity, I refer to a county as being
“federal eligible” if the county at least partly contains a HPSA in its borders and
is thus eligible for the federal LRP, and “state eligible” if, in addition, the state
has an SLRP. HPSA designations can change over time, causing the eligibility of
counties for the federal and state LRPs to change as well. The federal program’s
existence, requirements, and program amounts do not change over this time period,
which means that, when it comes to the federal program, counties can only vary in
terms of eligibility, and this effect is estimated by the federal program indicator. In
terms of the SLRP amount variable, there are two additional sources of variation,
in addition to eligibility changes: states adopting or abandoning SLRP programs
over time, and states altering the generosity and requirements of their programs.
States affect the generosity of their programs by changing the total amount of loan
repayment available to physicians with a minimum contract as well as the number
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of years required in the minimum contract. These sources of variation are examined
more thoroughly in section 3.5.2.
I define the variable Stateamtst as the amount of SLRP dollars per year avail-
able to a physician in a county and year, obtained by using the minimum contract
for physician locating in an HPSA in that state and dividing the total amount of
loan repayment by the number of years of service required. Defining Stateamtst
allows for a direct comparison to the wage variable wagesct, which is in terms of
annual salary. I also include the number of years required in a minimum contract
in a state, MinY earsst as a measure of the length of time required for a physician
to complete their contract. Physicians may prefer shorter contracts which do not
require as many years of service, and including the number of required years allows
for a direct test of this.
I test for the equality of β2 and β4, the coefficients on the SLRP per year and
the annual physician wages variables, respectively, using a Wald test in order to de-
termine whether the loan repayment amount is as effective as an equivalent amount
of wages. This is meant to provide some indication of whether SLRP programs are
less, more, or equally effective as providing an equivalent amount of cash incentive,
but there are some caveats to this exercise that make it more descriptive in nature.
The first is that there is not any exogeneous variation in the wage variable, and
its endogeneity means that this measure is likely to incorporate other factors that
affect wages, like housing price differentials, amenity values, and competition among
job seekers and employers. Secondly, because physicians must first contract with a
practice or hospital in the HPSA before applying for LRP funds, there is an element
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of risk associated with the SLRP amount, as it is possible for a physician not to
receive the SLRP amount if there are more applicants than available funds. If re-
ceiving the SLRP funds is risky, then it would be more appropriate to weight each
state’s program amount by the probability of receipt, in order to incorporate this
uncertainty. Unfortunately, in the manually collected data on each state’s program
history, I do not have the number of applicants and recipients or the application
success rate, because this was not something that was universally tracked by states
over the period in my sample. The few states which were able to provide some
of this information to me generally had very high, if not 100% acceptance rates of
physicians into the SLRP program. I, therefore, make the assumption that all states
have high acceptance rates, and do not weight the SLRP program amounts, but the
reader should bear this assumption in mind when I test the equality of wages and
SLRP amounts.
I include county and time fixed effects in model 3.2. As will be examined in
more depth in section 3.5.2, a county’s program eligibility and generosity change over
time, and such variation enables the use of a county fixed effect. I include time fixed
effects to account for general year-specific shocks in the number of physicians. As
my data covers a period of time that includes the Great Recession and the passage
of the Affordable Care Act, these time fixed effects are clearly needed to account
for large changes that may affect physicians at the national level. In addition, I also
include variables to account for some county specific characteristics that may change
over time: the poverty rate and the unemployment rate. I use these variables with
the intention that they can account for counties that are disproportionately affected
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by the Great Recession. My dependent variable of interest is uses the population
of a county in its denominator, to account for population changes. I also include
the birth rate as a control variable. A large number of births can be an additional
criteria that makes an area a HPSA, even outside of the regular HPSA designation
criteria. I include this variable as an additional regressor in order to control for the
fact that counties designated under the additional birth criteria may be different
from those who qualify under the normal criteria. I lastly include a measure of the
percentage of the county’s population that is medicare eligible, to control for the
fact that physicians that treat medicare patients in a HPSA are also eligible for
additional Medicare reimbursement incentives.
Equation 3.2 can be seen as a difference-in-difference-style specification, that
identifies the effects of the federal LRP and SLRP from changes in program eli-
gibility and amounts over time. Therefore, in order for the estimates of Equation
3.2 to be used as causal evidence of the effect of SLRP program amounts, I require
the assumption that there are not any other county-year shocks concurrent with a
county’s change in eligibility status or generosity, which is the typical assumption
of any difference-in-differences (DID) style estimation technique. This assumption
requires that there are no other additional treatments concurrent with LRP program
eligibility that would have an effect on the physician-to-population ratio. Though
this “parallel trends” assumption on the counterfactual cannot be verified, research
that use DID specifications typically present evidence pre-treatment of similar pre-
trends in the outcome variable between the treatment and control group in order to
give some credence to the strong assumptions. In section 3.6.2, I use an econometric
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test following Autor [2003] to provide evidence in favor of the DID assumption in
the case of the model of Equation 3.2.
To analyze the overall results of the program on the physician-to-population
ratio, I use physicians of all ages in the calculation of MDct. In additional specifica-
tions, I analyze heterogeneity of the LRP effect by physician age. The average age of
loan repayment recipients in the studies by Pathman et al. [2004] and Jackson et al.
[2003] is 33 and 40, respectively, and Pathman et al. [2000] find a median age of 37.
This young average age is consistent with the idea that these programs would be
most effective for younger physicians who have recently completed medical school,
and have high amounts of debt. In the data, counts of physicians are arranged in
10-year bins beginning at age 35 (the first bin includes all physicians younger than
35). Based on this previous literature I hypothesize that the effect of the LRPs, if
present, would be strongest among physicians 35 to 44 years old. Conversely, I ex-
pect the programs to be ineffective for physicians in older age ranges, as they likely
have less medical school debt remaining. I examine these hypotheses by estimating
the effect on each age range in separate regressions.
3.5.2 Identifying Variation
In order to use a county-level fixed effect specification to test the effect of LRP
programs on the physician-to-population ratio, I exploit several different sources of
variation in the amount of loan repayment available in a county over time: counties
that change their eligibility for the federal and state LRPs, states that adopt or
abolish programs over time, and changes in SLRP generosity.
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the variation in eligibility status over time. First,
Figure 3.1 plots the number of counties that are eligible for the federal LRP and those
eligible for both the federal and state programs over time. We can see that over time
the number of counties that are eligible has increased substantially, with a drop after
the year 2011, and that this occurs for both types of eligibility. It is also possible
to observe that the number of federal eligible counties increased more quickly in
the early 2000’s than the state eligible programs and rose more steadily until 2011,
while the number of state eligible programs had a steeper increase between 2006
and 2011.
Figure 3.2 examines this variation in a slightly different way, by looking at the
number of years that a county has been eligible for each type. Immediately apparent
by this graph is the large number of counties that were either ineligible or eligible for
the entire length of the sample. There are substantially more programs that were
never state eligible than were never federally eligible. The regression described by
(2) uses the counties found in between these two values, those that have had their
eligibility change at some point during the sample years, or those with 1-12 years of
eligibility. Among these counties, we can see that, in general, the number of federal
and state eligible are similar over time, but there are more counties federally eligible
for 11 and 12 years than state eligible, while more counties state eligible for 3 and 10
years than federal eligible. This variation identifies the effects of the two programs
separately.
The second source of variation is changes in SLRPs over time, which can
take different forms. Some states programs do not extend over the entire 2000-
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2013 period, but either begin or end during this period. In addition, the maximum
amounts for a minimum contract or minimum contract length can change over time.
Table 3.4 shows the list of state programs, the minimum contract lengths, and the
amounts. Over the period 2000-2013, 8 states change amounts and 10 began or
ended their programs. There were 6 states who never had an SLRP program over
this period, and there are 12 states for which I was unable to attain the necessary
information or the program was structured so differently that they cannot be used as
a comparison5. The 6 states are included in the sample, but provide no identifying
variation, but the 12 states with insufficient information are removed from the data.
Two states, Texas and South Carolina, operated their own loan repayment programs
outside of the federally-backed NHSC program, but still used the federal HPSA
designations for determination of eligibility, and are thus included in this sample.
An explanation for this increase in the number of eligible counties over time is a
general decreasing overall trend in the physician-to-population ratio. This trend can
be seen in Figure 3.3, which shows the overall trend in the physician-to-population
ratio across all U.S. counties, as well as the trend in counties which always have
an active HPSA, and those who never have an active HPSA. Over the period 2000-
2013, the physician-to-population ratio in the U.S. decreased overall, which would
be an explanation for why more counties would contain active HPSAs over time, and
simultaneously becoming eligible for LRP and SLRP programs. Both counties that
5Ten of the states are excluded because I have yet been unable to obtain sufficient information
on the offered SLRP amounts between 2000-2013. Alaska is excluded because it faces a unique
challenge in attracting physicians due to its location and climate, and while its loan repayment
programs are fairly generous, there are also other cash incentives also included in the program.
Oklahoma is also excluded as it has a state program that doesn’t use federal funds, and also uses
its own underserved designations besides the federal HPSA designations.
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never had and always had active HPSAs have decreasing physician-to-population
ratios, but the decrease among the always inactive counties is slightly steeper.
As a summary measure of all the useful variation in program eligibility and
generosity, the plots in Figure 3.4 show the amount of loan repayment that each
county is eligible for over the period 2000-2013. Lighter colors indicate higher loan
repayment amounts, as measured by the average LRP amount used in equation 3.2.
These figures demonstrate both sources of variation. Particularly in the earlier and
later years, it is possible to see ineligible counties in participating states becoming
eligible. Also, changes in program amounts are more visible in this fashion, and it
is possible to see the states whose programs begin (New York, Idaho, or Montana,
for example), end (South Carolina), or increase in generosity (Texas).
3.5.3 Data Sources
Each state keeps its most recent SLRP program information concerning the
minimum number of years required and the maximum amount of repayment avail-
able online for physicians to view. However, to know the program specifics going
back further in time, data for each state’s program was collected manually by email
and phone contact with each state’s agency that administers the program (typically
the state’s Department of Health and Human Services). A table representing this
information, which includes the state, years in which the SLRP program was ac-
tive, the program name, the minimum years of service required, and the maximum
repayment amount for that minimum contract is available in Table 3.1. The data
collected in this table covers the years 2000-2013, which is the period of time used in
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this study, due to restrictions on the data availability of the number of physicians.
The HRSA provides a historical list of HPSAs, including the year in which they
were designated as a HPSA and the year it stopped being a HPSA, if applicable.
I then aggregate the HPSAs to the county level by the county FIPS code, and
designate a county as having an active HPSA if either the entire county is an active
HPSA or the county contains HPSAs within its borders. Ideally, I would be able to
weight each county by the scores of the HPSAs inside of them, but one limitation of
this data is that the HRSA only keeps the most recent HPSA score for each HPSA,
and not historical scores over all available years. Since the HRSA continually reviews
scores and replaces them, I cannot use the score to provide a more continuous
measure of program intensity and county need. I code a county as being federal
eligible if there is an active HPSA within its borders and additionally state eligible
if the state has an SLRP.
The National Health Resource Administration’s Area Health Resource Files
(AHRF) provide county level information on the number of physicians, population,
poverty, unemployment rate, and total births variables. The AHRF breaks down
the number of physicians in a county by age and specialty, and I thus use the num-
ber of physicians in the fields of General Practice, Family Practice, General Internal
Medicine, and Pediatrics in my count of physicians. I focus on these specialties
because they are common to all state programs in terms of eligibility, and are spe-
cialties that fall under NHSC federal LRP and SLRP definitions of primary care. I
also restrict to physicians that are involved directly in patient care, which excludes
physicians that are only engaged in teaching and administrative positions. The
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AHRF does not have a count of physicians for the year 2009, and thus 2009 was
removed from the data.
Wage data for physicians at the county level is difficult to obtain, and I use two
measurements of wages, separately, to incorporate wages into regression 3.2. The
first is a measure from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES), which gives a three-year survey average of the mean annual wages
for a given occupation. I use the average wages of Family and General Practitioners
(occupation code 29-1062). One disadvantage of using this measure is that they
are only available at the Metropolitan (and non-Metropolitan) Statistical Area level
(MSA), and so I match counties to MSA and non-MSA using a Census crosswalk.
This does, however, mean that the wage measure is less accurate than if it had
been measured at the county level, especially for non-MSAs which can sometimes
cover many counties in a state. Another disadvantage is that non-MSA wage data
is only available for the years 2006-2013. In other regressions, not reported here, I
use estimates of wages from the BLS’s Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW). This wage measure uses industry classification and does cover all of the
years in the sample. However, the wages include an average of a physicians office,
which includes non-MD staff, and the counties represented (and not all are) seem
to skew towards more highly populated areas. Likely due to these two factors, the
point estimates of the regression are similar, but contain much more noise, and so I
focus on using the OES wages.
Lastly, I use the Urban-Rural Classification Scheme for Counties from National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) to determine whether a county is rural or urban.
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I use this variable for a robustness check on the main results. It classifies counties
according to the population size and relationship to an MSA. I code counties with
a classification of “small metro”, “micropolitan”, and “non-core” as being “rural”,




Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the
regressions can be found in Table 3.3. The data covers the period 2000-2013, and in
the full model, we can see that there are 29,522 county by year observations, which
decreases to 13,793 when years before 2006 are excluded. As detailed in Section
3.5.3, the more restricted year range is used to include a measure of wages, which
are only available beginning in 2006. On average, counties had 116 primary care
physicians and 14.6% of its population in poverty. The average unemployment rate
is 6.3%, although this variable changes significantly over this particular time period.
The averages wages for primary care physicians in the data is $184,021, though
this has a large standard deviation ($25,944), meaning that the wages vary across
counties and through time. The physician-to-population ratio is coded in terms of
physicians per 10,000 residents. Thus in Table 3.3, we can see that the average is
8 physicians per 10,000 residents, and also that this varies significantly (a standard
deviation of 3 physicians). The table also shows how this physician-to-population
ratio is distributed across different physician age groups. Physicians are most heavily
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concentrated in the 35-44 and 45-54 categories, with 2.13 and 2.34 physicians per
10,000 residents.
In some specifications, I limit the sample to counties to counties designated
as “rural” based on the criteria noted in Section 3.5.3, which limits the sample to
22,453 county by year observations. In some respects, this limited sample of counties
differs from the overall sample. Most strikingly, the average number of physicians
and the population fall to approximately 30 and 32,000, respectively. The physician
to population ratio falls from just above 8 physicians per 10,000 residents to 7.7. In
the average sized county, this is a difference of about 10 physicians.
3.6.2 Evidence on the Parallel Trends Assumption
Though the differences-in-differences style assumption of parallel trends be-
tween counties that change eligibility or SLRP amounts and those who do not is
fundamentally untestable, the empirical standard is to provide evidence that the
treatment and control groups do not differ significantly in trends of the dependent
variable before the treatment. When using a generalized differences-in-differences,
pre-trends can be difficult to visualize, due to the fact that units are affected by
the treatment at different times, which is true of LRP eligibility. In lieu of visual
evidence, I follow the method of Autor [2003], who uses “leading” and “lagging”
indicators of treatment indicators to test for differences in pre-trends. In a general




δjDij + γi + αt + εct (3.3)
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In equation 3.3 the fixed effects model uses a sequence of indicators, Dij, which
are equal to 1 in the year that is j number of years until the treatment. The test is
then whether each Dij is significantly greater than 0 for all j < 0. If so, this would
be some evidence that there is a unit by year shock occurring before the treatment
year, which is affecting the estimates.
To test for this in my model, I estimate a version of equation 3.2 in which I
replace the federal and state treatment indicators with dummy variables designating
the number of years until the county becomes eligible for the federal and the state
LRPs. I include separate sequences of indicators for the federal and state programs,
and leave out the time period immediately before treatment (t− 1) as the excluded
category. In Table 3.5, I present the estimates for of coefficients on all indicators
in periods before the treatment, in order to allow for a legible table. In general,
the estimates are not statistically significant, and do not seem to show any type of
pattern that would be concerning for the differences-in-differences specification. This
provides some evidence in favor of the validity of the parallel trends assumptions.
3.6.3 Main Results
Table 3.6 displays the results from the regression model described by equation
3.2, and which compose the main results of this paper. The table has three columns,
the first (column (1)) uses the data that includes the years 2000-2013 while the
second and third columns restrict the data to the years in which the OES wages
variable was available. Column (2) does not include the wage variable, while column
(3) does, which allows me to see separately how the data restriction and the inclusion
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of the wage variable affects the estimates. Variation in the available SLRP amount
varies at the state level for all eligible counties, and thus I cluster my standard errors
at the state level in order to allow for within-state dependence in the error term. F-
statistics for the joint significance of indicate a better fit for the models that include
the 2006-2013, though none of the regressions reject the null hypothesis that all of the
independent variables are equal to zero. The better fit for the 2006-2013 period may
reflect the fact that eligibility status changed consistently and dramatically over this
period and that several large states instituted programs during this period, relative
to the 2000-2005 period.
Before discussing the coefficients and hypothesis tests, the interpretation on
the “State Eligible Amount per Year” variable needs to be explained. The physician-
to-population ratio is scaled to represent the number of physicians per 10,000 resi-
dents of the county, and the loan repayment variable is scaled such that an increase
of one unit is an increase of $10,000. Thus the coefficient has the interpretation
of the effect of a $10,000 per year increase on the number of physicians per 10,000
residents. Wages are similarly scaled to provide a similar interpretation of the coef-
ficient.
Table 3.6 shows a negative estimated effect on the indicator for being eligible
for the federal program, with large standard errors. The coefficient on the SLRP
amount per year is 0.041, 0.031, and 0.033 in columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively,
but none of these estimates are statistically significant at any conventional level of
significance. The estimates for the minimum program length required for a state
program are negative, but similarly statistically insignificant. Most other coefficients
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are also not statistically significant. This could be due to the inclusion of county and
year fixed effects, which may explain most of the differences between counties and
over time in these variables. The size of the medicare eligible population is significant
in the first two columns, but becomes insignificant once wages are included. This
could be due to the fact that physicians in underserved areas receive more of their
wages through medicare reimbursements, but when I account for wages, I control
for this fact.
Since previous literature found that physicians who participated in loan re-
payment programs were found to be younger than those who are not [Jackson et al,
2003], I hypothesize that the SLRP effect would be largest among younger physi-
cians, or those who would be in the age range that would indicate recent graduation
from medical school. In Table 3.7, I present the model of Table 3.6, Column (3)
estimated separately for the age ranges, “Under 35”, “35 to 44”, “45 to 54”, “55
to 64”, “65 to 74”, and “Over 75”, in columns (1) through (6). In this table, the
federal program eligibility is statistically insignificant in all regressions, but the state
program amounts are positive and marginally statistically significant (at a 10% con-
fidence level), with an effect size of 0.055 per $10,000 of SLRP available per year for
the “35 to 44” years age group. This provides some evidence with the hypothesis
that these programs are more attractive to younger physicians.
The effect of the SLRP minimum number of years required is generally nega-
tive, but statistically significant, except for the “45 to 54” group. There is a highly
significant negative effect for this group, which may indicate that physicians that
the next age range up from the group that seem to respond to the program may be
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averse to contracts that require them to stay longer in an eligible location. Since
the SLRP program effect is not significant for this group, however, this results is
only suggestive.
For the “35 to 44” age group, the effect of an increase in wages is positive,
with a 0.015 effect. Since the program effect is marginally significant in this case,
I perform a Wald test of linear restrictions to determine whether the effects are of
statistically different magnitudes. As discussed in Section 3.4, a significantly higher
effect for the LRPs would indicate a behavioral response to the program amounts,
such as debt aversion or mental accounting. The Wald test does not reject the null
hypothesis that the effect of the SLRP program amounts per year and the effect of
annual wages are the same (with a p value of 0.19). However, the larger coefficient
on the SLRP in conjunction with the Wald test may at least suggest that the loan
repayment effects on those individuals most likely to respond are not less than that
of the response to wage increases.
In order to properly understand the size of the effect on 35- to 44-year-old
physicians, it is helpful to use change of a likely size given the differences in loan
repayment amounts both within and between states. A change of $10,000 per year
would move a state from the 50th percentile to just over the 75th percentile of per
year program generosity, and thus makes for an appropriate comparison value. Based
on the results in Table 3.7, this would result in a change in the number of physicians
between 35-44 per 10,000 residents by 0.055. The average county’s physician-to-
population ratio of this age range is is 2.12, which means that the effect of a $10,000
increase would amount to a 2.5 percent increase. Using the median population in
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the data, which is 25,287, this would be an increase of 0.14 of a physician in the
median county. A state moving from having no SLRP eligibility to a $30,000 per
year SLRP (the average across state programs) would correspond to an increase in
the physician-to-population ratio of 0.165. In the introduction I noted that urban
areas had had approximately 8.4 physicians per 10,000 residents while rural areas
had 6.8. This amounts to a gap of 1.6 physicians per 10,000 residents. The effect of
a program becoming eligible for $30,000 in SLRP per year then constitutes 10% of
the gap between urban and rural counties. Placed in this context, the estimate is a
sizable effect.
In Tables 3.8 and 3.9, I recreate tables 3.6 and 3.7, but show the effect sizes
when no other regressors are included in the model except for the SLRP amount.
Table 3.8 shows that the effects are mostly unchanged in the model that is not
broken down by age. A negative, but statistically insignificant effect on the Federal
program indicator, and positive but statistically insignificant effects on the state
program amount available. When examining by age in Table 3.9, the same positive
effect is found on the location decisions of 35-44 year olds. This effect is 6.2 and is
significant at the p < 0.05 level. This shows more evidence of a positive effect, that
is somewhat diminished when wages are included in the main model specification.
3.6.4 Using the Overall Loan Repayment Amount
In addition to the regression results of Table 3.6, I also use the total amount
of loan repayment for a minimum SLRP contract to replace the loan repayment
amount per year variable. Though seemingly similar, the change from the per year
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variable to the overall amount variable could have slightly different effects. For
example, Texas had a minimum contract of $61,000 over 3 years while Vermont had
a minimum program of $40,000 over 2 years. In my previous specification, these
would have appeared to have nearly the same values in the loan repayment variable,
but when examined in terms of the total amount over the minimum contract years,
there is a difference.
Table 3.10 shows the main regressions using this new definitions of the SLRP
amount. The federal program is again estimated to have a negative effect, but the
estimates are quite imprecise with large standard errors. As in Table 3.6, the effect
of the SLRPs are also insignificant.
Similar to the SLRP amount per year variable, there seem to be significant
effects when the model is estimated separately for different age ranges. In the “35 to
45” category and the “45 to 54” category, the effects on the total SLRP available to
physicians are 0.014 and 0.011 per $10,000 in total contract, which are statistically
significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. The minimum program length is
not statistically significant for the “35 to 45” group, but is highly significant for the
“45 to 54” category, with a coefficient of -0.0910, which is the effect on the physician-
to-population ratio of this age group for an additional year of required service in
the minimum SLRP contract. This may again be evidence that the program does
have a small effect on the next age group above the most likely respondents, but
the older groups respond very strongly to longer required commitments.
Though the effects of the total SLRP amount available are smaller in estimated
size, they are of a similar magnitude when placed in context. The average total
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minimum contract amount is almost $55,000. Going from no SLRP to the average of
$55,000 total SLRP amount would result in an increase of 0.077 physicians between
the ages of 35-44 per 10,000 residents, a 3.5% increase in the physician-to-population
ratio of this group, slightly smaller than the effect of the SLRP amount per year.
This is some evidence that increasing the amount of loan repayment per year has a
very similar effect to increasing the total amount of loan repayment.
3.6.5 Examining Rural Counties Only
The summary statistics of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that rural locations can
be very different in terms of population, the total number of physicians, or the
physician-to-population ratio. As an additional examination of heterogeneous ef-
fects, I limit my sample to only rural counties to examine whether there is a different
effect for rural counties. These results are presented in Tables 3.12 (all ages) and
3.13 (broken down by ages.
Table 3.12 looks very similar to the previous sections in that there is not
a statistically significant effect of either the federal or SLRP programs. Again,
however, looking by age groups finds heterogeneous effects. In Table 3.13 the effects
of the SLRP are insignificant for the “35 to 44” age group, but are positive and
statistically significant for the “45 to 54” age group. The effect estimate of $10,000
per year is 0.060 and of a similar effect size to the effect of $10,000 per year on 35- to
45-year old physicians in the main results of table 3.7. Interestingly, it seems that an
older age group is more responsive to the state programs among rural counties. As
in previous results, this age group responds quite negatively to an additional year
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of contract terms (an effect estimate of -0.125) indicating a preference for shorter
commitments.
3.7 Conclusion
This study uses variation in a county’s eligibility for federal and state loan
repayment programs, as well as change in state program generosity over time to
estimate the effects of federal and state LRPs. I find no statistically significant
results for either program in the main regressions that grouped together all physician
age ranges, however, when I estimate the model separately by age range, the age
range that corresponds most closely to recent medical school graduates (ages 35-44)
had a marginally significant effect of SLRPs on the physician-to-population ratio.
Using this estimate, I calculate that the effect of the average SLRP would amount to
a 10% reduction in the physician-to-population ratio gap between rural and urban
areas. When I use the full SLRP amount, instead of the amount per year, I find
similar results, as well as when I restrict my sample to only rural counties.
The lack of significance for federal programs, but a possible positive effect of
SLRPs among young physician warrants future research into why the state program
could potentially be effective when the federal program is not. It is possible that
states may include more outreach and recruiting than the national program, or that
states offer loan repayment programs with more attractive terms than the federal
programs. Future research on SLRPs may also want to study the effects of offering
a direct cash incentive versus loan repayment, as a more direct test of physicians’
preference for debt repayment.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Changing Program Eligiblity Status Over Time
Notes: This figure shows the number of counties that are ”eligible” for either only the
federal LRP or both the federal and a state LRP over time. An eligible county contains
an Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA).
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Counties by Number of Years Eligible
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of time in which counties are eligible for the
federal LRP and the federal and state LRPs. Years between 0 and 13 indicate a county
that has changed its eligibility status at some point
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Figure 3.3: Physician-to-population Ratio in Always-Inactive and Always-Active
Counties
Notes: This figure shows the trends in the physician-to-population ratio among counties
that always have an active HPSA (and are thus eligible for LRPs), never have an active
HPSA (always inactive), and the overall average for all counties in the sample.
126
Figure 3.4: Changes in State Loan Repayment (SLRP) Amounts and Eligibility over
time.
127
Figure 3.5: Changes in State Loan Repayment (SLRP) Amounts and Eligibility over
time.
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Table 3.1: State SLRP Programs, Years of Activity, Minimum Required Years, and
Repayment Amounts
130
Table 3.2: State SLRP Programs, Years of Activity, Minimum Required Years, and
Repayment Amounts
Notes: This table compiles all information gathered on state loan repayment programs
including the state, the years the program was active, the name of the program, the
minimum required years of service, and the maximum loan repayment amount available
for that minimum contract. It also displays the states that did not have programs and
states that were not included due to incomplete or insufficient information.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Physicians 29,552 115.775 421.426 0 10,491
Population 29,552 104,888 349,352 42 10,017,068
Annual Wages 13,793 18.402 2.594 6.243 26.155
Poverty Rate 29,552 0.146 0.059 0.000 0.560
Unemployment Rate 29,552 6.319 2.862 0.000 29.900
Total Births 29,552 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.038
Phys-Pop Ratio 29,552 8.008 5.647 0.000 92.146
PTP Ratio: und. 35 29,552 1.022 1.666 0.000 36.073
PTP Ratio: 35-44 29,552 2.124 2.079 0.000 51.086
PTP Ratio: 45-54. 29,552 2.338 2.288 0.000 54.348
PTP Ratio: 55-64. 29,552 1.669 1.873 0.000 55.021
PTP Ratio: 65-74. 29,552 0.624 0.935 0.000 19.685
PTP Ratio: Ovr. 75 29,552 0.231 0.553 0.000 14.948
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the dependent variables and
independent variables used as controls in the regression estimates. The annual wages are
scaled in terms of $10,000. Poverty Rate, Unemployment Rate, and Total Births are all
scaled as rates. All physician-to-population ratios represent the number of physicians per
10,000 residents.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Physicians 22,453 29.742 49.411 0 686
Population 22,453 32,104.570 37,051.960 42 247,141
Annual Wages 10,143 18.548 2.600 7.164 26.155
Poverty Rate 22,453 0.154 0.059 0.000 0.560
Unemployment Rate 22,453 6.374 2.972 0.000 29.900
Total Births 22,453 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.038
Phys-Pop Ratio 22,453 7.723 5.815 0.000 92.146
PTP Ratio: und. 35 22,453 0.864 1.643 0.000 36.073
PTP Ratio: 35-44 22,453 2.026 2.223 0.000 51.086
PTP Ratio: 45-54. 22,453 2.286 2.490 0.000 54.348
PTP Ratio: 55-64. 22,453 1.686 2.055 0.000 55.021
PTP Ratio: 65-74. 22,453 0.627 1.034 0.000 19.685
PTP Ratio: Ovr. 75 22,453 0.234 0.618 0.000 14.948
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics: Rural Counties Only
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the dependent variables and
independent variables used as controls in the regression estimates. The annual wages are
scaled in terms of $10,000. Poverty Rate, Unemployment Rate, and Total Births are all





Fed. Eligible t-13 −0.287 (0.790)
Fed. Eligible t-12 −0.526 (0.620)
Fed. Eligible t-11 −0.031 (0.805)
Fed. Eligible t-10 0.037 (0.941)
Fed. Eligible t-9 −0.079 (0.669)
Fed. Eligible t-8 0.113 (0.295)
Fed. Eligible t-7 0.253 (0.244)
Fed. Eligible t-6 0.071 (0.220)
Fed. Eligible t-5 0.197 (0.206)
Fed. Eligible t-4 0.199 (0.171)
Fed. Eligible t-3 −0.011 (0.183)
Fed. Eligible t-2 0.082 (0.095)
State Eligible t-13 0.697 (1.070)
State Eligible t-12 1.285∗ (0.775)
State Eligible t-11 1.093 (0.873)
State Eligible t-10 0.489 (0.994)
State Eligible t-9 0.432 (0.730)
State Eligible t-8 0.289 (0.226)
State Eligible t-7 0.048 (0.243)
State Eligible t-6 −0.076 (0.273)
State Eligible t-5 −0.231 (0.239)
State Eligible t-4 −0.078 (0.188)
State Eligible t-3 0.193 (0.137)
State Eligible t-2 0.018 (0.097)
Observations 29,552
Table 3.5: Examining Pre-trend Evidence for the DID Assumption
This table provides evidence on the differences-in-differences assumption by using
leading and lagging dummy variables for each year pre- and post-treatment, where
treatment corresponds to becoming eligible for the federal program or becoming eligible
for the SLRP. The table displays only the estimates of the coefficients for the
pre-treatment period. The county-level covariates of the main specification are included,
as well as county and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels denoted: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Dependent variable:
Physician to Population Ratio
Without Wages With Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Fed. Eligible −0.188 −0.071 −0.074
(0.120) (0.170) (0.173)
State Eligible Amount Per Year 0.041 0.031 0.033
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028)




Poverty Rate 0.901 0.005 −0.025
(1.265) (1.301) (1.290)
Unemp. Rate 0.014 −0.014 −0.015
(0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
Total Births −18.902 −30.862 −30.909
(20.176) (35.726) (35.746)
Medicare Eligible Population 4.286∗∗ 6.039∗ 5.991
(1.900) (3.636) (3.652)
Observations 29,552 13,793 13,793
Table 3.6: Effect Of LRP Eligibility and Amount per Year on the Physician-to-
Population Ratio
Notes: This table presents the results of the main fixed effects regression of the physician
to population ratio on an indicator for being eligible for the federal program and the
available SLRP amount a county is eligible for per year. Columns (1) and (2) do not
include wages, while (3) does. Column (1) uses the full sample while columns (2) and (3)
use the sample from 2006-2013, to correspond with the availability of wage data. The
coefficient on the ”State Eligible Amount Per Year” has the interpretation of the effect
of $10,000 in SLRP on the physician-to-population ratio. County and time fixed effects
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Physician to Population Ratio
Without Wages With Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Fed. Eligible −0.195 −0.086 −0.090
(0.119) (0.174) (0.177)
State Eligible Amount Per Year 0.039 0.032 0.035
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)




Observations 29,552 13,793 13,793
Table 3.8: Effect Of LRP Eligibility and Amount per Year on the Physician-to-
Population Ratio
Notes: This table presents the results of the main fixed effects regression of the physician
to population ratio on an indicator for being eligible for the federal program and the
available SLRP amount a county is eligible for per year. Columns (1) and (2) do not
include wages, while (3) does. Column (1) uses the full sample while columns (2) and (3)
use the sample from 2006-2013, to correspond with the availability of wage data. The
coefficient on the ”State Eligible Amount Per Year” has the interpretation of the effect
of $10,000 in SLRP on the physician-to-population ratio. County and time fixed effects











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Physician to Population Ratio
Without Wages With Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Fed. Eligible −0.159 −0.051 −0.053
(0.118) (0.155) (0.156)
Minimum SLRP Contract Amount 0.012 0.009 0.010
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)




Poverty Rate 0.945 0.037 0.008
(1.254) (1.262) (1.255)
Unemp. Rate 0.014 −0.014 −0.015
(0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
Total Births −18.780 −30.900 −30.956
(20.140) (35.378) (35.407)
Medicare Eligible Population 4.336∗∗ 6.074∗ 6.028
(1.919) (3.668) (3.680)
Observations 29,552 13,793 13,793
Table 3.10: Estimates Using Full SLRP Amount
Notes: This table presents the results of the main fixed effects regression of the physician
to population ratio on an indicator for being eligible for the federal program and the
available SLRP amount a county is eligible for over the entire contract. Columns (1) and
(2) do not include wages, while (3) does. Column (1) uses the full sample while columns
(2) and (3) use the sample from 2006-2013, to correspond with the availability of wage
data. The coefficient on the ”State Eligible Amount Per Year” has the interpretation of
the effect of $10,000 in SLRP on the physician-to-population ratio. County and time
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Significance


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Physician to Population Ratio
Without Wages With Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Fed. Eligible −0.204 −0.011 −0.014
(0.147) (0.219) (0.223)
State Eligible Amount Per Year 0.049 0.033 0.034
(0.040) (0.036) (0.036)




Poverty Rate 0.330 −1.555 −1.579
(1.439) (1.707) (1.686)
Unemp. Rate 0.007 −0.023 −0.024
(0.028) (0.036) (0.036)
Total Births −15.286 −33.301 −33.303
(22.215) (40.322) (40.331)
Medicare Eligible Population 4.613∗∗ 7.410∗ 7.382∗
(2.201) (4.320) (4.343)
Observations 22,453 10,143 10,143
Table 3.12: Estimates Using Only Rural Counties
Notes: This table presents the results of the main fixed effects regression of the physician
to population ratio on an indicator for being eligible for the federal program and the
available SLRP amount a county is eligible for per year. This sample is restricted to
rural counties only. Columns (1) and (2) do not include wages, while (3) does. Column
(1) uses the full sample while columns (2) and (3) use the sample from 2006-2013, to
correspond with the availability of wage data. The coefficient on the ”State Eligible
Amount Per Year” has the interpretation of the effect of $10,000 in SLRP on the
physician-to-population ratio. County and time fixed effects are included. Standard


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4: The Effect of High School Career and Technical Edu-
cation on Postsecondary Enrollment and Early Career
Earnings: New Evidence from Maryland
4.1 Introduction
Career and Technical Education (CTE) has long been a fixture of U.S. pub-
lic secondary, with federal funding of CTE existing since the first authorization of
the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act1 in 1984. Recent incarna-
tions of CTE education in U.S. high schools have focused on sequenced programs
designed to prepare students directly for a two-year degree four-year degree, or an
industry-recognized credential, with the goal of giving students pathways towards
higher earning jobs after high school. Despite the history and prevalence of CTE
education, the current literature concerning effects of CTE education on long-term
outcomes-such as postsecondary education, degree receipt, and earnings-has found
mixed results [U.S. Department of Education, 2014]. A recent Institute of Education
Sciences working group on CTE noted “ the need for more causal studies of CTE”
[Ahn, 2017].
In this paper, I use student-level longitudinal data from the Maryland Lon-
gitudinal Data System to investigate the effects of completing a CTE program of
study on postsecondary enrollment, degree receipt, as well as early career earnings.
1Originally the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act
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I use two complementary identification strategies that can be viewed as complemen-
tary and information for two cohorts of students who graduate from high school in
2010 and 2011. First, I use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to pair
CTE-completing students with students who do not complete CTE programs based
on observable characteristics. In light of the possible biases and as a complimentary
method, I estimate 2SLS models in order to provide an causal estimate of CTE under
the relevance and exclusion restrictions assumptions. I take advantage of the fact
that some CTE programs are provided at CTE Centers or technical high schools,
which are separate public institutions from standard high schools that students can
attend for part of their school day. I use the driving distance (in the amount of time
required) from a student’s high school to a CTE center or technical high school and
use this as an instrument for CTE completion, as a longer distance to a separate
institution might require additional direct or psychic costs in order to complete a
CTE program.
Using the PSM method, I find that CTE completion is associated with a sub-
stitution effect from enrollment at four-year to two-year institutions, which persists
through degree completion. Specifically, CTE completion is associated with a 5.1
percentage point (p.p.) decrease in bachelor’s degree completion and a 3.5 p.p. in-
crease in the probability of an associate degree. CTE completion also increases the
likelihood of earning a certificate by 0.9 p.p. Furthermore, CTE completion is asso-
ciated with higher early career earnings: CTE increases annual earnings in the sixth
year after high school graduation by $2,050, and increases the earnings during the
first year after the completion of education by $1,444. Estimating these effects by
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different program types, I find that some programs, especially those of a traditional
vocational nature (e.g. construction or automotive repair, for example) are associ-
ated with larger negative effects on four-year degrees but still produce positive effect
on early career earnings, while others lead students to substitute towards two-year
degrees.
The 2SLS models, using driving time as an instrument, produce evidence con-
sistent with the PSM results for the types of programs that are traditionally offered
at CTE centers. I find that completing a CTE program has a positive effect on at-
tending a 2-year institution immediately after high school, and a negative effect on
attending a 4-year institution. Completing a CTE program causes a significant de-
crease in the probability of completing a bachelor’s degree, but a significant increase
in the likelihood of earning a certificate. I also find positive effects on earnings in
the sixth year after high school graduation.
To implement the PSM approach, I calculate a student’s propensity to com-
plete a CTE program based on observable demographic information, as well as scores
on three standardized high school assessments required to graduate high school in
Maryland. I then use a nearest-neighbor matching process and examine the effect
of CTE using the matched data. I also examine how the long-run effects of CTE
education differ by the types of CTE programs completed in order to understand
heterogeneity among the different types of CTE programs. However, in order to
produce a causal effect, matching requires that there are no unobservable variables
that might affect both the decision to enroll in CTE programs and the outcomes of
interest. If this assumption does not hold, the matching procedure can provides de-
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scriptive information about CTE completers, but will not produce causal estimates.
I estimate the effect of CTE education by an instrumental variables procedure
using two-stage least squares. The types of programs offered at CTE centers and
technical high schools are often a subset of the total number of available programs
to students, typically of programs that require larger amounts equipment or capital,
and therefore the IV estimates provide a causal estimate of CTE completion, but
for the types of programs available at CTE centers. IV estimates can then be
seen as complementary method, as the IV estimates can be compared to the PSM
estimates of similar types of programs to see whether the effects of CTE are similar
using a different method with distinct assumptions. Using different specifications
of the driving distance instrument, I find that driving distance is significantly and
negatively related to the completion of a CTE program. Being within 10 minutes
of a CTE Center or technical high school, for instance, increases the probability of
completing a CTE program by 11 p.p., which is an increase of over 50% relative to
the mean probability of completing a CTE program.
CTE education could affect postsecondary enrollment and earnings in several
ways. First, CTE programs may provide easier access to industry credentials, or
information to student about the availability of college programs associated with
the CTE program. The latter may be valuable, especially for low-income or first
generation college students who have limited information about college [Hoxby and
Turner, 2015]. CTE education may also provide students with information about
their own set of cognitive and mechanical skills. The dynamic process of skill revela-
tion can influence postsecondary enrollment decisions [Arcidiacono et al., 2016] and
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both earnings and degree attainment may be influenced by a student’s cognitive and
mechanical skills. [Heckman et al., 2006, Prada and Urzúa, 2017]. In addition, CTE
education could affect high school graduation by either providing students an avenue
to finish high school or a reason for doing so. Receiving a high school diploma has
been associated with positive career outcomes in prior research [Jaeger and Page,
1996, Arcidiacono et al., 2010].
Earlier research on vocational education found that students who take vo-
cational courses receive higher earnings, but are less likely to complete a college
degree [Bishop and Mane, 2005, Meer, 2007]. More recent evidence suggests that
student outcomes can depend on the type of CTE coursework completed. [U.S.
Department of Education, 2014]2 Dougherty [2016] finds positive effects of CTE on
high school graduation using a regression-discontinuity design while Kreisman and
Stange [2016] find positive effects of advanced CTE coursework on earnings and that
there is some substitution between four- and two-year college enrollment, though
this does not extend to college degrees.
4.2 CTE in Maryland
The United States has long funded vocational education, and the most recent
iteration of this Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006, the
fourth reauthorization of such funding since 1984. The Perkins Act provides grant
aid to state and local education agencies to fund CTE programs in high schools and
2This report commissioned quasi-experimental studies in several U.S. cities to examine the
effects of CTE coursework. For example, study results from San Diego [Betts et al., 2014] and
Philadephia [Furstenberg and Neumark, 2005] find positive effects of CTE on postsecondary en-
rollment or aspirations of enrollment, while the study in Florida found no effect on college going
for CTE students [Jacobson and Mokher, 2014].
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community colleges. The most recent version of the Perkins Act requires funded
programs to offer a sequence of nonduplicative classes that help prepare students
for entering postsecondary education or obtain an appropriate industry credential.
In the State of Maryland, there are 148 programs of study for students to
choose from, organized into 10 “Career Clusters” or coarse groupings of related
programs. A wide variety of programs are offered, ranging from pre-engineering
programs designed to prepare students for studying engineering at a four-year insti-
tution to programs like carpentry and automotive technician that prepare students
for recognized industry credentials. To comply with the Perkins Act, all new pro-
grams must be approved by state and local governing bodies, and must prepare
students for a postsecondary pathway or for an industry credential. Some programs
include opportunities internships, shadowing, or other work experience that give
students a direct opportunity to learn about the potential career options available
upon completing a CTE program.34
CTE programs are typically four-course sequences that a student completes
in their later years of high school. Typically, students begin with a CTE course
in 10th grade, or two courses in 11th grade and complete the sequence in 12th
grade with two courses that include a capstone course. Modern CTE programs
are intended to be easily completed in conjunction with normal college preparation
coursework, a practice intended to avoid “tracking” programs that have occurred
3Each Career Cluster has a Program Advisory Committee (PAC) and local districts have a
Local Advisory Committee (LAC), each consisting of members of local school districts and industry
representatives. LACs work in conjunction with PACs to propose new CTE programs. This can
also be done at the statewide level through the Governor’s Workforce Investment Board.
4The “Career Research and Development” is a specific cluster in which students who participate
do so in assistantships in the private sector
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with previous iterations of vocational education in the United States. Over 50%
of students who complete CTE programs in Maryland also complete the minimum
entry requirements for the University System of Maryland.
In addition to variation in the types of programs offered, there is also variation
in how student access the courses. Some programs are available at a student’s regular
public high school, while other courses are offered at a CTE Center, an institution
designed by the school system to provide CTE education for specific programs to all
the schools in a school district. These programs often tend to be capital intensive
programs, such as those that require specialized equipment or instruction. For
example, business or marketing program may be provided at a student’s high school,
while an automotive technician program might instead be offered at the CTE Center.
Some school districts may instead have technical high schools that provide a wider
variety of CTE programs than standard high schools, but also provide standard
high school curricula. These schools often function as magnet high schools where
most students apply for entry in 8th grade, but also accept part-time students who
commute to the school for a portion of the day. School systems typically provide
transportation in the form of busing for students to attend CTE Centers, but the
commute during the day may still provide both financial and psychological costs
that reduces a student’s likelihood of completing a program.
The three most common ways for students to complete high school in Maryland
are: to complete the University System of Maryland (USM) requirements for entry
into the USM system, to complete a CTE sequence of courses, or to complete both.
Completing the USM requirements requires satisfying a minimum number of credits
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in required courses and achieving minimum scores on the High School Assessment
(HSA) tests available to students once they complete their Algebra I, English 10,
and Biology courses. CTE completion requires finishing the four course sequence
of CTE courses. Though each of these provide pathways to a high school diploma,
a student’s high school diploma does not reflect which of the pathways a student
used to complete high school, and therefore a student’s CTE completion is only
represented as an indicator on their high school transcript.
4.3 Data
To estimate the effect of CTE on postsecondary outcomes, degree receipt, and
early career earnings, I use student-level data from the Maryland Longitudinal Data
System, the State of Maryland’s central repository for longitudinal student data.
The MLDS data is composed from several different sources. PreK-12 enrollment data
is received from the Maryland State Department of Education and contains public
school enrollment information for students beginning in the 2007-2008 academic
year. The PreK-12 enrollment data is then matched to data from the Maryland
Higher Education Commission and the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) to
create enrollment and degree histories for students in postsecondary education. By
matching to the NSC, it is possible to see enrollment and degrees for students who
may have left the state to pursue higher education. Lastly, the education data
is also linked to earnings data from the state Department of Labor Licensing and
Regulation, which contains information on earnings from wages and salaries from the
state’s unemployment insurance database. The enrollment data spans the 2007-2008
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to 2015-2016 academic years.
Using this data, I select a cohort of students who were in 12th grade in the
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 academic years. This is done for several reasons. First,
given the time span of the data, this ensures that I can see students up to six
years after high school graduation, an amount of time that is frequently used in the
education literature, as it would allow students who immediately enroll in four-year
degree programs 150% of the time expected to graduate. Secondly, some variables,
such as the High School Assessment scores (discussed below) are not available for
students before this graduating cohort. These cohorts contain over 80,000 students.
Using the data on postsecondary enrollment and earnings, I construct college
enrollment and earnings histories for each student in the cohort. For college enroll-
ment, I count a student as enrolled if they are degree-seeking and enrolled either
part-time or full-time at a two-year or four-year degree granting institution in the
fall of each year after high school graduation. Using the information on degrees
granted, I create indicators for whether a student earns an associate degree or a
bachelor’s degree, where each indicator is independent, allowing students to have
a value of one for each indicator if they earn both types of degrees. I also include
certificate receipt as an outcomes.
Using the earnings data, I similarly construct a history of earnings after high
school graduation. Earnings in the MLDS are collected quarterly, therefore I aggre-
gate the quarters into approximations of academic years. For example, quarters 3-4
of 2015 and 1-2 of 2016 are counted as earnings during the 2015-2016 academic year.
Aggregating earnings this way allows for an easy comparison to the academic year
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and therefore are more easily interpretable when combined with the estimates on
enrollment. I focus on two measures of earnings. The first is the annual earnings six
years after high school graduation. This measure is meant to indicate the earnings
for a student after as sufficient length of time to complete a four-year degree is met,
but may also include years of experience for students who either do not complete a
degree or complete a two-year degree. I include an additional measure of earnings
to exclude the effects of career experience by calculating the annual earnings for a
student in the first year that they are no longer enrolled in any kind of education.
This measure more directly compares students after they finish their education, but
discounts the opportunity to begin a career early and earn work experience.
One important limitation of the earnings data is that by receiving earnings
from the state unemployment insurance database, the earnings excludes students
who move outside of the State of Maryland or federal workers. Both of these limita-
tions are important in the case of Maryland, as there is easy travel to nearby states
and federal workers make up a significant portion of the Maryland workforce.5 De-
spite these limitations, the earnings data still provide an important estimate of the
long-term effect of CTE education, though the results should be considered with
the limitations in mind.
The data contain demographic and standardized test score information for
each type of student. I view a student’s race, gender, and ethnicity (Hispanic or
not Hispanic), and whether a student has any special education accommodations.
5About 5.5% of Maryland’s workforce was employed by the fed-
eral government in 2016 according to the Maryland State archives.
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance/economy/html/labor.html
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The data also contains an indicator for whether a student is eligible for free-and-
reduced-price meals (FARMS), a common indicator of low-income status in K-12
education data, and the number of weeks a student is absent from school
For use as additional covariates in both the matching and instrumental vari-
ables methods, I also measure the distance (in miles) between a student’s high
school in 12th grade and the nearest two-year and four-year postsecondary institu-
tions. These serve as controls for one type of cost of attending college. I also include
school level covariates for students, including the percentage of students who pass
their algebra HSA exams, the total number of CTE programs available at school,
and the overall percentage of the school that are FARMs eligible. I use these vari-
ables to control for differences between the schools a student attends, even if the
student were to be atypical within that school.
To fulfill high school graduation requirements, students in this cohort were
required to score above a minimum threshold on three High School Assessment
(HSA) standardized tests.6 These tests, in Algebra, English, and Biology, typically
were taken by students after finishing the corresponding high school course. Scores
on each test range from 250-650 and students are required to score a combined 1208
on the three exams in order to meet the University System of Maryland requirements
for entry.7 Given the time frame of the data, students who take a course early in
their education may be seen to be missing an HSA Exam score. This is particularly
true of the HSA Algebra exam, where many students take Algebra I in either 8th or
6In 2015, the HSA exams were replaced by the PARCC assessments in the State of Maryland.
7Fulfilling USM requirements does not guarantee enrollment in the University System of Mary-
land, but is a requirement for high school students seeking to enroll.
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9th grade. In this case, I code an indicator of 1 or 0 for whether a student’s exam
score is present. Despite the missingness of the data, this indicator provides some
information on the academic ability of a student, as students with higher academic
ability are more likely to take the HSA Algebra early and therefore will not have a
score present.
CTE program completion is measured at high school graduation, where ac-
companying a student’s record of high school completion is an indicator for fulfilling
the USM requirements, completing a CTE program, or both. Accompanying the
program completion indicator is a Classification of Instructional Program (CIP)
code for the type of program that a student completes. I use the CIP code to deter-
mine to which of the Maryland CTE Career Clusters a student’s CTE completion
corresponds in order to provide a coarse description of the type of CTE program
completed.
As described above, the CTE coursework for some programs in some counties
is completed at either a technical high school or a CTE Center. Using data from
the state department of education, I determine the CTE center or technical high
school available to students in their school system.8 To do this, I pull sophomore
high school enrollment for the 2010 graduating cohort, and measure the distance
between the student’s high school as of 10th grade and the CTE center or technical
high school. I use 10th grade distance as the measure, because this is the time
typically before students have made their decision to enter CTE programs. As a
measure of distance, I use the driving time according to Google Maps. This provides
8This data is publicly available at https://www.mdctedata.org.
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a measure of the time cost required to attend a CTE center from your sending high
school.
4.3.1 Sample Selection
I limit the data to only students who complete the USM requirements, in-
cluding both students who complete CTE programs and do not. The rationale for
doing so is a consideration of the counterfactual to completing a CTE program. In
examining high school graduates, the proper control group for students who only
complete high school through completing a CTE program is not clear, as the decision
for some of these students is likely between completing high school by CTE or not
completing high school at all. Therefore, I restrict to only students who complete
the USM requirements. This has the benefit of having a reasonable control group,
but does mean that both methods that I employ will likely be producing local esti-
mates of the average treatment effect for relatively positively selected studnets. In
Section 4.3.1, I show how CTE-only completers differ from students who complete
both CTE and a USM program.
I examine summary statistics of students who complete and do not complete
CTE programs in Table 4.1. This table breaks down several demographic and test
score characteristics by the type of completion, with the three types being USM
only, for students who did not complete a CTE program but fulfilled the USM
requirements, CTE and USM, for students who completed both, and CTE Only, for
those students who completed only a CTE program. Though students who belong to
the first and last columns will be the only ones included in the analysis, it is helpful
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to see how they differ from student who graduate high school by only completing a
CTE program.
In Table 4.1, USM Only and those who complete both are remarkably similar
in demographic and test score characteristics. Those who complete both are slightly
more likely to be male, white, and black. They are less likely to be Asian overall.
The propensity to have an HSA Algebra test score and the score for those who do
are fairly similar between the two groups, but those who complete CTE programs
have slightly lower HAS English scores. These students are also much more likely
to have an available HSA Biology score, suggesting that students who complete
CTE programs take Biology later in their high school career, on average. The
same patterns exist for CTE only relative to USM only students, just with larger
magnitudes in the differences. For example, 33% of CTE only students are FARMS
eligible compared to 21% of USM only students. The two types of students are
generally similar in their distance to the nearest college. In general, CTE students
are more likely to be male, white, of low family income, and slightly less academically
prepared. CTE and USM completers, relative to non-completers, generally are the
same distance from the nearest two- or four-year higher education institution, and
have the same number of weeks absent. In terms of school-level characteristics,
CTE and USM completers have a similar percentage of students (62% versus 61%)
that pass their Algebra HSA tests. However, CTE and USM students, versus non-
completers, have a slightly higher number of CTE programs available within their
own high school (13 versus 12) and have a slightly higher percentage of students
who are FARMs eligible (26% versus 23%).
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I show raw outcomes of interest among the three groups in Table 4.2, where
rates of enrollment at the two types of postsecondary institutions, rates of degree
receipt and annual earnings 6 years after graduation are shown for the three types
of students. Students who complete both are about 11 percentage points less likely
to enroll in a four-year institution and 9 percentage points more likely to enroll
in a two-year program immediately after high school graduation. This difference
is also apparent in the propensity to receive a degree, with those who complete
both 9 percentage points less likely to receive a bachelors degree and 5 percentage
points more likely to obtain an associates degree. CTE and USM students are more
likely to have positive earnings observed in the data, and among those with positive
earnings, have higher earnings; $24,371 compared to $22,055 of non-completers.
To provide some idea of what CTE students study, I break down the type of
program completed by each type of CTE completion (CTE and USM versus CTE
Only), in order to give a percentage of completers who complete each type. Table
4.3 lists the Career Clusters on the left hand side and the percentage of completers
on the right. Several patterns emerge from this comparison. While students of each
type of completion complete each type of program, students who complete both
CTE and USM are much more likely to complete the Business, Management, and
Finance; Health and Biosciences, and Human Resource Services programs. CTE
Only students, on the other hand, are much more likely to complete Career, Re-
search, and Development; Construction and Development; and Consumer Services,
Hospitality, and Tourism programs. The types of programs completed, as well as
the general summary statistics suggest that students who complete CTE and USM
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are different from students who complete CTE only. However, since more than 50%
of CTE completers complete both, the CTE and USM completers remain a highly
relevant subset of students.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of CTE on long-run outcomes, I use two complemen-
tary strategies. First, I use propensity score matching to pair CTE completers with
non-CTE completers based on observable characteristics. Under a set of strong as-
sumptions, these estimates provide an estimate of the causal effect of CTE program
completion, and allow me to examine heterogeniety in the effects of CTE by the
type of program completed. Given the strong matching assumptions required for
causality in the case of matching and plausible reasons why they may be violated in
the case of CTE program completion, I also employ an instrumental variables (IV)
strategy based on the distance from a student’s high school to the CTE center or
technical high school in their school district. Under the assumptions of relevance
and exclusion, this instrument can be used to estimate the causal effect of CTE
education, though for only the types of programs offered by CTE centers and tech-
nical high schools, which, as explained above is typically a subset of all available
programs.
The first empirical strategy uses propensity score matching without replace-
ment. Using a logistic model, I estimate the probability of completing a CTE
program based on observable student characteristics. In the model, I include the
demographic and test score information described in Section 4.3. In addition, I in-
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clude indicators for the county of a student’s high school, which corresponds to the
student’s school district. After examining the common support for the propensity
score, I then use a nearest-neighbor matching to match each CTE completer with
a non-completer of a similar propensity score. I use a caliper of 0.2 to ensure that
I limit cases of extreme difference in the propensity score. There are no students
eliminated from the treated sample due to not being able to find a match within
.2 of the probability of completing a CTE program. After matching and checking
the balance, I estimate the effect of CTE completion on each of the postsecondary
enrollment, degree completion, and earnings outcomes by regressing the outcome of
interest on an indicator for CTE completion.
In the case of CTE completion, it is possible to make the case that there are
unobserved variables that might be associated with both CTE completion and the
outcomes of interest. If we use enrollment in a four-year university as an example
outcome, we can likely hypothesize that there is a degree of selection into CTE
programs and that some of the variables on which a students selects, but is possibly
unobserved, might also be related to the college decision. Motivation might be an
example, where some students might complete a CTE program because there are
significant pyschic costs to attending a four-year university, and the student may
think of the jobs associated with CTE completion as another option to a four-year
degree. Previous work has also shown significant returns to mechanical skills [Prada
and Urzúa, 2017], and mechanical skills may be related to a student’s decision to
complete a CTE program as well as provides a student options relative to a four-year
degree.
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To match students via a propensity score, I first use a logistic regression to
estimate the probability of completing a CTE program. In Figure 4.1, I show that
the distributions of the propensity score for those who completed a CTE program
versus those who do not have a significant region of common support, suggesting that
the propensity score matching fulfills one of the crucial matching assumptions. After
obtaining the propensity score, treated students are then matched via a nearest-
neighbor matching with students who only completed the USM requirements with
a caliper of .2.
To examine the balance, Table 4.4 shows the standardized mean difference
of demographic characteristics before and after matching. The standardized mean
difference has an interpretation of Cohen’s d. As discussed in the prior subsection,
the differences between the CTE and non-CTE students are not exceedingly large
prior to the matching, with hardly any of the mean differences greater than .1.
However, a χ2 test of joint significance (including the county dummies not included
in the table) show that we can still reject the null hypothesis that the means of CTE
students are different from non-CTE students. After matching, the standardized
mean differences of the matched sample are even smaller, and the χ2 test does not
reject the equivalence of the group means.
For matching to produce a causal effect of CTE completion, the following as-
sumptions must be met. First, the propensity to complete a CTE program must be
positive for each observation. Secondly, matching requires that there are no unob-
servable variables that may be correlated with CTE completion and the outcomes
of interest.
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Given the strength of assumptions necessary for the PSM method to produce
causal estimates, I turn to an complementary instrumental variable strategy. As
described in Section 4.2, some CTE classes and programs are offered at separate CTE
Centers and technical high schools within a student’s school district, that students
will commute back and forth to during the school day. This extra commuting might
serve as a type of cost that might prevent some student from completing a CTE
program, despite school systems typically offering busing to and from the CTE
center locations. I treat the distance, in terms of driving time, from a student’s high
school to a CTE center as an exogeneously determined cost of completing a CTE
program. Using the sample of high school completers in 2010, I match students
to their enrollment in the 2007-2008 academic year (their sophomore year of high
school) and determine the distance from their high school in sophomore year to the
nearest CTE center or technical high school in their school district, in terms of the
driving distance in minutes.
I then use “time to CTE center” as an instrument for CTE program completion
among the same sample as the propensity score matching. In regression form, the
first stage equation looks like:
CTEi = α + β1Driving T imei +XiΓ + εi (4.1)
where i refers to an individual student, Driving T imei is the minutes from the
student’s high school to the CTE Center and Xi is a vector of individual charac-
teristics that correspond to the variables used in the PSM technique above. Using
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Driving T imei to instrument for CTE completion, I then estimate the effect of
CTE completion on each outcome of interest, Yi:
Yi = δ + β2 ̂CTEi +XiΨ + εi (4.2)
where the system is estimated by two-stage least squares.
For the IV procedure to estimate the causal effect of CTE completion, two
assumptions must be met. The first is that the Driving T imei variable must be
correlated with the decision to complete a CTE program. This relevance condition is
testable, and I show evidence in Section 4.5 that this appears to be true. The second
is an exclusion restriction necessary for the exogeneity of the instrument, which
requires that the Driving T imei variable is not related to the outcome through
any means other than CTE completion. This is fundamentally untestable, but is
likely a reasonable assumption in this case for several reasons. The first is that the
measure of driving time is created in the sophomore year so that it predates the
typical student’s decision to engage in career and technical education. Secondly, the
location of CTE centers and technical high schools is not likely to be associated with
locations of community colleges or four-year universities in the State of Maryland.
Thirdly, there are fewer options for school choice in Maryland compared to other
states, where other schooling options like charter schools remain a very small part of
the market for secondary education, and existing private-school voucher programs
are small.
For the IV regressions, I use several versions of the instrument; both dis-
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cretized continuous. I use an indicator for whether a student is within 10 minutes,
15 minutes, and 20 minutes as the instrument, which corresponds to the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles of the driving time variable. I also use a continuous measure
of the driving time, log(time). In Table 4.5, I provide the correlation between the
continuous measure,log(time) and several other variables in which high correlations
would suggest that the exclusion restriction is questionable. I show the correlation
with the distance to the nearest 2-year and 4-year higher education institutions, the
HSA Algebra passing percentage of the student’s school, and the percent of students
who are FARMs eligible within the school. If driving time were significantly related
to distance to college, then distance to a CTE Center might also be related to the
cost of attending college, which is an outcome of interest. I look at the HSA Algebra
passing percentage in order to figure out whether the driving time is related to the
academic achievement of students, which could suggest that driving time would pre-
vent less prepared students from attending CTE Centers. Lastly, I look at FARMS
percentage to understand if the distance might be related to a family’s level of over-
all resources. Each of these correlations is fairly low, with correlations of 0.03, 0.11,
0.09, and -0.05, respectively. This does not prove the exclusion restriction true, but
provides some evidence that it may be reasonable.
In Section 4.3, I explain that the restrictions of the MLDS earnings data which
might lead some students to not be present in the data, with the potential that this
might lower for CTE students versus non-completers. I use two methods in order to
try to limit the bias of these estimates. The first is that I provide lower and upper
bounds on the estimated effects using the bounding procedure developed by Lee
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[2009]. This uses the difference in the probability of having an observation present.
In the case of CTE, CTE students are more likely to have positive observations
of earnings. Using 1 minus the probability of having earnings observations as a
percentile, the procedure trims the top of the CTE distribution of earnings prior
to the estimation. This provides a lower bound, with a procedure for producing an
upper bound in a similar fashion. I also estimate the earnings using the data from
2009-2010 where earnings have been imputed. I use a method from Rubin [2004]
where values are imputed from a model that includes test score and demographic
characteristics and generate 5 imputed data sets. I use Rubin [2004] to determine
the average estimate, overall variance, and confidence intervals over the 5 data sets.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Propensity Score Matching
In Table 4.6, I use the matched sample to estimate the effects of CTE on en-
rollment at each type of institution for four years following high school graduation.
The results in Table 4.6 show the coefficient on CTE of a linear regression of an
indicator for college enrollment on the CTE variable with additional controls using
the matched sample. Each column corresponds to enrollment in that type of school-
ing for x years after high school graduation. The common pattern that emerges is
that there seems to be a substitution towards 2-year enrollment from 4-year enroll-
ment. Columns (1) and (2) show a statistically significant (p < .01) 3.7 percentage
point increase in 2-year enrollment and a 4.7 percentage point decrease in 4-year en-
rollment with CTE completion, respectively. This corresponds to a 10.6% increase
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in the likelihood of 2-year enrollment and a 12.1% decrease in 4-year enrollment,
respectively. This pattern of statistically significant substitution continues through
year 4, with a 3.1, 2.5, and 2.1 percentage point increases in 2-year enrollment in
years 2, 3, and 4 after high school, respectively, and 5.2, 6.1, and 5.8 percentage
point
Table 4.7, shows that this pattern extends to the degrees earned by each
student within 6 academic years of high school graduation. Column (1) of Table 4.7
shows a student’s propensity to continue to be enrolled after 6 years. CTE students
appear to be no more likely, on average, to be enrolled six years after high school
graduation. In terms of degree receipt, the same substitution between the two-year
and four-year degrees appears to be present, when I compare the effect of CTE on
the rate of associate’s degree receipt and bachelor’s degree receipt in columns (2)
and (3). I find a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of an associate
degree and a 5.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of a bachelor’s degree,
with each being statistically significant at a p < .01 level. This amounts to a 23%
increase in the probability of attaining an associate degree and a 13.1% decrease in
the probability of a bachelor’s degree. CTE completion also has a positive effect on
certificate receipt, with a statistically significant (p < .01) effect of 0.9 percentage
points on the probability of receiving a certificate. Though small, this is a 30%
increase over the 0.03 probability of receiving a certificate. These results suggest
that CTE directs students towards associate degrees and certificates, substituting
away from bachelor’s degrees.
Turning to the effects of CTE on annual earnings, Table 4.8 shows the effect
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of CTE on the probability of observing earnings (Column (1)) and, for those with
positive earnings, the effect of completing a CTE program on earnings in year 6
after high school (Column (2)) and in the first year after education (Column (3)).
As the summary statistics would suggest, CTE completers are more likely to be
present in the earnings data. Completers are significantly (p < .01) 3.2 percentage
points more likely to have positive earnings, a 4.3% increase over the mean for non-
completers. Restricting to only those with positive earnings, CTE completers have
annual earnings $2,050 larger in the sixth year and $1,444 larger in the first year of
any employment, compared to non-completers, with each results significant at the
(p < .01) level. These represent increases of 9.1% and 8.7% above the non-completer
mean, respectively. Since the data is restricted to only those with positive earnings
in the sixth year, I report the Lee [2009] bounds in the bottom of the table. In each
case, the lower bound of the estimate, −$256 and −$795 for the sixth year and first
year of earnings, respectively, is negative, suggesting that I cannot rule out that the
higher likelihood of the CTE completers to be missing is responsible for the larger
estimates of earnings.
In Table 4.9, I show the same effects but for the sample in which multiple
imputation was used to generate earnings values for the missing observations. I find
similar sized estimates. CTE completion has a $1,905 and $1,300 effect on earnings
in year 6 and at first employment, respectively, each significant at the p < .01 level.
These effects correspond to an 8.5% and a 7.9% effect, respectively.
Table 4.10 shows the estimated effects on enrollment in 2-year and 4-year in-
stitutions in the first year after high school, using a separate PSM model for each
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CTE Career Cluster. Different clusters of programs appear to have heterogeneous
effects of CTE completion. Several Clusters show statistically significant evidence of
the substitution from 4-year to 2-year institutions, such as: “Environmental, Agri-
cultural, and Natural Resources”, “Health and Biosciences”, and “Transportation
Technologies”. Several are associated with decrease in the probability of attending
a 4-year institution, such as: “Career Research and Development”, “Construction
and Development”, and “Consumer Services, Hospitality, and Tourism”. Others are
associated mainly with a positive increase on 2-year enrollment, such as: “Business
Management and Finance”, “Human Resource Services”, and “Information Tech-
nology”. “Manufacturing, Engineering, and Technology” does not appear to have a
significant effect on attendance of any type the year after a student graduates high
school.
Table 4.11 provides the same PSM cluster by cluster analysis as Table 4.10,
but for enrollment in the sixth year, associate degrees, bachelor’s degrees, and cer-
tificates by six years after high school. The clusters that appear to shift students
from bachelor’s degrees to associate degrees are: “Business Management and Fi-
nance”, “Consumer Services, Hospitality and Tourism”, “Health and Biosciences”,
and “Transportation Technologies”. “Career Research and Development”, “Con-
struction and Development”, and “Environmental, Agricultural, and Natural Re-
sources” have a significant, negative effect on bachelor’s degree receipt. “Human
Resource Services”, “Information Technology”, and “Manufacturing, Engineering,
and Technology” increase the probability of attaining an associate degree. “Arts,
Media, and Communication” and “Health and Biosciences” significantly increase
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the likelihood of attaining a certificate.
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 examine the earnings effects by the program cluster.
Since the table is restricted to the 2009-2010 academic year, the sample sizes for
each PSM are fairly small, and the standard errors fairly large. Several have positive
earnings effects, but are measured too imprecisely. However, several clusters have
significant positive effects on earnings. “Business Management and Finance” has
positive effects of $2,321 and $2,853 on earnings after six years and earnings in the
first year of employment, respectively. These effects amount to 10.5% and 17.2%
effects, respectively. The Lee [2009] lower bounds (in brackets) are positive for each
outcome, suggesting that the effect may not entirely be due to a difference in students
who complete this cluster. “Human Resource Services” also has positive effects of
$2,064 and $1,604, respectively, with the Lee lower bound being positive for the
earnings after six years. “Career Research and Development”, “Construction and
Development”, and “Transportation Technologies” have positive effects on earnings
after 6 years of $2,933, $3,266, and $7,287, respectively. These clusters have smaller
and statistically insignificant effects on earnings at first employment. This pattern
could suggest that the way students who complete these clusters are better off six
years after graduation compared to non-completers might have a tenure component.
4.5.2 Instrumental Variables
To present the IV estimates, Tables 4.14 through 4.16 are designed in the
following way. Each of the four panels corresponds to a different version of the time
distance instrument, with A, B, C, D showing the results for the ≤ 11 minutes, ≤ 11
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minutes, ≤ 11 minutes, and log(time), respectively. The first column of the table
displays the first stage estimates of the effect of the instrument on the probability
of completing a CTE program. In each table, the following columns then show
the reduced form and IV effect on the enrollment, degree, and earnings outcomes.
In each Table, the continuous distance measure has opposite signed reduced-form
effects to the other measures, but in the text I will describe it using the opposite
sign to compare to the other measures.
In Table 4.14, it is possible to see that the driving time to a CTE Center has a
negative effect on completing a CTE program. Being within 11, 16, and 20 minutes
of a CTE Center increases CTE Completion by 5.1, 3.6, and 4.3 percentage points,
respectively. These correspond to a 39%, 27%, and 33% increase in the likelihood of
completing a CTE program, respectively. Panel D shows that a log-point increase
in driving time is associated with a 2.3 percentage point, or 17.8% decrease in the
probability of completing a program. The distance (in time) instruments, therefore,
appear to be highly relevant to the CTE completion decision.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.14 show the reduced-form and IV effects of
attending a 2-year institution immediately after high school, and Columns (4) and
(5) show the same effects for 4-year institutions. The estimates using the 11, 16 and
continuous instruments show that shorter distances have significant positive effects
on attending a two year institution, with reduced form effects of 1.5 (p < .05),
2.6 (p < .01), 0.5 (p < .05) percentage points, respectively. These correspond to
large positive effects of CTE completion in the IV estimation of 30, 72, and 22
percentage points, respectively. These are large estimates as, each each is either
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near or over 100% increases over the existing mean probability of attending 2-year
institutions. The 20 minute instrument is positive, but statistically insignificant.
Each instrument produces negative effects on attending a four-year institution. The
11, 26, 20, and log instruments produce reduced-form effects on four-year attendance
of -1.4 (p < .05), -2.1 (p < .01), -1.2 (p < .05), and -0.5 (p < .05) percentage points,
respectively. These correspond to large decreases in the IV models of 28, 57, 28,
and 22 percentage points, respectively, in response to completing a CTE program.
In Table 4.15, Columns (2) and (3) show the effects on associate degrees,
Columns (4) and (5) show the effect on bachelor’s degrees, and Columns (6) and
(7) show the effect on certificate receipt. Of the four versions of the instrument,
only the 16 minute instrument produces significant effects (p < .01) on associate
degree receipt, with a reduced form effect of 1.4 percentage points, and an IV effect
of 39 percentage points. Each version of the instrument produces a negative effect
on bachelors degree receipt. The 11 minute, 16 minute, 20 minute, and log(time)
produce reduced-form effects of -1.8, -2.2, -2.1, and -0.7 percentage point effects, with
each being signficant at the p < .01 level. These reduced form effects are associated
with large IV effects of 34.3, 60.4, 47.7, and 28.5 percentage points for the effect
of completing a CTE program on bachelor’s degree receipt. Each version of the
instrument also produces positive effects on the receipt of certificates. The reduced-
form effects for the 11 minute, 16 minute, 20 minute, and log(time) instruments
produce positive effects of 0.6, 1.3, 1.1, and 0.4 percentage point effects, respectively,
with each effect significant at the p < .01 level. The IV effects are quite large,
and given the small percent of students who complete certificates, 2.9%, these all
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represent very large increases of the dependent mean in the probability of completing
a certificate.
Finally, Table 4.16 shows the reduced-form and IV effects on earnings in the
sixth year (Columns (2) and (3)) and earnings in the first year of any employment
(Columns (4) and (5)). This table only uses data from the 2009-2010 year. Three
versions of the instrument produces positive effects on earnings six years later. The
11 minute, 16 minute, and continuous instrument produce significant reduced-form
effects of $1,148 (p < .05), $769 (p < .1), and $418 (p < .05), respectively. Each of
these corresponds to a very large effect on annual earnings, with each very nearly
a 100% increase over the existing dependent mean. These effects magnitudes seem
likely implausible large. There are smaller, but insignificant effects found on the
earnings in the first year of any employment, with the exception of the continuous
distance instrument, which has a positive effect of $315 (p < .05) on these earnings,
corresponding with an IV effect of $15,420.
The distance instruments produce local average treatment effects that are spe-
cific to the types of students who are induced to complete a CTE program by the
distance, including the types of CTE programs that students complete. This makes
the comparison versus the matching results difficult, because the group of “complier”
students do not produce an average treatment effect directly comparable to the av-
erage treatment effect of the matching. However, between the two sets of results,
there are patterns to suggest that the two sets of estimates have some consistency.
CTE Centers tend to offer programs in capital-intensive areas of education, such
as “Construction and Development”, “Health and Biosciences”, “Consumer Ser-
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vices, Hospitality, and Tourism”, “Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology”,
and “Transportation Technologies”. These are likely the types of programs the
instrument is inducing students to complete, and when looking at these programs
between the two types of estimation, there are many consistencies. “Health and Bio-
sciences” offers many nursing programs that can lead to certificates, and we see both
a substitution between 4-year and 2-year institutions and an increase in certificate
receipt in both sets of estimates, for example. “Construction and Development”,
“Consumer Services, Hospitality, and Tourism”, and “Transportation Technologies”
have large negative effects on 4-year degree completion in the matching estimates,
and the IV estimates produce large negative effects on bachelor’s degree completion.
While these results are not directly comparable, a consistent story between the two
estimation strategies could be told.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Directions
Using data on CTE completion from the Maryland Longitudinal Data System,
propensity score matching, and IV approaches, I find that CTE education is associ-
ated with a decrease in enrollment and degree completion at four-year institutions,
with substitution towards two-year institutions. This appears to have a positive
effect on a students early career earnings. These results are consistent with recent
research, such as that of Kreisman and Stange (2016), who find some substitution
between types of institutions and positive earnings effects, though do not the sub-
stitution extending to the types of degrees received. With the matching strategy,
it is reasonable to be concerned about bias due to selection on unobservables, with
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students possibly selecting to enroll in CTE programs based on private knowledge
about variables such their unobservable skills. Using the instrumental variables ap-
proach as a complement to the matching strategy, I find patterns similar to the
matching results, especially when considering the effects of the types of programs
that students will typically complete at a CTE Center.
There are several possible avenues for future research using data from the
MLDS on CTE completion. As additional years of earnings and enrollment data
are added to the system, even longer-term effects can be estimated using similar
approaches. Especially in the case of earnings, this would be useful to examine
the evolution of earnings to see whether CTE completers are eventually overtaken
by four-year degree completers, or whether the earnings effect of CTE completion
persists. In both the matching and IV estimates, I find some evidence that would
suggest that some of the earnings gains for CTE completers might be attributable
to tenure effects, which could possibly fade out over time as non-completer spend
more time in the workforce.
Additionally, given that the driving distance to a CTE center appears to be
a reasonably strong instrument, it is possible to use this approach to estimate the
effect of CTE on high school completion. This paper focuses on students who
graduate high school, as the available data can only determine CTE completion
among high school graduates, however, it is possible to use a reduced form approach
to estimate the effect on high school completion, where high school completion
would be regressed on the distance to a CTE center. This would provide a proper
counterfactual analysis for students who may only complete a CTE program where
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dropping out of high school might be a relevant outside option, and therefore could
address the types of students that are left out of the analysis in this paper.
4.7 Figures
Figure 4.1: Area of Common Support for the Propensity Score
Note: This figure shows the region of common support of the propensity scores of both
CTE completers and non-completers. A logistic regression was used to generate the




Variable No CTE CTE Only CTE and USM
% Male 46 59 47
% White 57 64 60
%Black 28 29 30
%Asian 8 2 4
% Hispanic 7 4 5
% FARMS 21 33 24
% with HSA Algebra 29 69 33
Avg. HSA Algebra 429 421 431
% with HSA English 96 96 98
Avg. HSA English 426 402 419
% with HSA Biology 80 94 86
Avg. HSA Biology 435 414 431
Four-year Distance 10 13 11
Two-year Distance 7 10 7
Weeks Absent 2 3 2
School- HSA Pass % 61 66 62
School- # CTE Programs 11 15 13
School- FARMS % 23 24 26
N 61,838 9,584 10,476
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by CTE Completion Type
Note: Table 4.1 displays demographic, test score, and school level demographic
characteristics for the students in the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 high school graduate
cohort in the MLDS data. The summary statistics are given by CTE and USM
completion status. Variables labeled “School-” are school level covariates.
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Variable No CTE CTE Only CTE and USM
% Initial 2-year Enrollment 28 27 37
% Initial 4-year Enrollment 48 7 36
% Associate’s degree earned 12 7 17
% Bachelor’s degree earned 47 6 36
% Without any Wages 31 36 35
Annual Wages 6 years later $22,055 $21,353 $24,371
Table 4.2: Raw Mean Outcomes by CTE Completion Type
Note: Table 4.2 displays raw mean outcomes for the students in the 2009-2010 and
2010-2011 high school graduate cohort in the MLDS data (earnings outcomes are
restricted to the 2009-2010 graduating cohort). The table describes initial enrollment by
institution, degree receipt within six years by type of degree, the percentage without any
earnings, and the average earnings among those with positive earnings. The summary
statistics are given by CTE and USM completion status.
Program (% Completing) CTE Only CTE and USM
Arts, Media, and Communication 3 6
Business, Management, and Finance 10 18
Career Research and Development 21 6
Construction and Development 14 8
Consumer Services, Hospitality, and Tourism 13 10
Environmental, Agricultural, and Natural Resources 4 3
Health and Biosciences 4 12
Human Resource Services 14 17
Information Technology 3 7
Manufacturing, Engineering, and Technology 3 8
Transportation Technologies 9 4
Table 4.3: Breakdown of CTE Program Completion: Program Clusters
Note: Table 4.3 shows the type of CTE program completed for the students in the
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 high school graduate cohort in the MLDS data who completed











% HSA Algebra 0.089 0.012
HSA Algebra 0.084 0.011
% HSA English 0.054 0.006
HSA English 0.035 0.001
% HSA Biology 0.083 0.010
HSA Biology 0.071 0.008
Special Ed. 0.014 0.007
Four-Year Dist. 0.170 0.022
Two-year Dist. 0.054 0.002
Weeks Absent 0.108 0.006
School-HSA Pass Pct 0.019 0.007
School- Number of CTE Programs 0.315 0.002
School-FARMS Pct 0.008
Chi-sq test of joint significance
Chi-sq 6, 694.030 52.034
df 48 48
p-value 0 0.320
Table 4.4: Standardized Mean Differences Before and After Matching
Note: Table 4.4 shows the standardized mean differences between CTE completers and
non-completers in the unmatched and matched data. Each value has a Cohen’s d
interpretation. At the bottom of the table, a Chi squared test of the total observable
difference between the CTE completers and non-completers is shown with the degrees of
freedom (df) and p-value of the test.
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Variable:
2-Year Dist. 4-Year Dist. HSA Pass Pct. FARMs Pct.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(time) 0.03 0.11 0.09 −0.05
Table 4.5: Correlations of Time Distance and Other Variables
Note: Table 4.5 shows the simple correlations between the log of the driving time


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Enrollment-6 years Associate’s Bachelor’s Certificate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CTE 0.003 0.035∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
Dep. mean 0.19 0.15 0.38 0.03
Observations 19,952 19,952 19,952 19,952
R2 0.023 0.050 0.207 0.021
Table 4.7: Degree Effects: CTE & USM
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.7 shows the results from a regression of the
outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity score
matched data. The outcomes are postsecondary enrollment after six years, and earnings
associate’s, bachelor’s, or certificates within six years after graduation. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. The sample for these regressions includes both the 2009-2010 and
2010-2011 high school graduate cohorts
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Dependent variable:
Has Earnings Earnings 6 years Earnings First Emp.
(1) (2) (3)
CTE 0.032∗∗∗ 2,050∗∗∗ 1,444∗∗∗
(0.009) (414) (359)
Lee Bound (-256,3315) (-795,2525)
Dep. Mean 0.74 22,255 16,501
Observations 9,656 7,110 7,110
Table 4.8: Earnings Effects: CTE & USM
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.8 shows the results from a regression of the
outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity score
matched data. The outcomes is an indicator for having any earnings, earnings six year
after graduation, and earnings at the time of first employment. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. The sample for these regressions includes just the 2009-2010 high school
graduate cohort and restricts the sample to those with positive earnings. Lee bounds are
provided according to the Lee [2009] method for each earning outcome.
Dependent variable:




[1011, 2798] [550, 2050]
Observations 9,656 9,656
R2 0.035 0.036
Table 4.9: Earnings Effects: Using Multiple Imputation
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.9 shows the results from a regression of the
outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity score
matched data with multiple imputation for the earnings outcomes. The outcomes are
earnings six year after graduation and earnings at the time of first employment. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. The sample for these regressions includes just the
2009-2010 high school graduate cohort is the result of a multiple impuation procedure






Arts, Media, and Communication 0.045∗ −0.028 1,252
(0.026) (0.024)
Business Management and Finance 0.029∗∗ 0.001 3,980
(0.015) (0.014)
Career Research and Development 0.044 −0.154∗∗∗ 1,204
(0.027) (0.022)
Construction and Development −0.032 −0.068∗∗∗ 1,564
(0.024) (0.021)
Consumer Services, Hospitality and Tourism 0.017 −0.100∗∗∗ 2,240
(0.020) (0.019)
Environmental, Agricultural and Natural Resources 0.086∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ 658
(0.038) (0.033)
Health and Biosciences 0.097∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ 2,498
(0.018) (0.018)
Human Resource Services 0.040∗∗ −0.010 3,604
(0.016) (0.014)
Information Technology 0.060∗∗∗ −0.006 1,510
(0.025) (0.024)
Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology 0.001 0.022 1,644
(0.022) (0.022)
Transportation Technologies 0.063∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ 872
(0.032) (0.028)
Dep. mean 0.35 0.39
Table 4.10: CTE Initial Enrollment Effects by Program Cluster
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.10 shows the results from a regression of the
enrollment outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity
score matched data. Each row of estimates corresponds to a seperate propensity-score
matching process where CTE completers of the specific CTE program were matched to
the pool of non-completers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample for these
regressions includes both the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 high school graduate cohorts.
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Dependent variable:
Enr. Assoc. Bach. Cert.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arts, Media, and Communication 0.036 0.022 −0.036 0.016∗
(0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.009)
Business Management and Finance −0.0002 0.020∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.006)
Career Research and Development −0.009 −0.012 −0.157∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
Construction and Development −0.058∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.098∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.009)
Consumer Services, Hospitality and Tourism −0.024 0.081∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.007)
Environmental, Agricultural and Natural Resources −0.046 0.048 −0.109∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.013)
Health and Biosciences 0.050∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.007)
Human Resource Services 0.006 0.028∗∗ 0.014 0.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006)
Information Technology 0.044∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ −0.025 0.017
(0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.010)
Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology 0.052∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.008 0.011
(0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008)
Transportation Technologies −0.060∗∗ 0.055∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.011)
Dep. mean 0.2 0.13 0.35 0.03
Table 4.11: CTE Degree Effects by Program Cluster: CTE & USM
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.11 shows the results from a regression of the
degree outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity score
matched data. Each row of estimates corresponds to a seperate propensity-score
matching process where CTE completers of the specific CTE program were matched to
the pool of non-completers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample for these
regressions includes both the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 high school graduate cohorts. For




Earn. 6 years Earn. First.
(1) (2)
Arts, Media, and Communication 788 −1,781
(1,806) (1,562)
[-1774, 2096] [-2830, -844]
Business Management and Finance 2,321∗∗∗ 2,853∗∗∗
(844) (744)
[695, 3385] [925, 3389]
Career Research and Development 2,933∗ 1,000
(1,499) (1,215)
[-950, 3789] [-1803, 1575]
Construction and Development 3,266∗∗ 519
(1,615) (1,428)
[1835, 4838] [-811, 1957]
Consumer Services, Hospitality and Tourism −1,286 −1,894∗
(1,537) (1,135)
[-3553, 176] [-3925, -666]
Environmental, Agricultural and Natural Res. −237 −2,532
(2,064) (1,778)
[-1321, 481] [-4196, -2962]
Table 4.12: CTE Earnings Effects by Program Cluster
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.12 shows the results from a regression of the
earnings outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity
score matched data. Each row of estimates corresponds to a seperate propensity-score
matching process where CTE completers of the specific CTE program were matched to
the pool of non-completers. Robust standard errors in parentheses and Lee [2009]




Earn. 6 years Earn. First.
(1) (2)
Health and Biosciences 543 862
(1,160) (1,040)
[-2831, 3263] [-2959, 2025]
Human Resource Services 2,064∗∗ 1,604∗∗
(871) (802)
[68, 3228] [-627, 2128]
Information Technology 1,388 2,025
(1,815) (1,589)
[-4531, 4149] [-4396, 3256]
Manufacturing, Engineering and Technology −693 276
(1,847) (1,675)
[-5471, 6055] [-6301, 4143]
Transportation Technologies 7,287∗∗∗ 1,635
(2,330) (1,785)
[-618, 10821] [-2190, 2499]
Table 4.13: CTE Earnings Effects by Program Cluster (Continued)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.13 shows the results from a regression of the
earnings outcome variable on an indicator for CTE completion, using the propensity
score matched data. Each row of estimates corresponds to a seperate propensity-score
matching process where CTE completers of the specific CTE program were matched to
the pool of non-completers. Robust standard errors in parentheses and Lee [2009]




Complete CTE 2-Year 4-Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Center ≤ 11 min.
Center ≤ 11 min 0.051∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Complete CTE 0.296∗∗ −0.280∗∗
(0.118) (0.121)
B. Center ≤ 16 min.
Center ≤ 16 min 0.036∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Complete CTE 0.724∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.159)
C. Center ≤ 20 min.
Center ≤ 20 min 0.043∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Complete CTE 0.118 −0.277∗∗
(0.134) (0.140)
D. Log of time
log(time) −0.023∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Complete CTE 0.222∗∗ −0.219∗∗
(0.100) (0.103)
Dep. Mean 0.129 0.284 0.284 0.513 0.513
Observations 29,885 29,885 29,885 29,885 29,885
Table 4.14: First Stage, Reduced Form, and IV Estimates on Enrollment One Year
Later
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.14 displays of the result of the IV
estimation on enroll by type of institution in the year after high school graduation. Each
panel corresponds to a different version of the time distance instrument. For each panel,
the first column is the reduced form effect on the probability of completing a CTE
program, Columns (2) and (3) are the reduced form and IV effects on 2-year enrollment,
and Columns (4) and (5) are the reduced form and IV effects on 4-year enrollment.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Complete CTE Earn. 6 Years Earn. First
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Center ≤ 11 min.
Center ≤ 11 min 0.050∗∗∗ 1,148∗∗ 614
(0.007) (450) (400)
Complete CTE 23,125∗∗ 12,361
(9,743) (8,268)
B. Center ≤ 16 min.
Center ≤ 16 min 0.043∗∗∗ 769∗ 482
(0.006) (399) (354)
Complete CTE 21,707∗ 13,610
(11,974) (10,319)
C. Center ≤ 20 min.
Center ≤ 20 min 0.037∗∗∗ 434 27
(0.006) (441) (392)
Complete CTE 12,790 790
(13,229) (11,545)
D. Log of time
log(time) −0.021∗∗∗ −418∗∗ −315∗∗
(0.003) (177) (157)
Complete CTE 20,434∗∗ 15,420∗
(9,138) (8,018)
Dep. Mean 0.129 $23,242 $23,242 $18,003 $18,003
Observations 14,720 8,962 8,962 8,962 8,962
Table 4.16: First Stage, Reduced Form, and IV Estimates on Enrollment One Year
Later
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Table 4.15 displays of the result of the IV
estimation on the earnings outcomes. Each panel corresponds to a different version of
the time distance instrument. For each panel, the first column is the reduced form effect
on the probability of completing a CTE program, Columns (2) and (3) are the reduced
form and IV effects on earnings six years after graduation, and Columns (4) and (5) are
the reduced form and IV effects on earnings in the first year of any employment. The
sample is restricted to those with positive earnings in year 6 after high school
graduation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Maria F. Prada and Sergio Urzúa. One size does not fit all: Multiple dimensions
of ability, college attendance, and earnings. Journal of Labor Economics, 35(4):
953–991, 2017.
Jesse Rothstein and Cecilia Elena Rouse. Constrained after college: Student loans
and early-career occupational choices. Journal of Public Economics, 95(12):149 –
163, 2011.
Donald B Rubin. Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys, volume 81. John
Wiley & Sons, 2004.
Neil S Seftor and Sarah E Turner. Back to school: Federal student aid policy and
adult college enrollment. Journal of Human resources, pages 336–352, 2002.
SD Seifer, K. Vranizan, and K. Grumbach. Graduate medical education and physi-
cian practice location: Implications for physician workforce policy. JAMA, 274
(9):685–691, 1995.
Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko. Contribution of Primary Care to
Health Systems and Health. The Milbank Quarterly, 83(3):457–502, 2005.
Ralph Stinebrickner and Todd Stinebrickner. Academic performance and college
dropout: Using longitudinal expectations data to estimate a learning model. Jour-
nal of Labor Economics, 32(3):601–644, 2014.
Charles M. Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424, 1956.
Lesley J Turner. The road to pell is paved with good intentions: The economic
incidence of federal student grant aid. College Park, MD: University of Maryland,
Department of Economics. Retrieved April, 15:2016, 2014.
U.S. Department of Education. National assessment of career and technical educa-
tion: Final report to congress. Technical report, 2014.
William B. Weeks and Amy E. Wallace. Rural-Urban Differences in Primary Care
Physicians’ Practice Patterns, Characteristics, and Incomes. Journal of Rural
Health, 24(2), 2008.
Byron Williams. Who does aid help? examining heterogeneity in the effect of
student aid on achievement. Working Paper, 2018.
Cristobal Young and Charles Varner. Millionaire Migration and State Taxation of
Top Incomes: Evidence From a Natural Experiment. National Tax Journal, 64
(2):255–83, 2011.
199
